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In addition to the offieial acts published in the Official 
Gazette of the European Communities, the activities of 
the European Communities are reported on in publications 
appearing at regular intervals. 
Thus, the Commission of the European Communities publi• 
shes a Monthly Bulletin on the activities of the Communi-
ties while the European Parliament issues a periodical 
Information Bulletin on its own activities. 
The Council of Ministers issues a press release after all 
its sessions. Its activities are also reported on in a spe-
cial section of the Bulletin of the European Communities. 
The Economic and Social Committee issues press releases 
at the close of its plenary sessions, and its overall activ-
ities are reported on in a Quarterly lnfonnation Bulletin. 
The Survey of European Documentation is in tended to serve 
as a supplement to the above publications. It deals w·th 
salient features of the process of European integradon 
taking place outside Community bodies. 
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Part I 
DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
At the National Level 
- 1 -

I. GOVERNMENTS AND PARLIAMENTS 
Australia 
Commonwealth reactions to the Luxembourg agreements 
In a press conference before his return to Australia, the Deputy 
Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Anthony, accused Britain of 'washing her 
hands' of all responsibility for the. repercussions facing his country as the 
result of any British entry to the Common Market. 
Like the Australian High Commissioner in London who said that 
the Commonwealth would become 'a hollow shell' if Britain persisted in going 
ahead at Brussels on the Rippon terms, Mr. Anthony takes a bitter and gloomy 
view of the future. 
He said that the social and economic upsets in Australia would be 
particularly hurtful to the farming community in his country, but that his rep-
resentations on this point had made 'no impression' on British Ministers. He 
added: 'I cannot see much hope for the Commonwealth if this is to be their 
approach. 
I want to be sure that "third countries" do not pay the price of Brit-
ish entry. And as far as I can see, Australia is being treated like any old 
"third country". ' 
The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Sir Keith Holyoake, told Par-
liament on 23 June he was confident that the Government could safeguard New 
Zealand's interests within the framework of the broad agreement reached bet-
ween Britain and the Six on a special arrangement for New Zealand's dairy 
products. 
'Moreover, we shall be on a unique footing in our future dealings 
with the enlarged Community. No other country will enjoy the same advan-
tages,' he said. 
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But the leader of the Opposition, Mr, Norman Kirk, said the ar-
rangement for New Zealand dairy exports on Britain's entry to the Common 
Market was 'neither satisfactory nor just.' 
Breaking the line on all party unity, Mr. Kirk said it might have 
been the best agreement that Britain could extract from the Six, but it was 
not the best agreement for New Zealand's needs and purposes.' 
(The Guardian, 17, 24 and 2 8 June 1971; 
The Times, 22, 24 and 28 June 1971) 
- 4 -
Austria 
Attitude of Mr, Kreisky, Austrian Federal Chancellor, and Mr, Staribacher, 
Minister for Trade, on EEC questions 
On 18 June 1971 Federal Chancellor Kreisky described the EEC 
proposal for the creation of a free trade area for the non-applicant EFTA 
countries as 'good and acceptable'. This proposal was in accord with the 
three-phase plan that Austria had been putting forward for a number of years. 
Addressing journalists in Vienna on 17 June, Mr, Staribacher, 
Minister for Trade, said that Moscow would not be officially opposed to an 
agreement between Austria and the EEC. He had had talks in Moscow with 
Mr, Kossygin, He thought that it was, of course, not expected that the Soviet 
Union would welcome a link between the EEC and Austria and critical com-
ments in the Soviet press were to be expected. But such a link was consistent 
with Austria's neutrality and its international economic obligations, particu-
larly regarding the Soviet Union, which would be respected, 
Speaking in Vienna on 23 June, Mr. Staribacher described the suc-
cessful conclusion of the EEC negotiations with the United Kingdom as a long-
awaited precondition for negotiations with the members of the smaller Euro-
pean Free Trade Area, So long as the United Kingdom's accession problems 
had been unresolved Austria and the other neutral States had no chance of any 
similar agreement, As he explained, the Austrian Government was in perma-
nent contact with Switzerland and Sweden regarding a rapprochement with the 
Common Market, 
(Neue ZUrcher Zeitung, 20, 21 and 26 June 1971; 
Die Welt, 24 June 1971) 
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Belgium 
1. Debate in the Senate on the Foreign Affairs budget 
The Senate examined the Foreign Affairs budget on 16-18 March. 
Discussions centred on European problems and more particularly on the poli-
tical and institutional problems of European integration and on Britain's mem-
bership of the Communities. 
(a) Political and institutional problems 
Mr. Van Bogaert (Belgian Socialist_ Party), rapporteur for the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, recalled thatthe Luxembourg Agreements of 1966 
had weakened the Community to the point of preventing full implementation of 
the EEC Treaty in 1969. In 1970 the Werner Plan was a 'substitute' for the 
objectives which had not yet been reached and an appendage to the existing 
customs union. The decisions taken on economic and monetary union may 
provoke fears that the Community might be dominated by technical organiza-
tions. 
In fact these fears are unjustified because: 
- the Ministers of Foreign Affairs remain responsible to their own parlia-
ments; 
- the Council is alone in taking decisions and does so solely on proposals of 
the Commission; 
- the European Parliament is consulted. 
The rapporteur pointed out that during the Committee meetings 
certain members had called for an increase in the supervisory powers of the 
European Parliament and even for direct election of its members who could 
thus exercise new powers. In the opinion of the rapporteur these wishes could 
not be implemented in the near future. 
Mr. Van Bogaert wondered whether the Treaty should not be re-
vised again to allow the economic and monetary union to be achieved. In his 
opinion this revision might weaken the supranational structure created by the 
Treaty of Rome which was essential for the success of European integration. 
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The poor results achieved by EFTA showed how likely this was. 
Mr. Ballet (People's Union) raised the question of rEWresentation 
of the parties in the European Parliament. He believed that even before the 
organization of elections by universal suffrage the small parties should be 
represented in the European Parliament, At present this representation gives 
a mistaken idea of currents of thought in Europe. 
Mr. Thiry (Walloon Party) drew the Senate's attention to regional 
problems. In his opinion 'at European or regional level the creation of a Com-
munity without adequate means of action is a waste of time, i, e. the time re-
quired for a futile experiment to confirm what everyone knew in advance, 
namely that without the means of action there can be no action. ' 
Mr. Harm el, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, commented first on 
the decision to establish the economic and monetary union progressively. 'As 
yet this is only a political commitment - nevertheless it is a firm and solemn 
commitment. This political decision already means that we have embarked 
upon a process of continuous development which will progressively lead us to 
economic and monetary unity by the end of this decade. The original aspect 
of this decision is, we believe, that it has succeeded in overcoming the funda-
mental differences of opinion between monetarists and economists. We be-
lieve that the impetus given in the first three years should be sufficiently clear 
for the process to be irreversible when the vital step comes to be taken on 1 
January 1974. The Governments of the Community which will in the meantime 
have been enlarged, i.e. in all probability the Governments of the Ten, will 
then have to draw up a balance sheet of their economic and monetary achieve-
ments in the three first years and draw the relevant conclusions, Then too 
the Community must be given the powers it needs to achieve its aim. ' 
Mr. Harm el noted that Europe was now taking shape and that the 
institutional problem was becoming increasingly important. 'This is a triple 
problem: 
l, What powers should be transferred from the States to the Community in-
stitutions? 
2, Will the nation States have a say in management of the powers transferred 
in this way? 
3. How will authority be shared between the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil of Ministers and the European Commission? 
These three questions require careful thought. 
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There is no simple answer to the problem of the transfer of powers. 
The process is bound to be both complex and progressive. Complex, because 
each transfer raises the three questions we have just noted and progressive 
because the Communities have acquired the habit of proceeding in stages. 
However, I believe that we already have some experience to draw 
on and can start to lay down specific rules. 
In the first place it is quite certain that at the end of the process of 
unification each State will continue to manage on its own all that can best be 
dealt with at its own level; matters of language and culture as well as local, 
regional and many other powers will always remain the responsibility of the 
States. The latter will become increasingly important because regional in-
terests will be emphasized; a united Europe will not turn its back on its 
diversity. On the contrary, the diversity will become increasingly apparent 
as the Community is enlarged. 
Secondly the nation States will be all the- more willing to accept 
limitations on their sovereignty if two precautions are taken: first, there 
must be a gradual rather than sudden transfer of powers to the Community as 
a function of specific objectives determined in advance; secondly when powers 
are transferred to the Community, the Member States must retain their in-
fluence through the Council. And then there is a third idea which guides us in 
all our efforts to obtain the transfer of powers to the Community: it will be 
easier to grant fuller powers to the European Parliament and Council of Min-
isters if representatives of the Member States are involved in the process of 
decision-making. For example, there will be far greater inclination to in-
crease the powers of the Council of Ministers if, as the Head of the French 
State has proposed, it remains made up of Ministers who continue to belong 
to their national Governments. 
Similarly the Parliament may well be given wider powers if its 
Members are appointed partly by direct suffrage and partly by representation 
of the States, or if it consists of two Chambers, one of the States and the 
other of the people. This is a problem which remains to be solved but at all 
events it seems likely that fuller powers and authority will be transferred 
to the Community if Member States remain directly involved in the process 
of European unification.' 
Mr. Leynen (Christian People's Party) stated that the theory put 
forward by Mr. Hallstein, the former President of the EEC Commission, had 
proved incorrect: the Community had no inherent dynamism. Its machinery 
needed oiling from time to time. 
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At present the Council is too often concerned with minor problems 
and disregards the major options. Under the presidency of Mr. Malfatti, the 
Commission of the Communities had become a technical consultative body with 
no real executive powers. The European Parliament distribut~ resolutions 
which are immediately shelved and forgotten. 
He put forward a few suggestions which might enable short-term 
material concerns to be overcome and a European spirit fostered among the 
citizens. Majority voting in the Council must be introduced for all 'operation-
al' issues as opposed to matters affecting Member States' vital interests. 
Members of the European Parliament must be elected by direct suffrage, if 
necessary through concerted action between the Benelux partners. Residents 
who are nationals of other Member States should be allowed to vote in region-
al elections. 
(b) The United Kingdom's accession 
Mr. Strivay (Party for Liberty and Progress) outlined the ultimate 
political and economic objectives of the enlarged Community: 'The political 
strengthening of Europe's position in the world; the consolidation of democra-
tic institutions through the accession of countries with a long-standing tradi-
tion of freedom; the pursuit of general economic growth of the Common Mar-
ket countries through an intensification of trade in an enlarged free trade 
area; the creation of a powerful technological Community in particular as a 
result of the British contribution which would allow Europe to enjoy genuine 
independence from the United States; better political and economic equilib-
rium within a Community in which Great Britain would help to counterbalance 
the power of Germany. 
Less striking but nevertheless important objectives include the 
world organization of agricultural markets which could be facilitated by the 
mere fact that Great Britain would no longer have any interest in preventing it. 
It should also be added that the Treaty of Rome will remain the fun-
damental charter of the Community; its political, institutional and economic 
objectives must be resolutely pursued and the achievements of twelve years' 
work within the Common Market safeguarded. The new members must com-
mit themselves to this principle.' 
Mr. Strivay felt that these ultimate objectives might seem very am-
bitious by comparison with the achievements of the Common Market. The 
various common policies had not advanced very much: the programme of 
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qualitative growth had hardly got under way whereas quantitative growth -
development of trade, higher productivity, better division of labour - had 
continued at a higher rate than in other industrialized countries. Even in the 
agricultural sphere where the Council's decisions had been inspired by gener-
al economic and social considerations, results had not matched earlier hopes. 
In this sphere too qualitative objectives must take precedence over concerns 
of productivity. 
Mr. Harm el summarized progress in the negotiations with the 
United Kingdom: 
'At a time when negotiations are reaching the most sensitive area, 
i.e. the question of finance, and we are encountering certain internal difficul-
ties in the Community and to an even greater extent difficulties between the 
Community and the applicant countries, I believe it is worth stating vigorously 
that the direction we have taken is irreversible. We must not be discouraged 
by a negotiating procedure which, by the very nature of the complicated mat-
ters involved, sometimes leads to slowness which we should have preferred 
to avoid. But if we examine this matter seriously and calmly we find that the 
slowness is more apparent than real. 
First of all it has been agreed on both sides that the political objec-
tives and law deriving from the Treaty of Rome establish common ground bet-
ween the applicant countries and the Community; secondly Great Britain has 
accepted our agricultural market organizations and signified its agreement to 
the principle of the Community's own resources. Finally agreement has been 
reached on the organization of a transitional period which must enable the 
applicant States to make the transfer from the status of a non-member State 
to that of a Member of the Community. In other words, the only question we 
still have to resolve is that of knowing how the four applicant States will make 
the transition from the status of non-member States to that of full members 
within a period which has already been fixed as a minimum of five years, pos-
sibly with an extension of two or three years.' 
Mr. Harmel referred to certain difficulties encountered during the 
last Council meeting. 'There are three problems on which we stumbled a 
little yesterday evening and during the night and on which I must confess we 
have not been able to make proposals to Great Britain. These three problems 
are all technical and have considerable financial implications both for Great 
Britain and for the Community; the transitional arrangements for agricultural 
financing, the exceptions to be allowed for sugar from the Commonwealth 
countries and for New Zealand dairy products. 
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The Minister expressed his hope that the first part of the negotia-
tions could be completed before the Easter recess and the second part in 
which texts could be drafted would be brought to a conclusion in the second 
half of 1971. 
(S~nat, Annales parlementaires 1971, Nos 38, 39 and 41) 
2, Examination of the foreign affairs budget in the Chamber of Representa-
tives 
The Chamber of Representatives examined the foreign affairs bud-
get for 1971 during its sittings on 21, 22 April and 4 May. Several questions 
on European integration were discussed. 
(a) Where is Europe heading? 
Mr. Coppieters (People's Union) and most of the other speakers 
wanted a programme to be drawn up for Europe. 'What progress have we 
made already? What will happen to the Benelux union? Will it be strength-
ened or is it to disappear? What will be the structure of a centralized Europe? 
The normal answer would be regionalization but what stage has been reached 
with reforms? What do we mean by European federalism? Do we want a 
European Parliament with real powers? What is Britain's role?' 
(b) Political union and pragmatism. _ The supranational and regional theories 
Mr. De Wulf (Christian People's Party), the rapporteur, discussed 
the political union. In his opinion pragmatism was only one method and must 
not be taken as an excuse for an unimaginative policy. 'Pragmatism must 
encourage us to seize every opportunity which will enable the process of Euro-
pean unification to move ahead. In the opinion of the Council (of the Commu-
nities) a political union will result from monetary integration. 
Political cooperation should in fact be the natural consequence of 
cooperation in other areas. The political union does not hinge on foreign and 
defence policy; it is above all important for the European Community to de-
velop a policy and structure which correspond to its economic power. The 
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creation of common institutions and a European Government must also be en-
visaged as a function of political options. In this respect the dispute over 
supranationality seems less important and we are perhaps moving towards 
the creation of new Community institutions of an original kind. . . The Com -
mission will shortly have to redefine its ideas on the European institutions. 
The Davignon Committee will also have to formulate new points of view. I 
hope that from now on rapid progress will be made towards integration. ' 
Mr. Pierre Bertrand (Walloon Party) referred to a Europe of 
regions: 'We are in complete agreement with all measures tending to streng-
then the unity and cohesion of Europe. But we do not like the idea of a Europe 
based on a mere juxtaposition of Member States. Even if practical action is 
impossible at present we must still think in more imaginative terms. Fron-
tiers are the scars left by history which do not generally correspond to popu-
lar will. They do not create an ideal internal structure for Europe. The 
Europe of tomorrow must be built on regions rather than on States. The 
region seems certain to become the basic building-block in the European 
structure; this regional reality is as striking in Britain as it is in our own 
country, where the task of organizing the regions has still to be faced. ' 
Mr. Evrard Raskin (People's Union) defended the supranational 
theory: 'Foreign policy is egocentric in the sense that it is focussed entirely 
on the State and on the defence of national interests. The policy of European 
integration is also warped by national ideas. Supranational structures are 
only accepted as a last resort. The existence of sovereign States seems to 
be taken for granted as the natural order of things. 
We should also do more on federalist lines to reduce national sov-
ereignty because excessively one-sided or centralized measures would be both 
ineffectual and undemocratic. ' 
Mr. Van Elslande (Christian People's Party) stated that the Euro-
pean Communities were anything but democratic. 'The rule which requires 
unanimous decisions by the Council of Ministers has resulted in handing over 
complete power to an intergovernmental body. I am firmly convinced that the 
lack of genuine supranational organizations has furthered the cause of State 
nationalism. The economic success of the Common Market has merely rein-
forced the power of nation States. There is a risk that the EEC may move 
back towards nationalism because of the lack of political structures. 
Will the monetary union be a solution?... I believe that we must 
not place too much confidence in monetary unification. In my opinion we must 
make immediate moves towards the political unification of Europe. Political 
- 12 -
unification is always the main problem. ' 
He did not think that the existing form of political co,aperation was 
effective: 'After the Hague conference in 196 9, one diplomat rightly stated 
that instead of moving towards a political community we had created the basis 
for a free trade area. No doubt it was not possible to obtain anything more 
at that time but let us not now pretend that we made substantial progress at 
The Hague. And what does President Pompidou mean when he talks about a 
"confederation". We have made no progress whatever towards political uni-
fication. Could we not achieve integration between less than six countries if 
all the Member States were not willing to move forward at the same rate? 
Four years ago I spoke to you about the prospects which the Benelux union 
held out to us. I fully understand that some people react negatively to the 
idea of a political Benelux union ... 
The West European countries must complete their integration if 
they are to play a role in the world; similarly the Benelux countries must 
integrate if they are to play a role in Europe. ' 
Mr. De Croo (Party for Liberty and Progress) put forward a plan 
for the division of powers at international, national and regional levels. 'Our 
country belongs to international organizations. There are innumerable 
spheres in which our national Government can no longer take decisions on its 
own. At the same time it is granting powers to the regions. The Government 
is thus becoming a kind of link-pin which takes part in international delibera-
tions and coordinates the activities of the regions.' 
Mr. Harm el, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, spoke in favour of a 
nragmatic approach to European unification. In his opinion political unifica-
-- moved forward with each step towards achievement of the current objec-
tives. 'I hope,' he added, 'that in 1972 the Ministers will be able to take 
•ock and answer pertinent questions on future progress towards European 
.;nification. ' 
Referring to a Europe of regions, Mr. Harmel felt that 'the cultural 
powers of the regions will not lend themselves to internationalization. But if 
the regions have economic or infrastructural powers as do the Lander in Fed-
-.ral Germany, they will be given a say in decisions through appropriate insti-
1tions which Europe must create. I do not know what these powers will be, l •ut they will have to be defined.' 
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(c) Information available to the Belgian Parliament on European problems 
Mr. De Croo complained that foreign policy remained one of the 
least democratic sectors. 'What methods of supervision are in fact available 
to Parliament? It appoints representatives to international institutions but 
only through a permanent delegation to the Royal cabinet. In addition, Parlia-
ment may give directives to its representatives in particular to those who are 
members of the European Parliament. 
Parliament has no influence on Belgian representation in interna-
tional institutions or on information which the Foreign Minister chooses to 
supply. By this I mean that we are very badly informed. . . Parliament should 
have a greater influence on Belgian parliamentarians who belong to the Bene-
lux interparliamentary Council and to the European Assemblies. What means 
of supervision does Parliament have? What do we know about the cost of our 
European and foreign policy? We have no information on this subject ... 
For generations, Article 68 of the Constitution has been the corner-
stone of a policy which has prevented Parliament from performing a proper 
controlling function. 
In concluding this part of my statement, I would emphasize that we 
must create a special committee in the Chamber to provide information on 
foreign policy. Could we not repeat the experiment of creating a ministry of 
European affairs? Could we not publish as an annex to the budget the exact 
cost of our foreign policy?... In 1957 the Belgian Parliament passed a bill 
ratifying the European Treaties. In Article 2 of that bill, it obliged the Gov-
ernment to provide information. So far the Minister has failed to apply this 
law. For four years the Government has not observed this legal provision.' 
Mr. Harmel made the following statement on this subject: 'Several 
speakers have referred to the need to involve the national parliament and 
European Parliament in the decision-making process in European institutions. 
Between the decisions and their implementation it would be possible to convene 
committees responsible for providing information. This would entail conven-
ing some 10 committee meetings. I agree to some extent with this suggested 
procedure. In discussing the general budget of ways and means, there will 
then be a chapter on the Community budget. I can inform Mr. Van Elslande 
that the proceedings of the European institutions will in future be brought to 
the notice of Parliament. ' 
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(d) Towards a democratic Europe 
Mr. Van der Elst (People's Union) referred to the powers of the 
European Parliament, He believed that the powers and rights of the European 
Parliament were the main problem rather than the direct election of its mem-
bers. The lack of a democratic structure in the Communities was arousing 
mistrust on the part of the applicant States and in particular the Scandinavian 
countries. It was dangerous to grant wider financial and economic powers to 
the Community without streqi;thening the provisions for parliamentary super-
vision. 
Mr. de Keersmaeker (Christian People's Party) considered the 
institutional problems arising from the development of the European Commu -
nities. 'The Council is assuming an increasingly important role. The pres-
ent situation is not in accordance with the provisions of the ECSC and EEC 
Treaties. The EEC Treaty only gives the Council a coordinating function. 
The Commission was to be the driving force responsible for preparing Com-
munity regulations. 
The Council and Commission must cooperate closely. However, 
since the Luxembourg Agreement of 28 and 29 January 1966, the right of the 
Commission to take initiatives has been restricted. The Committee of Per-
manent Representatives is playing an increasingly important role. As a re-
sult institutional equilibrium has been destroyed for the benefit of national 
interests. There is therefore an increasing tendency for the Council to dis-
regard Commission proposals and entrust the Committee of Permanent Rep-
esentatives with the formulation of new proposals. 
In doing so the Council is of course far exceeding its right to intro-
ce amendments. It is worth recalling in this connection the well-known case 
which the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Permanent Represen-
tives overstepped their powers; a Court of Justice ruling stipulated that the 
Council of Ministers could only act in compliance with provisions laid down in 
Community agreements and must refrain from taking decisions of a national 
nature. Some ministers of foreign affairs are still confusing national and 
Community interests to the detriment of the Community. 
Mr. Nothomb again raised a plan of which he is a fervent supporter. 
namely the direct election of members of the European Parliament. 'Pending 
a solution of this problem by our neighbours we are at liberty to organize 
elections for our own representatives to the European Parliament. 
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I was astonished to hear Mr. Van der Elst say that direct elections 
were unimportant. I believe on the contrary that they are very important. I 
also believe that if we had a genuine European spirit we should not be afraid 
of progress towards integration. We can still do a great deal towards estab 
lishing a balance between the various powers before these fall under the dom 
nation of Europe. 
My reason for returning at this stage to the problem of direct elec-
tions is that a tripartite proposal has been unanimously accepted by the Com-
mittee on European Affairs. Unfortunately the Committee for Internal Af-
fairs which is responsible for electoral matters has treated it with less urgen-
cy. It was included on the Committee's agenda this morning but was not even 
reached. The Chamber should be able to take a unanimous decision and affirm 
through a motion for a resolution its own will to see the project for direct el-
ections brought to a successful conclusion. ' 
Mr. De Croo also referred to the problem of the appointment of 
members of the European Parliament by direct suffrage. He wondered why 
the Government was taking no action, even though there was general agree-
ment on the subject in the Chamber. 
Mr. Harmel said: 'It has been asked whether a country like ours 
does not run the risk of losing all its influence in the institutions of an en-
larged Community... We are certainly not underrepresented in the European 
Parliament. In addition small States have the same right of veto as large ones 
in the Council. If changes are made fois power would have to be maintained <~ 
one form or another. One could for example imagine a two-chamber systP= 
with a Chamber of the People and a Chamber of the States or a single Asst 
bly partially elected by universal suffrage and partially by some other me1 
which remains to be defined. ' 
Referring to the appointment of the delegation from the Belgian Pa. 
liament on lists which would be voted on by universal suffrage, tHe Minister 
replied that it was up to the Belgian Parliament to take a decision guiding the 
Government on this problem. 
(Chamber of Representatives, Compte rendu analytique, 21, 22 April and 
4 May 1971) 
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3. Election of members of the European Parliament by direct universal suf-
frage - motion for a resolution 
. On 4 May 1971 the Bureau of the Chamber of Representatives autho-
-t-ized the printing of a motion for a resolution on the election of members of 
the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. This resolution is the 
outcome of various proposals which have already been laid before the Belgian 
Parliament 1. 
Extracts from the explanatory statement are printed below: 'A bill 
signed by Mr. Nothomb, Mr. Chabert, Mr. Van Lent, Mr. Baudson, Mr. De 
Croo and Mr. Van Offelen, was tabled on 14 May 1970; it was unanimously 
approved by the Committee on European Affairs but is awaiting consideration 
by the Committee on Internal Affairs. 
Similar initiatives have already been taken in neighbouring countries 
and will come into force in 1972. 
These are all positive and complementary measures; that is why it 
would be desirable for the Chamber to reach a decision, when the Foreign 
Affairs budget for 1971 comes up for discussion, on the principle of the direct 
election of representatives from the future Belgian Parliament appointed after 
the next legislative elections. 
It would be generally welcomed if our country were among the first 
· nake this important political gesture in favour of a more democratic Eur-
~~ ' 
t. 
du 
The text of the motion for a resolution is as follows: 'Sole Article. 
, The Chamber favours democratization of the European institutions, in parti-
e,'IJ.lar by the election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. 
Without awaiting the outcome of negotiations between the European 
Governments on this subject, it expresses its desire for direct universal elec-
tions to be organized in order to appoint Belgian representatives to the Euro-
, .• Jean Parliament from among the members of the Belgian Parli~ment, in 
accordance with Article 138 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community. 
1 See European Documentation No. 2/70, p. 35. 
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If possible the elections should be organized in the months immedi-
ately following the next legislative elections. The Chamber calls upon the 
Government to take appropriate measures. 27 April 1971 - Nothomb (PSC), 
Chabert (CVP), Larock (PSB), Meyers (CNP), Van Offelen (PLP). 1 
(Chambre des Repr1\sentants, Doc. No. 969, 1970-71, No. 1) 
4, Question in the Chamber of Representatives on the seat of the European 
Communities 
On 11 May 1971 Mr. Gillet (PLP) put a question to the Prime Minis -
ter about the 'Government's attitude to the manoeuvres of certain French in-
terests to have the seat of the European Communities transferred away from 
Belgium, ' The speaker alluded to ideas expressed by Mr. Lavenir, a former 
official of the European Communities, according to whom enlargement of the 
Community by the entry of Britain, Norway, Ireland and Denmark may modify 
the economic, political and linguistic equilibrium of Europe in favour of the 
northern countries and to the detriment of France and Italy. To avoid that 
situation it would be essential to establish the political and administrative 
capital of Europe in the Paris area. A site had been chosen: Montesson in 
the Yvelines, where a new town would be built which would enjoy international 
status. 
This proposal was taken up again by Mr. Bernard Lefort in the 
newspaper 'Paris-Jour'; he wrote: 'Our partners (the partners of France) 
are saying this and none of them has proposed the name of any other town. 
The Germans know that Bonn cannot become the capital of Europe, the Ital-
ians would clearly be in favour of Paris, and the Dutch are not thinking for ,,. .. 
a moment of proposing The Hague. Finally, the British would be very mucli. 
in favour of a French city because they believe that their acceptance might 
help to confirm their full commitment to the European Community. 
The French Government will not, however, take any initiative. It J 
is waiting for the matter to be raised by its present or future partners. In the 
next few months they should make their intentions known to the Elys1\e. If . 
they are favourable, Montesson would have a strong chance of becoming the ' 
capital of a united Europe. ' 
Concluding his question, Mr. Gillet asked the Government to brea.1' 
its silence and state its position. 
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~ Mr. Larock (PSB) recalled the discussions of 6 and 7 January 1958 ·oncerning the seat of the Communities: 1, The following argument seemed to carry the greatest weight: it 
would not be desirable for the capital of Europe to be situated in a large coun-
try as this might be interpreted as a symbol of its predominant position, 
2. It seemed undesirable to stress that on this matter each country 
has the right to oppose a decision which it felt to be unjustified, in other words 
the right of veto. Of course we have this right but it seems more relevant for 
us to emphasize what has already been done as well as our firm desire to im-
prove the present arrangements. 
3, Finally, successive Belgian Governments in the past 13 years have 
accepted fairly heavy material costs, not out of a desire for prestige but in 
order to make their best contribution to progress and success of the common 
task, and it would surely be ill-advised to add another dispute to the Commu-
nity's present troubles. ' 
Mr. Scheyven (PSB), the Minister for Cooperation and Development, 
replied as follows : 
'1. The Government is closely following the campaign now being con-
~ucted by certain European journals on the subject of a possible transfer of 
~ seat of the European Communities. I can give an assurance that the Gov-
ment has no information suggesting that the role of Brussels may be called 
· question. 
After agreeing to the establishment of the European Communities in 
ssels, the Government has done all in its power to give the best possible 
··come to these institutions. It goes without saying that the Government is 
,y conscious of its responsibilities in this sphere. 
The Government has also recently offered its partners a site for 
the future building of the Council of Ministers. Our partners unanimously 
welcomed this initiative. 
3, Finally, it should be added that the Treaties of Paris and Rome 
.. pecify that decisions concerning the seat of the Community institutions re-
quire a unanimous vote by the governments of the Member States. ' 
ICompte-rendu analytique, 11 May 1971) 
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5, The use of French in the European Community 
On 2S J=e 1971 Mr. Bfillet (Union of the Flemish People) called onJ 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of French Culture to answer a question .. 
on 'certain statements made by the President of the French Republic concern-
ing the use of French within the European Community, on the attitude that 
Belgium will adopt in this matter and on the fact that the Niamey Convention 
of 20 March 1970 sets out with the assumption that Belgium is a purely French 
speaking country." Mr, Ballet stated: 'Europe cannot be built on the hege-
mony of a single language. A federal Europe must guarantee each ethnic 
group its own cultural essence. In the present European Community the lan-
guages of the six Member States are officially recognized, The political situ-
ation in 1958 enabled the French language to become predominant as a working 
language of the Community. Belgium must see to it that the four official lan-
guages now recognized remain recognized in the enlarged Community.' 
The speaker stressed the political character of the movement in 
favour of French-speaking people. 
Mr, Harm el, Foreign Minister, replied: 'The rules adopted by 
the Council of Ministers of the European Community lay down, in the first 
article, that the official languages and the working languages of the institutions 
of the Community are Dutch, French, German and Italian, 
A problem is obviously going to arise when the Community wel-
comes the United Kingdom, Norway and Denmark, All the documents of the 
Communities are drawn up in each of the four languages referred to and the 
possibility is open to all the members attending meetings of expressing them-
selves in their own language, The Belgian Government thinks that these lan-
guages will continue to be treated officially in the same way in the enlarged 
Community. The information I have at the moment does not show that the 
French Government envisages calling into question the official status regard-
ing the use of languages in the Community. 1 
(Sl\nat, compte rendu analytique, 24 June 1971) 
- 20 -
G. lncompatability of the Economic Expansion Act with the Treaty of Rome 
In the Senate on 24 June Mr. Ansiaux (Party for Liberty and Pro-
gress) addressed a question to the Government on I t he attitude it intends to 
adopt following the opinion published by the Commission of the Communities 
on 6 April 1971 on the inconsistency of the Economic Expansion Act with the 
Treaty of Rome. 1 He thought the idea underlying this act differed from 'that 
underlying the Treaty of Rome, because the authors of the act wanted to pro-
mote economic expansion in the country as a whole, within the framework of 
a national plan; the need for assistance arose because it was impossible for 
a new enterprise to raise any large amount of capital through the established 
procedure of going to the public to bid for people's savings... By bearing 
some proportion of the costs of the loan the State would in a way be returning 
the product of the tax on companies and dividends in the form of assistance 
of which foreign enterprises would be major beneficiaries. 
The Treaty of Rome approached things from a completely different 
angle, its operative principle being to establish a single market where compe-
tition could have free rein. Hence the ban on subsidies which could indirectly 
re-establish barriers between Member States and upset competition. ' 
Mr. Claes (Union of the Flemish People) felt that Belgian legisla-
tors had been rather ingenious in getting around the provisions of the Treaty 
of Rome where the main criterion for granting regional assistance was the 
lack of jobs rather than the standard of living. He called upon the Government 
to apply European decisions fairly. 
Mr. Cools, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Economic Af-
fairs, recalled that the Official Gazette of the European Communities had pub-
lished a Commission statement on 6 April 1971 to the effect that it had begun 
to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty with 
regard to the Belgian Economic Expansion Act. The Minister added: 'The 
Commission considers that the application of the Act of 30 December 1970, 
on the basis of the Royal Decree of 6 January 1971 giving effect to it, is in-
compatible with the Common Market. It has formally ordered the interested 
parties, apart from the Member States, to present their comments within 
four weeks of the publication of the opinion. 
Under the terms of Article 93, to which the Commission is refer-
ring, the Belgian Government is faced with the following alternatives. It can 
either submit its comments within the framework of the standing consultations 
instituted by Article 93(1), in which case the Belgian State would have to com-
ply with the decision of the Commission, if necessary by rescinding or modi-
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fying the provisions under dispute. Or it could put a request to the EEC 
Council of Ministers to get it to decide that the assistance should be consid-
ered compatible with the Common Market. In this instance I would stress 
that the Government will opt for the former of these two solutions .•• ' 
'It should not be forgotten that the Royal Decree of 6 January 1971 
was provisional in character. The Government is not losing sight of its obli-
gations to promote economic expansion and to find solutions to regional prob-
lems: a Royal Decree is being drawn up to forstall the effects of the proce-
dure initiated. It will be submitted to the Community authorities.' 
(S~nat, compte rendu analytique, 24 June 1971) 
7. The Middle-East crisis 
On 30 June Mr. Simonnet (Belgian Socialist Party) addressed a 
question to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 'the recent decisions of the 
Council of Ministers of the Six concerning the Middle-East crisis.' 
He said: 'The position of the Six is that Europe has the right to as-
sert itself as a Mediterranean power. This is perfectly reasonable. If we 
look into the recommendation of the Six it may be asked whether it is ultimate-
ly detrimental to the cause of peace. I wonder if the six EEC Ministers have 
not deviated somewhat from their objective by stating their positions in such 
a way as to make the negotiations difficult. 
While I agree it is a good idea fpr the Six to adopt a common stand, 
I would ask you: (1) If the initiative taken really serves the interests of 
peace? (2) If it is plausible that Israel will agree to withdraw from all the 
occupied territories, including those that were formerly part of Jordan? (3) 
Lastly do you think that Europe can usefully contribute to a dialogue between 
Israel and the Arab States in such a way as to lead them to conclude peace?' 
As far as Mr. De Vlies (Catholic People's Party) was concerned, 
they had gone too far in meeting the wishes of France, which wished to inter-
vene politically in Mediterranean affairs. He could not accept a Europe in 
which one of the four great powers imposed its will and where France played 
the part of spokesman for the EEC. The working document of the Council dis-
played an unyielding attitude to Israel. 
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j 
Mr, Harmel, Minister for Foreign Affairs, explained the position 
that the Belgian Government had adopted during the discussions which had led 
the Six to harmonize their approach to the Middle East. He stated the three 
principles underlying the Belgian attitude: 
'1. It is no longer acceptable for Western Europe not to be involved in the 
search for a solution to the conflict in the Middle East. It is already regret-
table that it was unable to intervene effectively to prevent the events that took 
place in 1967. It would be equally regrettable for Europe not to participate in 
the efforts to reach a peaceful settlement now being made, It is consistent 
with the interests of Europe and the interests of the States in this region for 
the European countries to take part diplomatically in the efforts to secure a 
peace settlement, The impressions that I gained in my recent trip confirmed 
this, 
2. The basis for peace can only be the implementation of the Security Coun-
cil's resolution of 22 November 1967, which we described at the time as mira-
culous. This resolution provides for a whole range of interlocking measures. 
It also provided a method for working out a solution with the interested par-
ties, i. e, recourse to the good offices of the special representative of the 
Secretary-General, Mr. Jarring,.. On the other hand we feel it is essential 
to take definite action in the diplomatic field and to do so energetically and 
discreetly to secure its application. It was in order to ensure that this diplo-
matic action was as effective as they wanted it to be that first the Six and then 
the Ten harmonized their positions, 
3, This diplomatic action is naturally geared to one main objective: ultimate-
ly, to ensure peace in this region, It is not a question of maintaining a truce 
- it is important to say this now - or of simply establishing that the state of 
war is over. On the contrary, a peace treaty must be signed and this must 
change the relations between the States in this region and enable all of them 
to live in peace, We need to understand all the difficulties of going from a 
state of war to a state of peace.' 
(Chambre des Representants, compte rendu analytique, 30 June 1971) 
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Denmark 
1. Debate on integration in the Danish Parliament: the Social Democrats call 
for a referendum 
During the debate on Europe held in the Danish Folketing (Parlia-
ment) on 18 May 1971, Mr. Nyboe Andersen, Minister for Trade, said he was 
satisfied with the progress of the Brussels accession negotiations. Denmark 
hoped to become a member at the beginning of 1973 and wanted to avoid any 
transitional period for agriculture. Its wish to join was not restricted to the 
economic aspects; it also meant Denmark had the political will to participate 
in wider forms of European cooperation. 
In the debate the main point of concern for the Social Democrats in 
particular was that before any decision in Copenhagen, it must be made clear, 
at the negotiations, whether the EEC would leave Denmark free to develop its 
own social policy. Mr. Nyboe Andersen replied that the Rome Treaties con-
sidered the way social policy was applied to be a matter for the individual 
Member States. There was no mention of any downward adaptation of social 
policies. 'The idea is, on the contrary, to enable those countries that are 
lagging behind to catch up with the most advanced. ' 
The debate took place against the background of a decision taken on 
4 May by the party leadership and the parliamentary group of the Danish Social 
Democrats in which they came out in favour of a referendum on Denmark's 
accession to the EEC, 
So the Party took up a proposal by Mr. Haekkerup, former Foreign 
Minister, who launched this idea in a speech he made on 1 May. Naturally 
Mr. Haekkerup wanted a referendum to precede the final policy statement of 
the Parliament whereas the Party only advocated a plebiscite after the Fol-
keting's decision. 
The Social Democrats explained that they were sticking to their 
existing policy on the Market. This meant that they wanted Denmark to join 
the Community of the Six, provided (i) the United Kingdom were a member of 
the EEC; (ii) the remaining Nordic countries could come to some arrange-
ment about their relations with the EEC, and (iii) the Danish Parliament re-
tained the right to decide on its own main welfare and fiscal policy problems. 
After discussion of integration policy problems and final agreement in the 
Parliament, these questions should be submitted to a referendum, quite in-
dependently of whether the Folketing's decision were supported by simple 
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~ajority or by a majority of five-sixths of all those eligible to vote. Accord-
ing to the constitution, a five-sixths majority would be needed for Denmark to 
join the European Economic Community. 
(Neue Zi.ircher Zeitung, 6 May 1971; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine, 19 May 1971) 
2. Danish Minister for Economic Affairs and European Market Affairs: Ap-
proach to the Common Market 
In an article published in the 'Danish Journal 70' Mr. Poul Nyboe 
Andersen, Minister for Economic Affairs and European Market Affairs, con-
siders that membership in the EEC will benefit the national economy. He 
hopes that the 19701s will see a move towards a true economic and monetary 
union in an enlarged Community and envisages among later developments a 
coordinated European attack on pollution and a common approach to other so-
cial problems. 
'It is important for maintaining the dynamism of European integra-
tion that the area of cooperation should be widened and deepened so as, to a 
greater extent than hitherto, to include monetary, economic, industrial and 
technological matters. It is no less important that the EEC should become 
the core of a European partnership of sufficient geographical extent. The 
negotiations on an extension should therefore lead to the inclusion of all the 
European countries who are willing to join. The considerable European 
results that have been achieved in cooperation by the EFTA countries must 
not be sacrificed, but as far as possible preserved in a broader European 
framework. In Denmark's case, an extension of inter-Scandinavian coopera-
tion will be important. We mean to continue and develop this in a larger Euro-
pean setting, and we believe it to be not only a Scandinavian but also a Euro-
pean interest. 
We are ready to accept full membership responsibilities froui the 
moment the enlarged treaties come into force, but are well aware of the pos-
sible need to agree to a period of transition in deference to the other applicant 
countries. We find it natural that the terms of this transition period should 
so be framed as not to have unreasonable effects on our economy. Denmark 
is among the countries that have been most adversely affected by the split in 
the European market. Danish exports to Common Market countries have 
fallen considerably since introduction of the EEC's agricultural policy, while 
French exports of food to the other EEC countries, of the same order as Den-
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mark's in 1960, have quadrupled,,, 
Membership of the Common Market will unquestionably have a vital 
effect on the Danish economy, The creation of a large market, with goods 
freely crossing national frontiers, must lead to an expansion in inter-Euro-
pean trade and thus will help to promote a bigger growth-rate in the European 
economies. The effect of the present split in the European market is reflec-
ted in Danish trade figures, In 1959, the Common Market countries accoun-
ted for a third of our exports, and in 1969 their share had fallen to under a 
fourth. Conversely, EFTA exports to Denmark show a rise from 40 per cent 
in 1959 to about 50 per cent in 1969. This alteration in the trade pattern is 
no less remarkable in view of the fact that in the 1960s economic growth in 
the Common Market countries was substantially greater than in the EFTA 
countries as a whole ... 
Abolition of tariffs and other trade restrictions together with the 
introduction of a common external tariff will enhance the opportunities for 
industrial exports to Common Market countries. At the same time, we can 
expect greater competition at home. Introduction of the EEC's common ex-
ternal tariff in Denmark could mean that Danish industry would have to relin-
quish the cost advantage it enjoys through tariff-free imports of a number of 
raw materials and semi-manufactures, The costs of power production may 
well increase also. Given present competitive conditions, this will mean a 
reduction in the cost advantages of under 1 per cent of the aggregate indus-
trial turnover. The industrial disadvantages of belonging to the Common 
Market, therefore, will probably be outweighed by the marketing benefits , 
especially on the long term ... 
On the whole, I think there can be no doubt that the creation of a 
broad European Community will benefit the Danish economy and will increase 
the economic strength of Europe. The achievement of greater economic pros-
perity in Europe will, however, be conditional on a dynamic approach to co-
operation. The problems of European economic cooperation have been chang-
ing continuously, and I think that the emphasis will continue to change. The 
issues will undoubtedly move away from the problems that were uppermost in 
the 1960's, namely the abolition of tariffs within the EEC and EFTA respec-
tively and realization by the EEC of the common agricultural policy, 
Along with a fusion of the two economic groupings in the 1970's, we 
should go a good step towards a true economic and monetary union, At the 
centre of discussions in the 19701s we should therefore expect to see coopera-
tion on economic and monetary policy, removal of trade restrictions other 
than tariffs, extension of cooperation to taxation, and cooperation in techno-
logy and research, We may envisage also that European countries will inten-
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sify and coordinate their attack on environmental problems, such as pollution, 
which follow in the wake of industrial development. 
Later - and this may well prove to be the main task of the 19801s 
- I think attention will increasingly concentrate on matters not directly eco-
nomic. The solution of such problems as democratic participation, education, 
etc. , now facing the various countries, can then perhaps, through the develop-
ment of European integration, be tackled in a broader European context.' 
(Danish Journal 70) 
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France 
1. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs discusses the problem of British 
membership 
At a meeting of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee 
on 5 March, Mr. Maurice Schumann, Minister for Foreign Affairs, discussed 
the British application for membership of the Common Market. 
He said: 'There is no question of France's vetoing Britain's joining 
the Common Market; France has simply come back with the argument the 
Community put forward in 1967, and even more strongly in 1969, to the effect 
that the problem of Britain's sterling balances was a capital one that had to 
be solved. 
There is a conflict between membership of the Community (which 
has its own monetary reserves and whose duty it is to support the currencies 
of its members) and possessing an international reserve currency (as Britain 
does). France is not asking for this state of affairs to be changed at the very 
beginning but it would like a reduction in these sterling balances during the 
transitional period,' 
Mr, Schumann said that the British Government's reaction to the 
French approach had not been unfavourable, The sterling problem had also 
been discussed at the latest round of talks between Mr. Rippon and the Com-
munity. 'The British representative said that we should not dramatize this 
problem. I myself find regrettable the publicity given to this affair which 
should have remained a confidential matter, as France requested at the meet-
ing on 17 March. ' 
Outlining the conditions to be respected in enlarging the Community 
Mr. Schumann said: 'The United Kingdom must make its choice. If it wishes 
to join the Community it must accept the Community rules. 
Entry into the Community means accepting Community preferences, 
The principle of financial solidarity, which the United Kingdom has 
in fact accepted, must be recognized. But as regards the arrangements for 
putting this into application, the British proposal to meet only three per cent 
of the Community's expenditure is not realistic, 
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The United Kingdom must accept the common agricultural policy, 
I am sure that, like the Government, the Parliament wants the 
Community to be enlarged but that it will refuse to accept the fuconsistency 
inherent in the idea of enlarging the Community and at the same time sacri-
ficing its Community character.' 
(Le Monde, 27 March 1971) 
2. A written question and a topical issue dealt with in the National Assembly 
(a) Seat of the institutions of the European Communities 
In a written question dated 13 March 1971, Mr. Godon (Union of 
Democrats for the Republic) informed the Foreign Minister that he had learn-
ed of statements attributed to him on the question of the final seat of the Euro-
pean institutions. A number of responsible Europeans had then come out in 
favour of settling this issue through the development of a European district in 
the Parisian area; he was astonished at the comments that had been attribu-
ted to him; and he wanted to know to what extent these statements, if they 
were true, reflected the official view of France, Bearing in mind in particu-
lar the imbalance resulting from the eccentric nature of the economic centre 
of gravity of the EEC, an imbalance recently referred to again by very high 
national and international authorities, Mr. Gordon wanted to know if the study 
of the plan for a European district at Montesson was to be the subject of an 
official decision. 
In reply the Foreign Minister stated: 'As the honourable Member 
knows, Article 216 of the Treaty of Rome states: "the seat of the Community 
institutions shall be fixed by mutual agreement between the governments of 
the Member States." The implementation of this provision gave rise to a lot 
of discussions at the beginning of 1958 both in the European Parliamentary 
Assembly and on the Council of Ministers of the Communities; the problems 
that would be raised by the creation of a European district were carefully 
examined. Failing any nnanimous agreement between the six Governments 
on the location of such a district they had to establish "provisional places of 
work" for the institutions of the Communities. Provisional by definition, the 
decision taken to this effect by the six Governments in 1958, and confirmed 
in 1959 and 1957, remains valid today. It is however desirable to stress that 
this leaves the question of the seat undecided and in no way prejudges the final 
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solution to be worked out in application of Article 216 of the Rome Treaty. 
While we are naturally inclined to take a favourable view of the rights that 
Paris and the Parisian region can legitimately claim, the Government has in 
no way been associated with the preparation of any plan for a European dis -
trict in the Parisian region, or more particularly, in Montesson. It is in 
fact aware of the very great difficulties which have so far prevented any final 
settlement of the question of the seat of the Communities from being reached. 
It does not believe that the time has come to raise this question officially at 
a time when problems which are even more important are demanding the at-
tention of the European Governments. This is why, while aware of the merits 
of the plan discussed by the honourable Member, the Government feels it 
preferable not to take any initiative on this subject. ' 
(J. O. D~bats parlementaires, AssembUie nationale, 13 May 1971) 
(b) International monetary crisis 
At the National Assembly on 12 May 1971 Mr. Claude Roux (Union 
of Democrats for the Republic) asked the Government about the measures en-
visaged to resolve the international monetary crisis. 
In reply Mr. Val~ry Giscard d'Estaing, Minister for the Economy 
and Finance, stated that the attitude of the French Government during this 
crisis had been governed by three concerns: 'Firstly, to protect the French 
economy from this shock; secondly, to try and obtain a thorough analysis of 
the international monetary problem and not only of its apparent consequences; 
thirdly, to see to it that the measures taken do not compromise the effort 
being made to organize an economic and monetary union in Europe. ' 
On this latter point the Minister recalled that the summit meeting 
at The Hague had established the principle of economic and monetary union. 
'It is with some astonishment that one looks back to the difficulties encountered 
the previous 14 December when it was thought that the French delegation was 
dragging its feet in the organization of this economic and monetary union. 
Lastly it will be remembered that in February we agreed between ourselves 
on a certain number of stages, the first of which was to begin immediately, 
to achieve this union. 
Was it possible to face up to this crisis by recourse to Community 
measures? What were, in fact, the Community solutions that would be right 
for resolving this difficulty? 
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The first, which was the one the German Government undoubtedly 
envisaged, was a concerted floatation of all the currencies of the Six. 
One had to be clear about the consequences of such a solution which 
would indeed have been a Community one. If there had been a concerted float-
ation of the currencies of the Six to bring about a change in parities , it would 
have been an indirect way of bringing about a collective revaluation of the 
currencies of the Six. 
Under present circumstances could the collective revaluation of the 
currencies of the Six be regarded as desirable? We discussed this and sever-
al delegations - France was not the only one, even among the larger Member 
States - said they were against this idea not only for circumstantial reasons 
relating to the fact that the present monetary difficulties are not due to the 
surplus in Western Europe's balance of payments but also for philosophical 
and political reasons. 
Indeed if we were to accept the collective revaluation of the curren-
cies of the Six, this would mean our agreeing to periodically redress the mon-
etary inflation of the United States by economic deflation in Europe, a deflation 
which we should have to pay for in terms of expansion and employment. 
This is the basic reason why we were unable - I say "we" in the 
plural - to opt for a concerted floatation. 
In point of fact, the second Community solution would have involved 
concerted action to restrict the flow of floating capital into the European Com-
munity. 
It was possible to envisage introducing provisions, on the lines of 
those we are already applying, to restrict these inflows of floating capital and, 
as a result, to raise the true problem indirectly, that of the creation of this 
floating capital. 
We debated this. Some of our partners, notably the representatives 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, stated that they were unwilling to adopt 
such measures under the present circumstances. 
Seeing that a Community solution was impossible, what were we to 
do? 
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We were informed of the intention of our German partners to float 
their currency, and it was probable that any country whose economy was 
closely bound up with theirs would do the same. Now the floatation of certain 
currencies in the Community is obviously not a Community solution. 
I would here recall the conclusion of the deliberations of the Council 
of Ministers of the Six of 6 October 1969, the second paragraph of which 
stated: "Feeling that the system of a floating rate of exchange is in itself in-
compatible with the Common Market, stressed the value .•. " 
We therefore discussed this problem. It appeared that that solution 
was not a Community one. 
The French delegation endeavoured to reduce the resulting disad-
vantages in two important aspects: by restrioting the period of floatation and 
by placing a ban on any unilateral measures at the frontiers. 
First of all as regards the time restriction. 
Although we listened to the arguments of our partners to the effect 
that to set a time limit was to hand speculators an invitation card, we decided 
instead to embody in the document itself a condemnation of floating rates. 
After prolonged discussion we were able to include in the text which was adop-
ted a reference to the incompatibility of floating rates with normal operation 
of the Common Market. This means that our partners undertook to return to 
a system of fixed rates of exchange at the end of the floatation period. 
Our second concern, as I have said, was to avoid any unilateral 
measures at the frontiers. 
As regards agricultural products in particular, it was almost cer-
tain that our partners were preparing to adopt a number of corrective meas-
ures, at the frontiers as from the Monday morning, and that these measures 
had been decided upon unilaterally. 
Our lengthy discussions led to these unilateral rre asures being 
abandoned and replaced by Community measures decided upon by the Council 
of Ministers on the basis of a proposal from the Commission. These meas-
ures, as you know, were decided upon yesterday by the Council, made up of 
Ministers of Agriculture. 
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Lastly we wanted the document to signify not approval but what we 
referred to as understanding for the special situation of our partners under 
the difficult circumstances they were facing. ' 
The lessons to be drawn from the situation were, according to Mr. 
Giscard d'Estaing, three in number. 
'The first is that the core of the problem was not discussed. All 
that was said and all that was decided concerned the currencies of Western 
Europe which, as you know, were not responsible for this situation. 
Hence we and the international community at large still have to deal 
with the heart of the matter. We have to deal with it in two ways, and first of 
all at Community level. 
In our joint statement it was planned that measures had to be deci-
ded upon regarding control over the movement of floating capital before 1 July. 
It was within the Community's power to adopt these measures and we saw this 
as being a real test of the European will to discuss the real issue. 
But of course there will still be the international facet of the prob-
lem, with reference to which I would remind you of the basic principles of 
France's attitude, 
First principle: we believe that the burden of the process of adjust-
ment must fall on the shoulders of the countries having a deficit in their bal-
ance of payments and not on those which have a surplus. 
Hence we are sticking to the spirit and letter of the Bretton Woods 
agreements, which provided for fixed rates of exchange which could not be 
modified except in the event of a fundamental imbalance and on the initiative 
of the country having a deficit. 
Second principle: we only accepted the creation of special drawing 
rights under certain conditions which were specified at the time and which we 
were based on a realization of the need for international liquidities, 
We must point out that there was no need for any additional inter-
national liquidities in 1970 and yet three and a half thousand million dollars 
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of additional special drawing rights were created. 
Lastly, the third principle: we proposed on several occasions -
in line, I think, with the feeling of the National Assembly - that there should 
be international supervision of the immense market of the Eurodollar. 
The second consequence was a hiatus in the realization of economic 
and monetary union, not because of the four countries which actually upheld 
the principle of fixed rates of exchange, but because of the initiatives taken 
(in view no doubt of their special situations) by the countries that thought it 
essential to accept the floatation of their currencies. 
Indeed, the very principle of economic and monetary union which 
leads to a single monetary organization, consists in narrowing the bands of 
fluctuation and bringing the currencies closer_ together. 
When we in the French Government saw that we were going in the 
opposite direction, we said we did not feel it desirable for our experts to pur-
sue the finalization of the economic and monetary union for as long as the 
currencies of the Six went on floating against each other. 
There were some who tried to make this out, by analogy, to be a 
return to the 11empty-chair-policy" which France was forced to pursue under 
other circumstances. Our country continues to participate in the work of the 
various Community bodies: it was for example at yesterday's Council of 
Ministers' meeting and it will be at the one of this afternoon. But it will see 
to it that we do not end up in an unreal situation where we call our experts 
together to hold discussions amongst themselves about the means of organiz-
ing the single intervention of the central banks of the Six or to narrow the 
bands of fluctuation, as from 15 June, at a time when we are entering on a 
phase, which we hope will not last long, when some of the currencies of the 
Six are to be floated. 
On this point the French Government trusts that this is only going 
to be a short interval which will come to a conclusion as soon as it is possible 
to return to fixed rates of exchange. 
The third and last consequence concerns the French economy. 
In this respect we have two duties. 
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First of all we must protect the French economy against the infla-
tion which other countries are trying to contend with by allowing their rates 
of exchange to fluctuate. 
Because we have chosen to maintain a fixed rate of exchange we 
must carry our efforts to deal with inflation into other sectors. And it is with 
some seriousness that we think it is the Government's duty to defend the 
French economy against inflation at this juncture, but, once this monetary bliz-
zard has subsided, it will also be the duty of all French people. 
Next we must take advantage of the opportunity raised by the floata-
tion upwards of certain currencies in neighbouring countries to undertake a 
new export drive to penetrate foreign markets. 
If France were determined and able to struggle collectively against 
inflation, and if at the same time it were to take advantage of the fact that its 
prices have a new competitive edge on neighbouring markets, the present cir-
cumstances could be beneficial to the French economy. 
This is why the Government trusts that the National Assembly will 
be drawing a new determination from these circumstances to pursue the 
French policy of expansion but also of stability. 
(J. O. Debats parlementaires, Assemblee nationale, 13 May 1971) 
3. Debate on European policy in the National Assembly 
(a) For the Government, Mr. Chaban Delmas, Prime Minister, made a state-
ment to the National Assembly on 20 April 1971. 
On European policy, he stressed the progress made since the sum-
mit meeting at The Hague. The final financing regulation had been adopted; 
the consolidated agricultural policy had been finalized for the greater good of 
the farmers of the Community and, in particular, farmers in France. An 
agreement had been reached on economic and monetary union and negotiations 
initiated with the States that had applied for membership of the Communities. 
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On this latter point he added: 'We are approaching the decisive 
stage in the negotiations. Here France is adopting the same positive attitude 
as it did at the conference at The Hague, and one of its aims, of course, is 
to ensure respect for the basic principles of the European Community. Aban-
doning these principles would lead to the destruction of the Community. 
Although France sometimes takes the initiative in spotlighting some 
of the difficult aspects of the negotiations, it is not because it is trying to 
raise obstacles to the accession of the United Kingdom or the other applicant 
States but because it feels that it would be dangerous to allow any ambiguities 
to persist at a time when the political and economic map of Europe is being 
redrawn. 
The European Community is not a straightforward customs union. 
It is a community whose economic personality is becoming more definite 
every day and whose political personality, which is still rather vague, is go-
ing to become more clearly defined as time goes by and as each of the Mem-
ber States becomes aware of the vital part that a resolutely European Europe 
could play in the world. It is into this Community that we should like to be 
able to welcome our friends from across the Channel. It is this Community 
which we feel must, as the head of our State explained at his press conference 
on 21 January, gradually assume the shape of a confederation of States that 
are fully determined to live together and coordinate their activities in every 
field. Making Europe does not mean giving up France. Quite the contrary, 
we intend to develop France in order to strengthen Europe.' 
In conclusion Mr. Chaban-Delmas explained the broad outlines of 
the success that should result from the Government's policy, a success on the 
part of France and at the same time on the part of Europe, whose vital cog 
France had, by force of circumstances, become. 
It was true that past conflicts, the diversity of its traditions and 
the very wealth of its values had made the unity of Europe more difficult to 
achieve than was the case with new continents. But the rewards would be 
commensurate with the efforts made. 'In a tough world often striving to re-
gain its balance, Europe can once again go far and high, provided it can weld 
the power that will result from its unity to a specifically European concept of 
civilization. The heart of the European harbours a vision of justice, dignity 
and individual self-realization in which France, which has given so much to 
Europe, is able to recognize its own reflection. Whether vision is to become 
a reality will depend to a large extent on France. ' 
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During the discussion on the censure motion tabled by the Socialist 
Group, Mr. Claudius-Petit (Progress and Modern Democracy) expressed 
regret that they had begun by building a shopkeeper's Europe 'because trade 
relations do not necessarily foster political feelings. Some of us "European" 
Frenchmen believe that building Europe is not only a matter of promoting 
trade between Europeans but much more of preserving a certain idea of free-
dom and democracy in this part of the world. 
For us this is what Europe means. It is neither the Europe of shop-
keepers nor necessarily that of economic interests. Above all it affords a 
chance of preserving on this earth a haven where human purposes and a cer-
tain concept of freedom can develop freely without disturbing anyone: such a 
Europe would be a force for peace. We more than any can act in this direc-
tion and, to return to what you were saying, Prime Minister, I should say 
that if building Europe does not mean giving up France it is to be feared that 
by not building Europe we may end up by obliterating France. 
This is why I ask the Government if it is really reasonable to waste 
time on technical details in everything that stands between us and the entry of 
the United Kingdom into the Common Market. I have the impression that we 
are pursuing the policy of a petty tradesman and that by waiting too long we 
are liable to ruin everything. 
We should therefore take the initiative. You should not miss the 
chance, Prime Minister: at the moment the ball is in your court. It is for 
you, for us, to act. We and you can take the initiative. Because you have a 
sufficiently strong majority to do so without risk, be bold enough to reassure 
the United Kingdom in this sphere because at the moment public opinion on 
the other side of the Channel is very sensitive and there is a real fear that 
we are going to miss this opportunity of really building Europe. ' 
Mr. Louis Terrenoire (Union of Democrats for the Republic) said 
it was thanks to the President of the French Republic that certain prospects 
had been opened up again in regard to the future of the European institutions: 
at last it appeared to all reasonable men who had lived through the last twelve 
years of the European Economic Community's existence that these institutions 
had to be confederal rather than supranational in form. ' 
Mr. Terrenoire said that the British had approached the accession 
negotiations like businessmen negotiating a deal, forgetting the essentials. 
'The first essential of an Economic Community is Community preference. 
Without this there can be no Common Market. Unreserved acceptance of this 
does not mean that provisional arrangements cannot be made or that suitable 
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transitional time-limits cannot be set. ' 
'Of course we understand the British when they explain their diffi-
culties in jumping onto a moving train, But between that and reducing speed 
to 3 per cent - I mean between that and only envisaging such a small contri-
bution to the resources of the Community - there is a wide gap. It is under-
standable that this figure should have appeared to be in the nature of a joke. 
I will not dwell on how one can interpret the term political will. I 
will only mention the sterling balances which are an offshoot of the unfair 
privileges enjoyed by the dollar and which are hard to reconcile with a healthy 
monetary situation or an honest normalization of monetary relations between 
the Six. 
But we think political will presuppo_ses a reply to the question that 
our friend Mr, Maurice Couve de Murville recently put to Mr. Roy Jenkins, 
the former British Minister, during their fascinating encounter on television. 
Unfortunately he did not get any reply. It was a question of estab-
lishing what would be the attitude of the United Kingdom if its accession to the 
Common Market were to be followed by pressure from the other side of the 
Atlantic to change the Common Market into an Atlantic area. This raised the 
whole issue of the independence of Europe. 
For an enlarged Europe will not become the fourth world power we 
all want it to be unless it remains in full control of its future. Any ambiguous 
agreement on this capital point would carry with it the risk of a crisis which 
would for a long time and perhaps permanently ruin the hopes pinned on Euro-
pean unification. 
It is now up to the British and French Governments to assess 
whether a summit meeting - I mean between the British Prime Minister and 
the President of the French Republic - could cut the Gordian knot, if indeed 
this exists as some claim. Hoping as we do that the European Economic Com-
munity will be enlarged, we remain optimistic. ' 
(Journal officiel, Debats parlementaires, Assemblee nationale, 21 April 
1971) 
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(b) On 9 June a foreign policy debate was held in the National Assembly, It 
began with a Government statement by Mr, Maurice Schumann, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, dealing mainly with European policy. 
Now that the European Community had been completed, in particular 
through arrangements to endow it with its own resources, Mr, Maurice Schu-
mann felt there was nothing to prevent negotiations being opened with the ap-
plicant countries, 
'As soon as the applicant countries addressed themselves to a Com-
munity which had overcome its precarious situation of the past, we began the 
negotiations on enlargement - in accordance with the commitment entered 
into first of all here in June 1969, then in Brussels in July 1969 and subse-
quently at The Hague in December 1969 - with the firm intention of leading 
them to a successful conclusion, 
Admittedly that aim has not yet been achieved, But we do not re-
gret having taken steps to ensure that the prospects of success are greater 
than the risk of failure, I believe we have at least three good reasons not to 
regret our action, 
First of all we should have been unwise not to take advantage of a 
development which could not have been completed or even perhaps begun with-
out the tenacity of our country, Our five partners, and then the four applicant 
countries, have made a welcome and, I believe, decisive move towards aware-
ness of the needs and hopes of the Community which France has tried to safe-
guard on two occasions, although its action was misunderstood, 
I do not propose to consider here the biased arguments put forward 
by fanatics on both sides. Yes, something has changed since 1963, But what-
ever gullible observers may believe, it is not French policy which has chan-
ged, To quote only two examples, are the implications of British membership 
of the Common Market the same, regardless of whether that country applies 
the system of Community preference immediately? Will British membership 
have the same implications before and after the end of the transitional period, 
before and after the guarantees of irreversibility come into force? 
The reply is only too clear: before clarification of the British posi-
tion, anxiety and - let us not mince words - a certain mistrust in face of a 
genuinely incalculable risk were inevitably felt in the Community. But once 
the British position became clear, the same attitude and vocabulary, I nearly 
called it the same "package", on the part of the EEC would have been tanta-
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mount to a genuine veto which would have been fatal to the Community's co-
hesion, i.e. sooner or later to the Community itself. 
History will confirm what the texts already suggest: the Commu-
nity can now be enlarged while still continuing to merit its name, because its 
essential nature was preserved a few years ago through that salutary intransi-
gence which was characteristic of General de Gaulle. 
Does the completion of the Community rule out once and for all the 
risks of enlargement? Certainly not. The risks will only disappear when the 
United Kingdom has become unreservedly wedded to Europe while firmly re-
fusing, as we do, to abandon any part of its heritage, affinities or alliances. 
We know that the stresses will not disappear overnight. But that is only to be 
expected. 
Now for our second good reason: Mr. Heath's visit to President 
Pompidou and the clear statements they both made as well as the honesty of 
the conclusions Mr. Heath drew without a single omission to the House of 
Commons, all lead us to believe that when the time comes for the Mother of 
Parliaments to reach her verdict, she will have weighed up the implications 
and consequences of her choice. 
All the indications are in that direction, especially since the events 
of the day before yesterday. 
Only a few weeks ago when France raised the question of the inter-
national role of sterling against the background of economic and monetary 
union, observers interpreted this as an obscure manoeuvre - and why not? -
as yet another veto. 
The day before yesterday, the United Kingdom and then all our 
partners proved us right. An exchange of letters annexed to the future Treaty 
of Accession will set down the results of these negotiations which had to be 
conducted discreetly and brought to a rapid conclusion. A twin commitment 
to stabilization and gradual reduction fully satisfies the request we made be-
cause of the inherent logic of the Community. We were therefore not wrong 
to raise this problem and to believe it possible to reach a clear and reason-
able solution. 
No doubt Britain hopes to play in this Europe which it only recently 
saved from despair a role which accords with its history and genius. But that 
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is precisely what we expect of it, and this is the third and best of our three 
good reasons. 
Who in France could believe, let alone hope, that the barriers 
would never come down between France and the only country from which the 
appeal of 18 June could be sent out to it? 
In his famous statement of 14 January 1963, General de Gaulle ex-
plained why events had not yet come to maturity and why they would mature 
one day. 
"It is highly possible," he concluded fifteen days before the nego-
tiations opened ten years ago were interrupted, "that the evolution of Great 
Britain and the development of world affairs will bring the British closer to 
Europe, however long this process may take. I personally believe this will 
happen, and that is why, in my opinion at all events, it does immense credit 
to the British Prime Minister and his Government that they have discerned 
this trend at so early a date and shown sufficient political courage to announce 
the fact and take the first steps to set their country on the course which will 
one day moor it firmly to the continent. " 
Turning now to the third question, I am bound to note that the Com-
munity is being consolidated too slowly and hesitantly. 
In discovering and recognizing areas of agreement the meeting of 
9 February seems to have been marked by historic progress to which Mr. 
Giscard d'Estaing made an essential contribution. We did not take one deci-
sion, we took three. The first was to set in motion the process leading to 
economic and monetary union, at the same time affirming our political will 
to bring it to completion within a period of ten years. The second was to 
define figures for the economic objectives to be achieved by the Member 
States in the next few years, remembering that there must be no conflict bet-
ween the different objectives. The third was to prepare arrangements for 
medium-term financial support which would supplement the short-term sup-
port machinery already approved; in real terms this means that within the 
limits of a ceiling fixed at $2, OOOm the Member States undertake to open 
five-year credits to those among them that encounter balance of payments 
difficulties. 
Hardly had we decided to coordinate intervention by the central 
banks on the exchange markets to reduce margins of fluctuation between our 
currencies than the monetary cohesion of the Communities was dangerously 
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shaken by an event which Mr. Giscard d'Estaing has already explained to you 
at great length. 
Although the economic and monetary union was severely shaken, 
everyone will realize that France was in no way to blame. If the truth be told, 
the basic cause of these difficulties lies outside Europe - I repeat, outside 
Europe. But we are nevertheless entitled to regret that the reaction of the 
Europeans has not been guided by a little more Community spirit. 
While it justifies the caution and pragmatism for which we have 
sometimes been rather too hastily criticized, this unfortunate episode does 
not discourage our resolve to ensure the independence of the European eco-
nomy through a monetary union. 
But already more is at stake than the economy alone. As I said to 
you a year ago, "because it is irreversible, economic Europe is already a 
political Europe." 
I would now add that events have shown my statement to be correct, 
not only because of our initial experience with the regular coordination of our 
foreign policy - in which we have made no attempt to sidestep urgent and 
difficult problems - but above all because of the warm welcome given to the 
President of the Republic's statement of 21 January proposing an ambitious, 
reasonable and clearly-thought-out future for Europe. No other method or 
policy has been officially proposed to replace the basic idea of a "confedera-
tion of States resolved to harmonize their policies and integrate their econo-
mies." 
The originator of any alternative proposals would have been bound 
to incur accusations, this time justified, of placing a genuine veto on the 
British application. 
Mr. Heath, who has not been contradicted on this point in the House 
of Commons, has explicitly linked the United Kingdom's membership with the 
maintenance of confederal rules and prospects; in other words the French 
doctrine, because it has its own inherent logic which is stronger than artifi-
cial quarrels, is the only one to offer the Community the means of enlarging 
both its membership and the area of its activities.' 
Referring to relations between the European Community and the 
United States, Mr. Maurice Schumann said that 'if the United States had any 
- 42 -
underlying intention of maintaining their de facto hegemony in the areas where 
they still exercise it, and of extending that hegemony to the enlarged Commu-
nity, the incipient malaise would surely become worse. But it is not the 
guiding idea behind American policy on the contrary to invite Eyrope, of which 
America is and will remain a firm ally, to count more and more upon itself? 
This legitimate demand which accords with our forecasts and inten-
tions, does not apply solely to the vital area of defence. Europeans them-
selves must be responsible for the destiny of Europe in every sphere. 
A genuine Community organization with no gaps or exemptions is 
the economic expression of this will. Anything which might tend to water the 
Community down into a free trade area would ruin its spirit before destroying 
its machinery. 
Such is the significance of the choice which Britain is now making. 
I would go further: such is the significance, I am convinced, of the choice 
which Britain has made and which the United States must understand if they 
are to be logical with themselves. Of course not all the consequences have 
yet been accepted. It is vital to define them clearly and never lose sight of 
them whatever difficulties may be encountered. ' 
Opening the debate Mr. De Broglie (Independent Republican) , the 
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, welcomed Britain's entry into 
the European Community: 'The enlarged Europe which is now beginning to take 
shape seems to have recognized from the outset that it needs new ultimate 
objectives on the scale of its own future. 
Its first objective is of course to become an economic and monetary 
union and to complete its own construction by becoming a single market back-
ed by a common monetary system and harmonized legislation. 
Its second objective must be to gradually become a political entity, 
first by strengthening its decision-making procedures, then by progressively 
laying down an inter-State organization, and finally by developing a common 
attitude to the outside world. 
In a way these are new internal objectives. It is not self-evident 
that they will be achieved and we hope that the difficult monetary situation 
will not cause the Foreign Minister to turn his back on what he himself has 
called the deepening of the Common Market, a task which is no longer solely 
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economic but already has a political colouring. 
We shall have to avoid certain deviations to which he himself has 
drawn attention, We must not turn the Community into a kind of OECD, and 
we must avoid the other mistake of yielding to the temptation of creating a 
Franco-British Europe. We are building a Community, but we must not for-
get that the Franco-German Alliance is the heart and soul of that Community. 
And should we not stress once again the importance, which we be-
lieve to be vital, of the agreement concluded between Chancellor Adenauer 
and General de Gaulle? Should we not also stress the significance of this 
reversal of history and the efforts we are making to develop not only coopera-
tion but also political understanding with the Federal Republic? Without this 
contribution and without Germany, the whole programme of European unifica-
tion would be untrue to its own original objectives.' 
Mr, d' Ornano (Independent Republican) thought that enlargement and 
the monetary crisis would raise the problem of a 'second generation' European 
Community. 
'Now that the foundations are being laid for a Europe of the Ten we 
must strengthen the existing institutions if we want that Europe to continue to 
progress. 
We for our part view the strengthening of the institutions from three 
angles: from the angle of the executive, i. e. the Council of Ministers, from 
that of supervision, i. e, the European Parliament, and from that of the pro-
posing and implementing body, i. e. the Commission. 
As far as the executive is concerned, in the press conference to 
which the Foreign Minister has referred, the President of the Republic indi-
cated the path which should be followed: the nations should appoint ministers 
of European affairs who, endowed with the necessary powers, would prove 
that we are really working together. 
As for the Parliament, we must not of course forget that it has to 
supervise an executive and a budget; therefore the strengthening of Parlia-
ment and its more equitable distribution should probably wait until there is 
effectively a budget to supervise and a genuine executive. But it is not too 
early to begin to think about the problems and prepare the ground for their 
solution. 
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Finally, as regards the Commission, we shall probably need to 
create an organization which will make greater use in future of the special 
qualifications of its members, That is why the Independent Republicans have 
proposed that one member should be made responsible for app.91nting the Com-
mission; he would himself introduce the other members to the Council of 
Ministers and European Parliament, so as to ensure that each sector will be 
headed by a specialist in the Commission. 
With a Europe of Ten we shall certainly find it necessary in future 
to stipulate how votes will be taken, no doubt by a majority to approve Com-
mission proposals and unanimously when the Council wishes to depart from 
those proposals.' 
Mr, Sudreau (Progress and Modern Democracy) believed that 'the 
development of Europe and its future are at present largely coloured by the 
monetary crisis, The disagreement between the Six in Brussels on 9 May -
which was certainly a definite split - may degenerate into a serious crisis 
for Europe, for the world, and for France, 
In the first place for Europe. 
After years of efforts to create a common economic policy and 
after many vigorous declarations on European cooperation, after the confer-
ence at The Hague, and after agreeing last February on the first phase of a 
plan for monetary cooperation, the Governments of the Six have adopted -
as the Foreign Minister pointed out only a short while ago - divergent atti-
tudes on this crisis as a function of their own interests, and they have rele-
gated the interest of the Community to the background, 
Under these conditions how can we continue to take seriously the 
will of members of the European Economic Community to harmonize their 
economic policy in order to create an indissoluble economic entity? 
How can any financial discipline be imposed on the applicant coun-
tries, and in particular on Britain, in the name of this objective? How can we 
avoid the important Luxembourg agreement being undermined in turn? 
It must be clearly stated, whatever the consequences, that the di-
vergent attitudes of the six countries to the monetary crisis are essentially 
due to their differing economic development. Harmonization of the economies 
of Europe is not something which will come about tomorrow and our compatri-
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ots who live in the frontier regions realized this fact a long time ago. 
With Europe and beyond Europe we must put an end to monetary 
anarchy which leads to all kinds of adventures. It is therefore the responsi-
bility of France, with its partners, to take the initiative in calling an inter-
national monetary conference, first at European and then at world level.' 
Mr. Habib-Deloncle (Union of Democrats for the Republic) thought 
it was necessary 'to eliminate an obvious contradiction, the contradiction 
which consists in showing on the one hand a perfectly legitimate attachment 
to national independence, whose legal expression is sovereignty, and on the 
other hand a no less legitimate attachment to European cooperation as reflec-
ted in the Community. 
It has been suggested that this contradiction is irreversible. My 
reply is that the European Community does not destroy its Member States' 
identity. 
As the construction of Europe progresses, the distinction between 
two terms which recently appeared synonymous to us, i.e. supranationality 
and community, is becoming increasingly clear. 
For example, we wanted - and this was one of the criteria of our 
policy - the Community to be enlarged without any dilution of its substance. 
Britain sincerely agreed to join a genuine Community, as a compo-
nent of a European Europe. That sincerity was demonstrated to the President 
of the Republic during his discussions with the British Prime Minister. We, 
that is several colleagues and myself, were also recently convinced of British 
sincerity when we met our colleagues from the British Parliament. 
Some welcomed this agreement because they felt that once Britain 
and three other States joined the Common Market, the basic principles of the 
Community would be weakened and might even disappear altogether. 
But the international monetary crisis once again makes the choice 
before us perfectly clear: either to face the pressure of the dollar in isolation 
comforted by the absolutely clear conscience of the Americans, as confirmed 
yet again by the US Secretary of State at the recent OECD meeting, or to move 
forward towards economic and monetary union and accept the inevitable sacri-
fices. 
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But recent events show perfectly well that in this sphere nothing 
can replace coordinated action by a group of States. No mechanism of coer-
cion can compel a Member State to take a decision it does not like. The pro-
cess of European unification must be based on the will of States, reflecting 
the will of the people. 
There is only one method of making the transition from the Commu-
nity to a confederation and that is prior agreement between countries without 
which no institutional machinery can be created. 
The illusion that there was another possible solution for a long time 
paralysed political and economic progress in Europe. It made us lose a great 
deal of time. In addition for some people supranational verbiage replaced a 
European spirit and helped to hide a deep attachment to the most sordid kind 
of national egoism. I am not speaking of the French but more often than not 
on the contrary of our partners who are only too keen to give us lessons on 
how to be good Europeans. 
Today we have reached the moment of truth and France has a vital 
role to play. 
The discussions between Mr. Heath and President Pompidou showed, 
or at least I believe they did, the existence in Britain of the political will to 
join a European Europe, provided that Member States retain their own sover-
eignty. 
The discussions which are due to be held shortly between Mr. 
Brandt and President Pompidou will show whether the Federal Republic of 
Germany intends to opt for close economic ties with the United States, the 
Mark being at one and the same time the opponent and supporter of the dollar, 
or whether it will return to the concept of a Community in which each State 
and each national Government will democratically assume responsibility to 
its public opinion for decisions taken jointly. 
When it comes to vital economic interests or basic directions of 
international policy, no State can be compelled to follow against its own will 
a path which it considers inappropriate. But once the commitment has been 
made to move forward only by joint agreement on these vital and fundamental 
issues, a common will must be created out of theconcordance of national wills 
and the institutional machinery to express these wills will follow naturally.' 
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Referring to the monetary crisis Mr. Mitterand (non-attached) said 
that there was 'a fundamental incompatibility between a common agricultural 
policy based on a single dollar price for agricultural products and floating ex-
change rates. And if the present crisis has highlighted this incompatibility 
we must also wonder, with Raymond Aron of "Le Figaro", whether there is 
any point in trying to reduce the fluctuation band-widths of the currencies of 
the Six as long as the Common Market forms part of a monetary system which 
is made vulnerable at every moment by the abundance of dollars and Euro-
dollars. 
In short the Governments of the Six had agreed to reduce this mar-
gin of fluctuation. But in deciding to float the Mark, the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany adopted a policy which goes against all the pro-
claimed objectives. 
Such is the fate of this Europe, of tp.is part of Europe in which we 
live. It is always relegated to second place behind the immediate preoccu-
pations of its Member States. How easy it is to complain of the lack of a com-
mon policy; but there are no signs of any such policy being established.' 
Concluding his speech, he added: 'Everything which will help to make our 
Europe an independent Community, to strengthen its powers and endow it with 
unity while founding it on democratic structures far removed from the trans-
national power of :monopolies, and finally to give it a vital role in world af-
fairs, will be highly desirable. 
I find it difficult to understand what the President of the Republic 
means by a "confederal Europe", or rather I do not see how a confederation 
can be anything more than one stage, and I am confident in the developments 
of the future.' 
According to Mr. Jacques Vendroux (non-attached) 'The time seems 
to have come to dissipate all ambiguity regarding the continuity of French 
foreign policy, at least as far as European unification is concerned. 
It would not be reasonable to claim that we are following the politi-
cal line traced out in this area by General de Gaulle. Why then does the Gov-
ernment refuse to admit that this line has changed, even though every French 
and foreign commentator is stressing the fact? Why does it not admit that it 
has chosen a different programme? It would be its right and even its duty to 
do so if it thinks it is on the correct path. I do not understand why the Gov-
ernment, with the support of a very large parliamentary majority, is not suf-
ficiently sure of itself to conduct its policies in accordance with its own ideas 
and to give those policies a personal label. 
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Let the Government therefore assume, once and for all, the respon-
sibilities which devolve upon it, without feeling itself obliged to refer to the 
past, although we believe that the future should at least preserve an intact 
image of past events. 
This being said, it is normal for all who remain faithful to a cer-
tain policy line to regret certain changes in direction. Certainly we recog-
nize that up to now - I am still speaking of European policy - some barri-
ers have stood in the way of any major deviations, for example, as regards 
the fundamental rule of unanimity which we would like to be firmly maintained. 
But we are disturbed to see many attacks on the principle of the 
integrity of national sovereignty which certain forces are patiently and obsti-
nately trying to undermine. 
Events have moved faster than the law and the Governments seem 
to have been dismayed on several occasions by Community decisions. 
There is a risk that their authority may be slowly but surely eroded 
and taken over by other bodies, in particular the Commission whose aspira-
tion is to be all-powerful. 
At a time when the Commission of the European Communities is 
already referring to itself as the European Commission - this is the name 
it almost always adopts now and the contraction is in itself significant - and 
constantly claims that it must play an increadingly decisive role, at a time 
when Chancellor Brandt has stated to an attentive Monnet Committee that his 
objective is a "reasonably organized European Government capable of taking 
the necessary decisions in the sphere of common policy and whose activities 
would be subject to parliamentary supervision," we are disturbed to see the 
extent to which the idea of supranationality has gained ground again in recent 
months.' 
(Journal Officiel, Debats parlementaires, Assemblee nationale, 10 Jul1e 1971) 
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4, Talks between Mr. Georges Pompidou and Mr, Edward Heath 
During his stay in Paris on 20 and 21 May 1971, Mr. Edward Heath 
was received by Mr, George Pompidou, the French President and by Mr, 
Chaban-Delmas, Prime Minister, 
The press communique issued at the close of these talks spoke of 
a wide measure of agreement between Mr, Pompidou and Mr. Heath on Eur-
ope's role in relation to the prospect of an enlargement of the Community. 
'In particular they expressed their determination to help promote 
increased European cooperation and specifically European policies, firstly in 
the economic sphere and, as time goes by, in other fields, by enlarging and 
consolidating the Community. 
As regards the operation and development of the Community, the 
talks revealed a complete identity of views. 
Mr, Pompidou and Mr. Heath discussed all the economic, financial 
and monetary problems liable to arise as a result of the enlargement of the 
Community. They also discussed the progress of the European Economic 
Community towards economic and monetary union and its implications for 
existing monetary relations, Mr. Heath repeated that the United Kingdom was 
ready to play its full part, in a European spirit, in this development. The 
talks clarified a number of points and would provide a solid basis for the fu-
ture. 
Mr, Pompidou and Mr, Heath welcomed the recent agreements 
reached in the agricultural and industrial fields at the conference held on 11 
and 12 May between the European Economic Community and the United King-
dom on the latter's accession, and particularly in the agricultural section, 
on the problem of Community preference, 
Mr. Pompidou and Mr. Heath consider it is both desirable and pos-
sible to reach an early agreement on the main subjects under negotiation 
which are being dealt with by the accession conference, particularly the prob-
lems concerning New Zealand and Britain's contribution to financing Commu-
nity expenditure. 
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Mr. Pompidou and Mr. Heath expressed a common desire to settle 
the problems that would arise when the Yaounde Convention was renewed, in 
a positive spirit and with a respect for established rights. It would also be 
desirable to bear in mind the need to safeguard the interests of countries 
which were, or might become, signatories to this convention, and which were 
largely dependent on the markets of an enlarged Community for their exports 
of sugar and other primary products. 1 
In the statement made to the press, Mr. Georges Pompidou stress-
ed that 'the aim of these talks was not and could not be to resolve all these 
questions under discussion in Brussels. Since the beginning of the negotia-
tions on British membership as on the membership of the other applicant 
States, France's view has always been that it was the Community which was 
negotiating and that as a result the Community had to reach agreement first 
of all on the proposals that it was making to the British negotiators. 
This is why we did not settle these problems which we were not 
qualified to settle. 
You would not believe me if I told you that we have not discussed 
them. We discuss them, comparing our views and above all trying to under-
stand the deep-seated economic or political reasons motivating each of the 
two Governments in coming to its position. 
All that I can tell you is that it would be unreasonable at present to 
believe that an agreement will i;10t be reached between the United Kingdom and 
the Community during the negotiations in June and that in any case the spirit 
of our conversations today and yesterday leads me to believe that these nego-
tiations will come to a successful conclusion. 
But the main feature of our talks was our general view of Europe, 
its organization, operation and its prospects - all of this within the frame-
work of the whole range of major problems arising in the world between Euro-
pean countries and others and within these European countries themselves. 
We saw that our viewpoints were similar and even identical on a 
certain number of major issues. 
With regard to other problems, we realized that the points of dif-
ference and disagreement between us were no obstacle to cooperation because 
we were of the same mind on the aim to be attained. ' 
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Speaking of the freedom and frankness that had prevailed during 
the talks Mr. Georges Pompidou added: 'This is the confidence that two 
peoples must have in each other and in their present and future partners in 
the Community if they are to build a Europe of nations that wish to preserve 
their identity but are also determined to work together to achieve real unity, 
economically to begin with and gradually in all the other fields, including of 
course the political field. 
There are many people who believe that the United Kingdom is not 
and does not want to become European, and that it wishes to enter the Com-
munity only in order to destroy it or to divert it from its objectives. There 
are also many people who believe that France is ready to seize any pretext 
to place a fresh veto on Britain's entry into the Community. 
Well, ladies and gentlemen, you are today faced with men who are 
convinced that the opposite is true. ' 
In a statement to the press Mr. Heath said that he was equally sat-
isfied regarding the outcome of the talks. 'I believe that we have now come 
to a very clear understanding of our respective views and are fully familiar 
with the questions arising for both of us. 
I have no doubt that all the discussions we have had will yield real 
and lasting benefits, not only for the United Kingdom and France but for 
Europe as a whole. 
Our discussions show that we agree that it is not only desirable 
but also possible for our negotiators in Brussels to find acceptable solutions 
to the problems still outstanding and for them to do so in June. The way has 
now been cleared for them to do this. 
I have long felt that Europe must progress together in unity and 
that the United Kingdom must be part of this greater entity. I believe that 
only in this way can we ensure complete peace for our continent and put an 
end for ever to the conflicts which have brought so much suffering to our 
countries in the past. 
Secondly I believe that in this way we can promote the prosperity 
of our peoples and take full advantage of the great economic opportunities 
that are opening up for us. Lastly I believe that it is only by working together 
that we shall be able to play a complete and credible part in our relations with 
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the world at large.' 
In their talks - said Mr. Heath - they had both been very much 
aware of the responsibilities that France and the United Kingdom had each in-
herited in the world and which they intended to continue to discharge.' 
(Le Monde, 23-24 May 1971) 
5, Visit by the French President to Belgium 
During President Pompidou's official visit to Belgium from 24 to 
26 May 1971, interest centred on European problems. 
(a) The official visit 
At a gala dinner held in the Palais Royal in Brussels, King Baudouin 
made the following observations, addressing Mr. Pompidou: 'I wish to pay 
tribute here to the will which has so often been expressed by you, Mr. Presi-
dent, and your Government to complete the political process (of European 
integration). 
Major steps have already been taken. The spirit of the summit 
meeting at The Hague in December 1969 enabled progress to be resumed 
again. We therefore have good reason to hope that the tasks leading up to 
the great political options can be completed by us with a sense of common 
purpose. The principle of economic and monetary union has already been 
agreed upon: negotiations on enlargement are continuing. These two under-
takings are not, however, without difficulties and problems which do not less-
en our joint will to succeed. We hope that irreversible decisions will be taken 
before the end of the French term of Presidency in the Council of Ministers. 
We know that the future of Europe is at stake in this great undertaking~ There 
are some historical opportunities which we cannot afford to miss. In the West 
this means that we cannot lose this chance to strengthen our place in the world 
and make our voice heard. Our action will not be governed by any desire for 
hegemony: our ambition must be different, namely to give the· world the bene-
fit of our long civilization and serve as an example in establishing a society in 
which the innermost aspirations of every individual can be met and assets of 
all kinds shared equitably. ' 
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In his reply, the French President also referred to European prob-
lems: 'There is one vital task which is of more direct concern to our two 
Governments: I refer to the building of Europe on which we and our partners 
have been engaged for over 20 years and more particularly since the signature 
of the Rome Treaty, For me this is an opportunity of paying tribute to your 
country's part in this vast undertaking and to the important role which some 
of its statesmen have repeatedly played in helping to reconcile points of view 
and enabling certain obstacles which have arisen to be overcome and progress 
made, We were recently able to appreciate this role when we took the first 
step towards economic and monetary union, 
At this very moment the Community is engaged on important nego-
tiations with several applicant countries, including Britain, It would not be 
right for me to indulge in forecasts or suppositions during this Franco-Belgian 
evening, even if my recent meeting with the British Prime Minister strength-
ens my natural inclination to be optimistic, The French point of view is very 
simple: France is ready to welcome its British friends and neighbours into 
an economic community which will be a genuine community and into a Europe 
which will be genuinely European, In this way true meaning can be given to 
an unparalleled undertaking through which independent States have chosen to 
move towards unity without sacrificing their diversity, in order to give our 
continent a role corresponding to its economic, intellectual and human possi-
bilities. Our friendship, trust and sense of common purpose are in our opi-
nion the best guarantee that this great hope will be fulfilled, ' 
(b) Interviews in the press 
During his visit, President Pompidou gave a press conference and 
also made a statement to a leading Belgian daily, 
On the question of languages, the President stated: 'If Britain joins 
the Community, which is probable and desirable, and if Norway, Denmark and 
Ireland which all have English and not French as their second language also 
join, the English language will inevitably make a breakthrough in this Commu-
nity, I hope quite simply that those Europeans who speak French will resist 
this trend by using their own language, so that French retains a place side by 
side with English as a working language, ' 
In answer to a question on the seat of the Community the President 
made the following reply: 'I assure you that I did not ask Mr, Heath to trans-
fer the Community's seat to Paris as a condition for British entry to the Com-
munity. That would have been a grave act of ill faith towards the Belgian 
Government, Legally Brussels is only the provisional seat of the Community 
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but you know that in politics provisional arrangements may last a very long 
time,' 
President Pompidou rejected the suggestion of American 'isolation-
ism' on defence policy, There were no real signs of American 'isolationism'. 
Then again the problem of common European defence was the most difficult 
and would therefore have to wait longest for a solution, 'This is not a problem 
to be considered at present because: 
- the defence of Europe still depends essentially on American nuclear power; 
- Britain has special links with the United States in this sphere which it can-
not abandon, France has a greater margin of freedom but cannot on its own 
ensure the defence of Europe. 
In short, Europe cannot at present take charge of its own defence,' 
While the President did not consider defence an immediate problem, 
he was disturbed by the future of the monetary union, 'The decisions recently 
taken in Brussels have failed to camouflage a situation which is very much 
against the interests of the Community, even if one can understand the diffi-
culties of the Germans, I hope that these problems will be solved between 
the Six as soon as possible (without venturing to hope for final decisions by 
1 July) so that our progress towards monetary union can continue; of course 
this major problem cannot be settled without a solution to the dollar question, 
We do not want a war on the dollar: that would be a disaster for the whole of 
the West, But it is not possible to retain as a monetary standard a currency 
which is constantly losing its value because of domestic difficulties in the 
United States, This problem cannot be solved immediately, but Europe should 
at least begin to consider where its common interests lie, ' 
Finally the President explained what he meant by a confederation of 
States: 'The term confederation has a precise meaning: it means that we 
should create a confederation of States. These States will only hand over 
rights to Community institutions voluntarily and as a function of developments, 
i, e, progress made in the Community, The wealth of different national char-
acteristics must be maintained within this Community, We do not propose to 
bully anybody, let alone the smaller countries, Finally we must avoid pro-
voking violent encounters through impulsive action which may even create a 
risk of the Community breaking up, After all the United States of America, 
whose Member States had practically no history and which did not seem to 
differ very much to begin with, still experienced a war of secession almost 
a hundred years after its creation, The European undertaking has no prece-
dent in world history, It holds out a promising future for our peoples, Above 
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all we must not jeopardize that future through hasty actions or abstract think-
ing, I 
(Le Soir, 19-20 and 21-25, 26 and 27 May) 
6, Mr, Georges Pompidou, President of the Republic, in a radio and tele-
vision interview 
In a radio and television interview on 24 June 1971, Mr, Georges 
Pompidou, President of the French Republic, discussed European policy and 
more particularly the conditions governing the enlargement of the European 
Community. 
Comparing Western Europe with North America and the Soviet bloc 
he stated: 'Just think of it, how fragile, how small, this threatened peninsula 
of Europe is and yet it has more than 300 million inhabitants and contains all 
the countries which have made the history of mankind for five centuries. It 
can draw on reserves of skill unrivalled in the world, and possesses an eco-
nomic power greater than that of the whole Soviet world and not far from 
equalling that of North America. 
Well, there are two alternatives: either we give up trying to count 
for something in the face of these immense powers or else we try to bring 
these nations of Western Europe together and pool all their potential. 
This is the task we have taken on and the task I have taken on. 
When I arrived on the scene Europe was at a dead-end. Our part-
ners of the Europe of the Six would no longer put up with Britain's staying 
outside, Britain would no longer put up with this Europe of the Six which put 
it in mind of the Napoleonic empire and the continental blockade. General de 
Gaulle, what is more, had been aware of this for a long time. As long ago as 
1958 he said to me: 
"What bothers me about the Common Market is that it will put us on 
bad terms with Britain." And as you know, in the last months of his presid-
ency, in 1968 or 1969, he made an approach to the United Kingdom which was 
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unsuccessful through the fault of the British Government of that time, 
At the same time I realized that our partners no longer wished to 
go forward and that there was very little chance in particular of going on with 
the common agricultural market and setting it up in its final form. This is 
why, at the summit meeting at The Hague, I put the matter squarely before 
them. I succeeded in getting the common agricultural market made final in 
return for opening up negotiations with the United Kingdom, 
And so, because I do not think external policy should be based on 
lies or hypocrisy, I felt that once the negotiations began we had to be fair and 
consequently, not try to lay traps or find roundabout ways of blocking Brit-
ain's path, but that what we had to do was be frank in asking questions. And 
this is what happened at what was obviously the most important moment, i, e. 
when I had my long conversations with the British Prime Minister. 
I then put my questions as clearly as possible. I began by saying: 
Are you ready to accept Community preference, which is the basis of the 
common agricultural market and according to which we obtain our supplies 
firstly from within the Community? And the British Prime Minister confirm-
ed as clearly as possible what had already been publicly stated by the British 
representatives in Brussels. 
The second question was on the operation of the institutions and the 
unanimity rule - about which, as you know, France feels strongly - which 
means that when a country considers that a capital issue is at stake, no one 
has the right to impose upon that country the will of the majority and that we 
have to arrive at unanimous agreement. The British Government replied 
"yes" and has moreover confirmed this publicly. 
The third question was the monetary one. At present the pound 
has the special status of a "reserve currency", It would be too complicated 
to explain this here but this means that it confers certain privileges, Obvious-
ly in the Community everyone must be on the same footing and so Britain's 
currency must be a currency like the others. The British Prime Minister 
gave me an assurance that that was his view of things and that gradually -
for there is no question of creating a monetary crisis in the sterling area -
the pound would become a currency like the others and would therefore be 
involved in what we are trying to create: a European monetary union, 
The fourth question was probably the most important. I asked the 
British Prime Minister what he thought about Europe, that is, whether the 
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United Kingdom had really decided to become European and whether this 
island had decided to moor to the Continent and was ready therefore to disen-
gage itself from the Atlantic area to which its face has always been turned. 
I can tell you that the explanations Mr. Heath gave me and the opinions he 
expressed tallied with France's view of the future of Europe and, moreover, 
with what Mr. Heath has been saying publicly for more than 20 years. 
Of course we are under no illusion: the Europe of the Nine or of 
the Ten will certainly be more difficult to operate than that of the Six and we 
shall have crises... We have already had them even with the Six ••• 
• • • It will be different in its component parts and will develop in a 
way that will raise problems with the East where we shall have to be quite 
firm about the closeness of our relations and our cooperation (without which, 
if you look at the map, we shall be crushed) with the Americans who are our 
friends and allies but, if you look at the map again, not Europeans. All this 
will involve a lot more effort especially since there will be the British tradi-
tions, administrative habits, ways of thinking and special commitments in 
certain fields such as that of defence. But we should be able to build Europe 
if that is what we want. 
France will have a duty and that is to be vigilant, and it will be, 
believe me. Because of its geographic position it enjoys the advantage of 
being in the centre of things and, therefore, indispensable. 
Apart from these two reservations, however, I am very hopeful. 
I have confidence in the United Kingdom of Mr. Heath and I am convinced that, 
not only with him but with all the others including Germany - I say Germany 
because the Franco-German reconciliation has after all been one of the 
important factors in the post-war period and in the formation of Europe - all 
together we can do something great and we can restore Europe to its rightful 
place in the world. 
We must believe in this and we must prepare for it with our eyes 
open.' 
(Le Monde, 26 June 1971) 
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Germany 
1. Visit by the Italian Prime Minister, Mr. Colombo, to Bonn 
:Y 
The Italian Prime Minister, Mr. Emilio Colombo, paid an official 
visit to the Federal Republic of Germany from 1 to 3 April 1971. Discussions 
centred on European problems, i. e, the institutional development of the Com-
munity and the negotiations on Britain's accession, 
Mr. Colombo stated to the 'Handelsblatt' that he would, if neces-
sary, advocate a new European summit conference to overcome any crisis 
which might arise in the negotiations on Britain's entry. Mr. Colombo made 
this statement in Rome on 1 April shortly before leaving for Bonn. 
'German and Italian interests coincide closely on European policy 
and in efforts to secure peace. ' this assurance was given by Chancellor 
Brandt when he welcomed the Italian President before their first private dis-
cussions. 
'Our meeting', said Mr. Brandt, is being held at a time of impor-
tant developments, We have made decisive progress in recent months in put-
ting into effect the decisions reached at the Hague summit conference. Italy 
and Germany could do a great deal to make further progress in Europe pos-
sible,' 
Mr. Colombo considered his visit to be a symbol of firm friendship, 
cooperation and consultation at all levels between Italy and the Federal Repub-
lic. 'Progress towards a united Europe is now entering a difficult but decisive 
phase.' The efforts of the Atlantic Alliance to consolidate peace and security 
must be pursued no matter what difficulties might be encountered. The Fed-
eral Republic and Italy supported the initiative for the political unification of 
Europe taken this year by France. At the end of their two-day discussions, 
Chancellor Brandt and Mr, Colombo suggested th.at the Berlin problem should 
be taken as a test case to determine whether a security conference for the 
whole of Europe was desirable. 
Referring to the final talks between the two Heads of State, the 
Government spokesman, Mr. Ahlers, stated to the press that the suggestions 
made by the French President, Mr, Georges Pompidou, for the development 
of European unification had been considered in detail, Both parties had wel-
comed the French initiative but stressed that much more detailed discussion 
was necessary. 
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At a dinner given in honour of his Italian guest, the Federal Chan-
cellor made a speech from which the following extracts are taken: 
'The Federal Government believes that the decade between 1970 
and 1980 for which we set our course at the Hague summit conference will be 
decisive. We assume that the economic and monetary union will be more or 
less completed and that the system of independent resources for the Commu-
nity linked with growing budgetary powers for the European Parliament will 
enter into force by 1980. We also consider that the enlargement of the Com-
munity, together with the necessary transitional periods and special arrange-
ments required for other countries, will be concluded. 
In addition we anticipate that in these years the foundations will be 
laid for a partnership between the Community and the United States. We also 
believe that important steps will be taken towards closer communication and 
cooperation between the Community and the East European countries. 
Finally political cooperation must be developed further to the stage 
of a common approach to world political problems. If these tasks are com-
pleted by the early 1980s, we shall then be able to begin work on unifying the 
various European activities. 
In the negotiations on the enlargement of the Community, we hope 
that the obstacles still standing in the way of unification will soon be over-
come. Here too our political opinions do not differ. The aims we have set 
ourselves in the sphere of European unification require Great Britain's full 
participation. If the necessary solutions are found in the interests of all par-
ticipants, few problems will be left for the other States which wish to join the 
Community. It will of course still remain for us to find a solution for those 
countries which need a special relationship with the Community. ' 
Replying, Mr. Colombo said: 'We have started work on program-
mes which will continue the far-sighted task embarked upon in the Rome 
Treaties by adding an economic and monetary union to the existing customs 
union. We must try to make sure that the strengthening of our Community 
goes hand in hand with the strengthening of its democratic and political struc-
tures. We must also make sure that this twofold process is not inward-look-
ing but on the contrary facilitates growth resulting from the accession of 
Britain and the other applicant States. 
Europe is already a reality in every sphere of activity and must 
grow from strength to strength. It must therefore maintain and develop exis-
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ting relations with the United States, the Eastern bloc countries and the Third 
World. In particular the alliance with the United States is a prerequisite for 
European defence and security, i.e. genuine freedom and democracy. 
The Atlantic alliance is a vital factor in maintaining peace and ac-
tively contributes to the process of understanding between East and West. We 
shall try to foster that understanding without being discouraged in any way by 
the difficulties we encounter. The Federal Government's Ostpolitik, which 
you have done so much to foster, can therefore only meet with the complete 
sympathy and support of Italy which is patiently working towards detente and 
cooperation on the basis of the highest possib\e mutual respect between the 
parties concerned. ' 
(Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung No, 53, 
6 April 1971; 
Handelsblatt, 2-3 April 1971; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 April 1971; 
Die Welt, 3-5 April 1971; 
Luxemburger Wort, 5 April 1971; 
Relazioni Internazionali, No. 15, 10 April 1971) 
2. The Federal Chancellor is interviewed about European policy 
In an interview he gave on the West German television programme 
'Die Woche in Bonn' (The week in Bonn) on 3 April 1971 Federal Chancellor 
Brandt said with reference to the enlargement of the EEC: ' ... I feel that we 
should not exaggerate the technical difficulties under discussion in Brussels. 
My recent discussions with the French President convinced me that there has 
been no change there in what we discussed in January and that several of the 
points on which an inflexible attitude was adopted will be approached there in 
a constructive way. That is the impression that I have. 
You may ask: What can we do? At all events we must not try to 
do anything spectacular but must realize that if we are to achieve any results 
there must be a common attitude on the part of the six present partners of the 
EEC which is at the sa:rre time acceptable to the United Kingdom. We can 
achieve nothing by applying pressure. We can achieve nothing by acting on 
our own and saying: we are going to take matters into our own hands. That 
is no good. We must always be ready to help. But, as I say, the decisive 
point is that we must arrive at a common ground between the Six and, further-
more, with the Commission. I suggest that this will be done if the negotia-
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tions are resumed in earnest in May. It has already been foreseen that the 
Council of Ministers will then discuss the whole matter thoroughly for a num-
ber of days, .. ' 
Asked whether he thought a West European summit conference 
would be necessary after the enlargement of the EEC, Mr. Brandt replied: 
'I don't want to rule that out but I would not like, at this stage, to give the 
impression that I am announcing such a summit conference. Many people are 
inclined to expect more from conferences than ought to be expected from them. 
It is the amount of careful preliminary work carried out that really counts. 
But I in no way reject the basic idea underlying your question. There is much 
to be said for the view that once the Community has taken the basic decisions 
on enlargement, the responsible Heads of State or Government should come 
together to discuss not only EEC questions in the narrow sense but also how 
the political weight of an expanding Europe could be used to greater advan-
tage.' 
In a broadcast interview on 5 April Mr. Brandt said that he had had 
a 'direct discussion' with President Pompidou on the EEC accession negotia-
tions. This showed that France had not changed its positive attitude to the 
enlargement of the Community and was cooperating 'constructively'. Mr. 
Ahlers, the Government spokesman, did not inform the press of the contents 
of the letter from President Pompidou to Federal Chancellor Brandt but he 
said that this gave details of the French attitude to the enlargement of the 
Community. 
(Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung No. 53, 
6 April 1971; 
Luxemburger Wort, 5 April 1971) 
3. Visit by the British Prime Minister to Bonn 
Mr. Edward Heath, the British Prime Minister, paid an official 
visit to the Federal Republic of Germany on 4 to 6 April 1971. 
In Bonn his discussions with Chancellor Brandt centred on the prob-
lem of Britain's accession to the EEC. The two leaders were in broad agree-
ment on Ostpolitik, the Berlin problem, East-West relations, problems of the 
Nato defence alliance and the need for close partnership between Europe and 
America. 
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.. 
After the first intensive discussions between Mr. Brandt and Mr. 
Heath, the Government spokesman, Mr. Ahlers, said that both statesmen 
considered it desirable and reasonable to have a final decision on Britain's 
accession to the EEC by the summer. Accession must not be considered 
solely as a technical problem but would also have major political implica-
tions. Both Mr. Brandt and Mr. Heath had said it would be fatal for the 
negotiations on entry to fail again. 
Mr. Heath repeated his warning against the dangers of failure of 
the negotiations on the enlargement of the European Economic Community. 
At a dinner given in his honour by Chancellor Willy Brandt, Mr. Heath said 
that the friends of Europe would be horrified by such a failure and its ene-
mies would draw fresh courage from it. Soviet ambitions \\Ould then become 
even more unbridled and the friends of Europe would leave the continent to 
fend for itself. Either Europe would unite and draw great benefit from its 
unity or remain disunited which would have adverse effects on everyone con-
cerned. 
In this connection Mr. Heath warned against the assumption that 
conditions would be equally favourable for enlargement of the Community in 
one or two years' time. He also appealed to the EEC Member States to 
grant Britain fair conditions for entry. The cost must not be so high as to 
endanger his country's growth. During his speech the British Prime Minis-
ter assured Mr. Brandt of the 'fullest support' for his Ostpolitik. 
Britain's accession to the EEC was also the central point of the 
Anglo-German discussions in which Foreign Minister Scheel and the Parlia-
mentary Secretary of State in the Chancellor's Office, Mrs. Focke, as well 
as senior officials of the British Foreign Ministry took part. Caution was 
the keynote of the discussion on political cooperation which also covered Mr. 
Pompidou's proposal for a European Federation. The Government spokes-
man later stated that the two Heads of Government felt that there would one 
day be a European Government. For the immediate future, Mr. Heath and 
Mr. Brandt considered it necessary to strengthen the efforts of the European 
partners in Nato for common defence; this would do much to persuade the 
Americans to keep their troops in Europe, which both parties considered 
desirable. 
The common interest of the two Governments in the conclusion of 
negotiations on Britain's entry to the EEC was stressed in the final meeting. 
Mr. Brandt emphasized that the political significance of the process of unifi-
cation was very important in the present phase of the discussions. He drew 
attention to an idea which Mr. Heath himself broached in his detailed state-
ment. Mr. Heath had clearly stated that Britain's future lay in Europe: 'We 
- 63 -
wish to play our full part as Europeans in Europe. ' 
He had also repeated his readiness to accept all the rules and regu-
lations of the Community on an equal footing with the other Member States. 
He called simply for conditions of entry which would create a fair possibility 
for Britain to adapt itself to the existing Community arrangements. 
At the end of his three-day visit to the Federal Republic, the Bri-
tish Prime Minister gave a press conference in Bonn during which he stressed 
his country's desire to become a full member of the EEC. He thought that a 
Europe which moved forward with economic and industrial strength combined 
with common political objectives could confidently face the dangers and chal-
lenges of the future. 
Europe would be a recognized partner and respected as a power of 
world importance. But if the Europeans missed their chance of enlarging the 
EEC, this would not only discredit the European idea in British public opinion 
but also encourage the Russians in their aim to achieve hegemony. Out of 
discouragement over the failure of the Europeans to reach agreement the 
Americans, on the other hand, would tend to leave Europe increasingly to its 
own fate. Moscow alone would be satisfied by failure of the negotiations on 
the entry of Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway to the EEC. 
(Bulletin des Presse- und lnformationsamtes der Bundesregierung No. 54, 
7 April 1971; 
Die Welt, 5, 6 and 7 April 1971; 
Luxemburger Wort, 6 and 7 April 1971; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 and 7 April 1971; 
Handelsblatt, 7 April 1971; 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung, 8 April 1971) 
4. Foreign Minister Scheel calls for a clear answer by the EEC on the ques-
tion of Britain's accession 
Foreign Minister Scheel urged the EEC Member States to give a 
clear answer to Britain by the end of May on outstanding problems concerning 
its accession to the EEC. In an interview published by the 'Frankfurter Rund-
schau' on 3 May 1971, Mr. Scheel stated: 'We all realize that the time for 
decisions has now come and that we must make decisive progress this sum-
mer which will enable the British Government, with the support of its public 
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op1mon, to complete the negotiations by the end of this year.' 'Let us not 
delude ourselves;' he continued, 'the negotiations will be tough.' 
Mr, Scheel believed that the EEC Ministers must give a clear 
answer to the British negotiator, Mr. Geoffrey Rippon, after their session 
on 10 May, on all the remaining problems of enlargement of the Community. 
Any hint of failure would be a more severe blow to the Community than the 
unsuccessful outcome of the negotiations with Britain in 1963. 
President Pompidou's idea of a future European confederation, out-
lined in his press conference on 21 January, was acceptable to Mr. Scheel as 
a basis for discussion. He stressed the need for a transition to majority deci-
sions in the EEC Council of Ministers and laid down three guiding principles: 
- an institution which is not dependent on instructions given by national Gov-
ernments must play a part in shaping Community decisions; 
- the European Parliament's role must be strengthened to strike a balance 
between parliamentary control and the influence of individual countries; 
- the well-tried institutional principles laid down in the Treaties must be 
maintained to enable the Community to fulfil the tasks awaiting it. 
(Luxemburger Wort, 3 May 1971; 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 May 1971) 
5. Mr. von Hassel, President of the Bundestag, advocates the direct election 
of the German members of the European Parliament 
Interviewed by 'Europa-Union' on 4 May 1971, Mr. von Hassel, 
President of the Bundestag, expressed the hope that the draft law drawn up by 
an inter-party group of the German Bundestag for the direct election of the 
German members of the European Parliament would have a 'positive effect 
on the other countries of the Community. ' 
He went on to say: 'The path to Europe that we have taken cannot 
and must not sidestep parliamentary responsibility and parliamentary and 
democratic control. It can only be completed with a strong European Parlia-
ment which is fully aware of its responsibility and its powers, It cannot leave 
the German Bundestag indifferent that as we progress towards European uni-
fication powers should be taken away from it that are not handed over to rep-
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resentatives of the people at the European level. Like the President of the 
European Parliament, I find it unreasonable that at the European level legally 
binding decisions affecting 183 million people should in some cases be taken 
without being subject to parliamentary control. 
Any further transfer of sovereign rights to Brussels will only 
appear acceptable to the national Parliaments if the position of the European 
Parliament is strengthened. Direct European elections are an important pre-
requisite for this. I expressed this view during my official visit to the Euro-
pean Parliament in Strasbourg in May last year and found undivided agree-
ment. I hope that my proposal to have this question discussed by the Presi-
dents of the national Parliaments can be implemented soon. 
The European attitude of the overwhelming majority of the members 
of the Bundestag is part of the history of this Parliament. Again and again, 
during Europe's crises members of all groups have taken the initiative in the 
interests of European integration. Today too·, joint action by the coalition 
and the opposition is still possible despite their different views. A few weeks 
ago an inter-party group on direct elections was set up in the Bundestag to 
tackle uniform direct elections to the European Parliament. 
Similarly a working party of the CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag 
has since the end of last year been looking into the possibilities of and arran-
gements for the direct election of German representatives, and into the status 
of European representatives as members of the Bundestag. It is suggested 
that such direct elections could be coupled with elections to the Bundestag, to 
save additional costs. The European parliamentarians, who could be elected 
directly into the European Parliament with an additional third vote, would 
have a special status in the Bundestag - somewhat similar to Berlin's -
so that majority relationships in the Bundestag would not be affected in the 
event of their absence. I think that such a procedure is perfectly feasible 
because it also ensures that the members working in Europe would not lose 
their links with their national parliaments. This should not happen at any 
price. 
On the whole I am optimistic that direct elections, a subject that 
is already almost as old as the EEC, can now at last get onto the statute book 
in Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands where similar efforts are being made, 
even though the standpoints of the governments in particular are still differ-
ent. The EEC Council of Ministers looked into this subject "much more 
closely" recently. Perhaps in the near future the Federal Republic will be 
able to take a decision on direct elections and thus render a valuable service 
as the pace-maker for Europe. ' 
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(Europa-Union-Dienst No, 19, 4 May 1971; 
Informationsdienst des Deutschen Rates der Europaischen Bewegung, No. 5, 
28 May 1971) 
6, Discussions in the Bundestag about the monetary crisis 
Mr. Schiller, Minister for Economic Affairs, made a statement 
about the Government's monetary policy measures in the Bundestag on 11 May 
1971, Both Mr. Schiller and the other speakers stressed the significance of 
these measures for the European Economic Community. Between spokesmen 
for the Government parties and the opposition there was no agreement regard-
ing the effect of the German monetary decisions on European integration, 
Mr, Schiller began by saying that the European economic and mone-
tary union was threatened by a greater danger in the form of the inflationary 
development in the Member States than it was by the unilateral monetary po-
licy decisions of the Federal Government, All countries had to have succes-
ses to show in achieving a policy of stability 'before we begin the second stage 
of the economic and monetary union, ' 
If the stability aim were not attained then one would come to a dead 
end at the end of the first stage of the economic and monetary union, Until 
then it was the professed policy of the Community 'to go along separately for 
the time being if a common course could not be found and the vital interests 
of a country made it necessary,' It was still important to get back onto the 
same road again soon, 
Mr, Schiller described the 9 May - the day when the rates of ex-
change were floated - as a day for stability and a day for Europe, At a 
special meeting of the Council of Ministers in Brussels, the German delega-
tion had struggled for a Community solution consistent with the principle of 
the market economy, Some Member States had not however taken advantage 
of this chance to take a step forward in the direction of a European economic 
and monetary union, Such a union could only come into being as the basis of 
lasting integration 'if we all solve our internal problem of stability.' This 
would perhaps necessitate a reappraisal of international monetary relations. 
Mr. Muller-Hermann (CDU/CSU), spokesman for the opposition, on 
the other hand, put forward the view that the European Economic Community 
was plunged in a serious crisis of confidence, After commitments had been 
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entered into about the creation of an economic and monetary union and the 
Federal Republic of Germany had committed itself to narrowing the bands of 
the rates of exchange, the Government was now confronted with the alternative 
of giving priority to the law on stability and growth or fulfilling its treaty com-
mitements to its partner States. It was moreover doubtful whether stabiliza-
tion would be successful; the real danger was that the agricultural market 
would be severely shaken. 
The opposition thought it highly important, before deciding on ex-
ternal economic measures, to take into account European integration and the 
after-effects, and common solutions had to be found beforehand. The CDU 
did not want a 'dirigiste' Europe. Nor did it want European integration to be 
threatened through undue insistence on the orthodoxy of European integration. 
Mr. Junghans (SPD) stressed that the monetary crisis did not start 
with the Deutschemark but with the dollar. The discussions in Brussels 
should also have brought it home to the people that the Federal Government 
could no longer act quite so independently ii;i economic policy as it had done 
a few years earlier. On the path to the European economic and monetary 
union the Federal Republic had to dovetail its external economic policy deci-
sions with those of its EEC partners. The SPD regretted that it had not been 
possible to agree with the other countries on joint action for stability. It was, 
however, glad that the Brussels decisions had given the Federal Government 
room to manoeuvre and to act alone and that other countries had also gone 
along with this. The Federal Republic had used this freedom to manoeuvre 
decisively in the context of the EEC. Mr. Junghans supported the Economic 
Minister regarding the further develcpment of the European Community. Care 
had, however, to be taken that the EEC did not become an inflationary Com-
munity. 
For the FDP group, Mr. Mertes was glad that the Federal Govern-
ment had not introduced currency exchange controls. From the foreign policy 
standpoint what was essential was not to allow the floatation of currencies to 
become a real burden on the EEC. Hence the FDP group would support any 
effort that had the slightest chance of bringing the EEC partners to the point 
where they could progress together with a common monetary policy. The 
FDP group recognized the special position France and Italy were in. They 
attached all the more weight therefore to the fact that the EEC Council of 
Ministers had succeeded in finding a solution which also suited Germany's 
interests. 
Speaking in the debate Chancellor Brandt stressed the Government's 
understanding for the position of the farmers following the floatation of the 
exchange rate. He hoped that the decisions of the Council of Ministers would 
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shield German agriculture from disturbances. At the same time the common 
agricultural market was still the main connecting link of European integration. 
Chancellor Brandt rejected opposition criticism that the Government 
had threatened the development of the economic and monetary union. The 
Government had done everything - in particular by offering monetary assis-
tance to win through to common action with its European partners. Even 
though this had not been possible, Germany was not isolated. They had been 
successful in Brussels in finding understanding for the exceptional measures 
in an exceptional situation. Until the development of the Community went fur-
ther it was still possible not only for others but also for Germany to invoke 
vital interests. But there could be no doubt about the Government's serious 
determination to realize economic and monetary union. 
This development would not be threatened by the Government's 
m.;:airnres. The monetary crisis had on the contrary shown those involved 
ht ·::.-urgently necessary it was to take steps towards a common European eco-
nomic and monetary policy. Of course the Government was still convinced 
that it was no help to Europe to give up the aim of a policy of stability. On 
the contrary efforts had to be made to achieve a European community of stabi-
lity. If one wished to have a healthy Europe one needed to have a healthy 
European economy. 
Chancellor Brandt went on: 'It is hard to see how monetary ques-
tions will affect the negotiations on the enlargement of the· European Commu-
nity. We hope that the present round of negotiations in Brussels will lead to 
further clarification on technical points. We made our contribution at the 
multilateral preparatory talks. I also hope that the forthcoming meeting bet-
ween President Pompidou and Prime Minister Heath will be helpful. The 
Government and I believe the overwhelming majority of this House thinks that 
Western Europe needs Britain and that the time is ripe, and I mean this sum-
mer, for taking the necessary decisions. This is economically reasonable 
and politically necessary. Then we shall see that the European Community, 
after dealing with many difficulties, will become an area in which growth and 
a due measure of stability can be achieved. 
But I remain of the opinion that it is consistent both with a sense· of 
national responsibility and with European realism for us to do everything to 
keep our own house in order. The next step is therefore to achieve stability 
in Germany, which is also necessary for the stability of Western Europe. 
Hence we must now take the Deutschemark out of the international inflation 
convoy for the time being, in the interests of the stability of this country and 
in the long run for the benefit of Europe. 1 
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Mr, Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU group, regretted that the 
European Community did not possess all the powers it needed so it could re-
solve the crisis, In Europe it was only possible to progress on the basis of 
a community of political interests. This called for a stage-by-stage plan and 
a firm commitment to a date for the beginning of a political Community, 
Mr, Apel (SPD) rejected the alternative put forward by Mr. Mtiller-
Hermann that Germany could either achieve internal stability or promote the 
advancement of the Community. There was a public opinion trend against 
European integration at present because of the feeling that it was a Commu-
nity of inflation that did more harm than good. The Federal Government had 
to make it clear that this was not the kind of Europe they were aiming at be-
cause this was not what people wanted, He thought the Brussels decision in-
volved no nation having to surrender: 'I mean that as a result of these deci-
sions, although it may seem paradoxical, we have driven in the first peg on 
the way to economic and monetary union, National independence is coming 
irrevocably to an end and so it is the more important that it should be made 
clear as a result of this step that it is now a matter of a common policy and 
doing more in this direction than we have dqne in the past. Because so far 
we have had the policy of Brussels conference crises which have always 
missed the mark as far as any real breakthrough is concerned, This discus-
sion has made it quite clear that the technocratic masterpiece of Brussels is 
increasingly incapable of standing up to the burdens of reality, that economic 
policy is only one aspect of politics as a whole and that a common monetary 
policy must be coupled with political integration, ' 
When the debate was resumed, Mr, Strauss, former Finance Minis-
ter, took issue with the argument that inflation in Germany had been imported 
from the outside: 'So far one's impression has been - we wish here to pin-
point cause and effect clearly - that this is home-made inflation,' Mr, 
Schiller had also conceded this point himself in all honesty in Hanover, 
'It is only to be expected - and here I am criticizing both the Fed-
eral Minister for Economic Affairs and yourself - that the other EEC part-
ners, and especially France and Italy, do not work on the principle that sal-
vation for Europe lies in adopting the German approach, The Government has 
today expressed regret that its partners did not endorse its own views. It 
would, of course, be a very simple European policy to bring about European 
agreement whenever the others sided with our views, This is a dangerous 
attitude, Mr, Apel, This could provoke a great deal of anti-German feeling, 
If we say we are making a breach in the Bretton Woods system - we must 
here start with a good example, so that an out-of-date system can at long last 
be shaken up and phased out - this is exactly the sort of tone that causes the 
greatest concern abroad and which can lead to consequences that none of us 
can want,' 
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Mr, Strauss agreed with Mr, Apel, of course, that the lack of a 
political superstructure stood in the way of a common cyclical policy: 11 
agree that freeing rates of exchange by all the Six would make sense but only 
on condition that they pursued the same cyclical policy, which ,fs asking too 
much as long as there is no central body to work out and carry through such 
a policy. Until then we shall have to manage with fixed rates of exchange, 
We cannot drag others along with us on a unilateral course, pleading that 
there have been others, but preventing a unified decision-taking process in 
the EEC by persisting in our present standpoint. That is indeed the problem, 
in which unfortunately everything turns round in a circle, ' 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 121st Session, 11 May 1971; 
Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung Nos, 71, 
72 and 73, 12 and 13 May 1971) 
7, Chancellor Brandt receives the German members of the European Par-
liament 
On 12 May 1971 Chancellor Brandt gave a reception for the German 
members of the European Parliament at the Federal Chancellery. 
Against the background of the gradual unification of Europe, he em-
phasized that the Federal Government attached great importance to the role 
of the European Parliament and was therefore particularly glad that after nine 
years a German should once again have been chosen as President of the Par-
liament. 
On the current monetary difficulties in the EEC he said: 'The Fed-
eral Government took its decision in accordance with its commitments in 
agreement with its partners. The outcome of the consultations - on the 21st 
anniversary of the Schuman Declaration - is no sign - as some commenta-
tors have suggested - of the weakness of the Community. It shows, on the 
contrary, that this Community can also contend with difficult situations with-
out this undermining its cohesion. 
Economic and monetary union - this is my firm conviction - will 
not be delayed as a result of the measures taken to safeguard us against cur-
rency speculators or as a result of our efforts to achieve stability .•. 
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The events of the last few days are no cause for giving up; they 
should make us much more determined in our commitment to Europe. ' 
With regard to the enlargement of the European Community, Mr. 
Brandt said that this question had again been discussed in recent weeks -
particularly in the many bilateral talks where the Federal Government had 
also been involved - and it would certainly go a long way towards being 
settled in the next few weeks. 
(Informationsdienst des Deutschen Rates der Europliischen Bewegung, No. 6, 
28 June 1971; 
Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung No. 74, 
14 May 1971) 
8. Mr. Franz Heubl (CSU), the Bavarian Minister of State for Federal Af-
fairs, puts forward a four-point emergency programme for a European 
education policy 
On 2 June 1971 Dr. Franz Heubl put forward, in the periodical 
'Europa-Union', a four-point programme for the development of a European 
education policy. (Dr. Heubl is the deputy Chairman of the CSU and Bavarian 
Minister of State for Federal Affairs.) Dr. Heubl, who was submitting his 
programme a few days before the opening of the Seventh Conference of Euro-
pean Ministers for Cultural Affairs, warned against 'any perfectionist efforts 
to achieve a grand design' in European education policy. As things were at 
present this would collapse straight away, he thought. 
In order to deal with the prevailing psychological difficulties the 
Minister advocated incentives for greater European mobility to begin with. 
He proposed four steps: 
1. The establishment of a European youth office. It was not enough to rely 
on young people's fondness for travel in the holidays. There had to be the 
indispensable minimum of organization and finance to promote exchanges 
between young people. 
2. The foundation of a European scholarship fund to support studies abroad. 
Such a fund could be financed from the budget of the European Communi-
ties. Dr. Heubl said on this point: 'Such a fund could justify increasing 
the proportion accruing to the European Community from the value-added 
tax yield of Member States. 1 
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3, The foundation of a European university for research and teaching in Euro-
pean integration. 
4, An inventory of the European educational systems in preparation for a 
'grand design' for European education. To this end he supported the 
French proposal to found a European institute for educational questions. 
In conclusion he stated: 'Only when we begin taking realistic steps 
will we achieve the great objective: a European design for education policy,' 
(Europa-Union-Dienst No, 24, 2 June 1971) 
9. Chancellor Brandt discusses relations between the EEC and the USA with 
President Nixon 
At a press conference he gave after visiting the United States from 
12 to 18 June, Mr, Brandt confirmed that he had had detailed discussions with 
President Nixon about the outlook for economic and trade relations between 
the Community and the United States, 
Mr, Brandt said: 'We must see to it that the United States and the 
European Communities develop particularly good relations with each other in 
keeping with the economic and political interests of both sides. There must 
be no trade war and at the same time we must remain close politically. 
The United States representatives stressed their keen interest in 
the development of Western Europe and in the problem of enlarging the EEC, 
and in everything involved in the beginnings of closer political cooperation in 
Western Europe; the United States' representatives looked for close coopera-
tion with Western Europe, I made it quite clear that this was what we wanted 
too,' 
(Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung No. 93, 
22 June 1971; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 June 1971) 
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10. Mr. Ertl, Minister for Agriculture, talks to the German-Swiss Chamber 
of Commerce about the major aspects of the agricultural integration 
policy 
On 18 June 1971 Mr. Josef Ertl, Minister for Agriculture, addres-
sed the annual general meeting of the German-Swiss Chamber of Commerce 
in Zurich on the common agricultural market and European integration. 
One point he stressed repeatedly, in different ways, was the need 
to back the common agricultural policy up with a coherent economic and mone-
tary policy directed at achieving the stability without which, in the long run, 
the agricultural market could not operate. Another major point, in view of 
the unsatisfactory trend in agricultural incomes and the threat of imbalances 
on the market, was the need for an agricultural structures policy, which the 
Council of Ministers had set in motion this spring with the adoption of the 
revised Mansholt Plan. Dr. Ertl recognized that this aim could not be achie-
ved without a gradual reduction in the agricultural population; at the same 
time he laid great stress on the sociological and ecological desirability of 
maintaining agricultural infrastructures in regions where the earnings situ-
ation had grown more difficult, particularly in the hill and mountain areas. 
On the possible agricultural aspects of an arrangement between the 
enlarged EEC and Switzerland, Dr. Ertl had friendly and encouraging things 
to say but the latest news from Brussels, he said, was that the European 
Commission had proposed restricting relations between the Community and 
the non-applicant EFTA States to industrial free trade rules. He thought it 
advisable for Switzerland to agree to this proposal because the Federal Gov-
ernment would probably support it. Of course the suggested arrangement 
should then be gradually expanded. 
Regarding repeated disturbances caused by the 'Green Dollar' in 
the common agricultural market, Mr, Ertl concluded, 'It will only be possilie 
for us to hang on to what we have achieved if further progress can be made 
with integration. This produces a source of pressure to forge ahead with the 
internal development and consolidation of the Community.' In actual fact one 
of the biggest problems of the common agricultural policy was the lack of 
integration in the external trade field and because of this, agricultural policy, 
which had long been the driving force of European integration, was now threat-
ening to become the Community's explosive charge. The special regulations 
passed in 1969 and 1971 - following the parity policy measures in various 
Member States - were simply palliatives to prevent the worst hardships and 
injustices. 
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Dr. Ertl said another serious problem which the EEC agricultural 
Ministers had to contend with all the time was the incomes disparity. The 
common agricultural policy had failed to bring a fair share of the general rise 
in incomes to the agricultural community and it had failed, on.the whole, to 
prevent product surpluses and increases in producer prices. Mr. Ertl illus-
trated the whole problem of devising a price policy that would provide adequate 
incomes by saying that 'the same agricultural prices have to be set from 
Sicily to the North Sea and from Brittany to the Bavarian Woods.' 
Having the same prices was in fact extremely difficult 'because 
almost all the factors involved in farm incomes differ so widely in this Com-
munity.' Prices and markets policy could therefore not solve the incomes 
problem on their own; they had to be coupled with structural, social and 
regional policy measures. The question as to whether the surpluses problem 
could eventually be solved with the necessary increase in productivity of those 
firms left in production was not one that could confidently be answered in the 
affirmative. 
Noteworthy were Dr. Ertl's comments on the division of the struc-
ture policy burdens between the Community and the Member States. Almost 
all the Member States had already taken national measures to promote reor-
ganization, giving State help where needed both to those leaving the land and 
to those farmers remaining in agriculture; but they had done so in widely 
differing ways; the amount they had spent had also differed widely. This was 
justified because of the way economic and farming conditions varied from 
country to country and from region to region, but also because if the struc-
tural policy were put on a completely 'Community footing' one would hit the 
financial ceiling relatively quickly. The Mansholt Plan would - and he 
regarded this as a positive feature - ensure that the 'Member States retain 
the necessary room to manoeuvre - especially for regional measures -
and that the amount of money used to implement the measures will be both 
limited and such that it can be taken in at a glance. ' 
On structures in the regional policy context, Dr. Ertl went into the 
agricultural future of the depressed areas. A modern agricultural policy had 
not only to be an economic policy but at the same time a policy for society at 
large. In the highland and mountain areas 'farm management can no longer 
simply be assessed purely by reference to profitability; agriculture and the 
care of the landscape is here a service for the leisure needs of the Community 
and compensation for this must be forthcoming either in the form of manage-
ment subsidies or of contributions from the public authority.' 
At the ensuing press conference Dr. Ertl said, with reference to 
the very topical issue of expanding the policy on producer prices by coupling 
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it with a system of direct income subsidies, that it was hard to see what new 
forms of income would be available to the farmer if the basic income trends 
in the rest of the economy continued . In the long run it might simply not be 
possible to overcome these disparities through price increases, cost reduc-
tions and productivity improvements. In practice, however, a very thorny 
problem stemmed from a recognized principle; for this question as to 'who 
gets what and where the borders are' was also hard to answer from the re-
gional policy point of view. 
Mr. Ertl did not say whether the EEC's market policy, based on 
unified prices, was going to undergo a fundamental overhaul but he did admit 
that the floatation of the Dutch and German rates of exchange had given new 
life to the discussion of this question. It had been proved that the equalization 
measures in the agricultural trade could only partially offset the effects of 
monetary developments. If there were any repetition of these parity changes 
the question of overhauling the agricultural price machinery would naturally 
arise, and here it should be noted that the common market regulations were 
not the only way of promoting the policy laid down in the Treaty of Rome. 
(Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung No. 96, 
24 June 1971; 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung, 22 June 1971) 
11. According to Mr. Karl Moersch, Parliamentary Secretary of State in 
the Foreign Ministry, 'policy on Eastern Europe is directly determined 
by policy on the West' 
Mr. Karl Moersch, the Parliamentary Secretary of State in the 
Foreign Ministry, gave an interview to the 'Handelsblatt' on 21 June 1971 in 
which he discussed the German Government's Ostpolitik. 
He thought that differences between the economic systems were 
largely responsible for the lower growth rates of German trade with Eastern 
Europe than of trade with other countries in the first quarter of 1971. Trade 
between similar economic systems was bound to increase more rapidly so 
that lower growth rates must be expected for trade with Eastern Europe. Mr. 
Moers ch believed that the present ratio of trade with Eastern Europe to trade 
with other countries would not change substantially for the Federal Republic; 
the proportion of trade with the East might even decline somewhat, assuming 
that trade with the West continued to grow at the present rate. 
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According to Mr. Moersch this was not a pessimistic analysis but 
a plain statement of facts.· He noted that business with the Comecon only ac-
counted for 4. 1 per cent of trade by western countries whereas business with 
the EEC and EFTA accounted for 18 per cent of all Comecon trade. On the 
other hand trade within the EEC has risen by 13 per cent over the last ten 
years and trade between the EEC and Comecon by 12. 2 per cent. The East 
European States' share of West European trade had remained constant in 
recent years, the reason being the narrow range of exports offered by the 
Comecon countries and also the lack of information on forward planning in 
Eastern Europe. In addition possibilities for investment by western compa-
nies in Eastern Europe were unsatisfactory; this again was a consequence of 
the differences between the economic systems. 
Mr. Moersch believed that the main political objective of the Fed-
eral Government's Ostpolitik must be to eliminate confrontations in the inter-
ests of the Federal Republic and of the West as a whole. The idea that secur-
ity could only be obtained with military backing was not sufficient. 'The 
causes of insecurity must also be progressively removed.' Confrontation 
could not be eliminated purely by signing non-agression pacts. Mr. Moersch 
believed that all the difficult problems arising between the Federal Republic 
and the East European countries must be discussed. 
Peaceful co-existence must be ensured even though it was impos-
sible to arrange a general peace conference leading to the signature of special 
treaties. The Federal Government's policy was to eliminate possible sources 
of conflict as far as possible, without either side needing to abandon its en-
trenched positions, especially from the legal standpoint. 
The existing power structure could not be abolished overnight. But 
it should be possible to eliminate the threats which had arisen after the second 
world war. The war did not have to be won again on the Berlin problem. Any-
one who approached practical politics with idealistic aims in the Federal Rep-
ublic was doomed to failure, German and European policy could only be suc-
cessful if it set out to achieve the most that was realistically possible without 
indulging in excessive idealism. 
Mr. Moersch did not conceal his conviction that idealism had re-
peatedly led to armed conflicts. In his opinion Bismarck advocated a policy 
based on the realistic cptimum, as did Stresemann who abandoned his policy 
of maximum targets after the first world war. Mr. Moersch paid tribute to 
Adenauer's policy on Western Europe as a splendid example of the attitude 
which he himself advocated. In the area of Ostpolitik he had, however, not 
been able to resist the forces in his own party which wanted to follow a differ-
ent path. 
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Modern politics implied an attempt to ensure not only the avoidance 
of confrontation in specific if limited spheres but also the creation of possibi-
lities for cooperation. This approach could lead to a permanent order of sta-
bility in which the consequences of the second world war could be made more 
tolerable. He thought previous governments had been mistaken to pursue a 
logical policy on western Europe while at the same time creating the impres-
sion that this policy would be abandoned as soon as the other side feU in with 
West German ideas on reunification. Policy on the West had at last become 
realistic now that the Government had admitted the existence of two German 
States. The Federal Government had simply drawn the consequences of the 
heritage of the 1950s: 'Policy on Eastern Europe is directly determined by 
policy on the West.' 
Respect for internal order must be the basis of all cooperation. 
The standards applied to policy on Western countries could not therefore be 
applied to Ostpolitik. Mr. Moers ch rejected the opposition's suggestion that 
any Ostpolitik must be declared a failure if it did not achieve the same degree 
of intensity as policy on the West overnight: 'Qualitatively and quantitatively 
Ostpolitik is quite different. 
German policy on the Eastern bloc countries entailed no value 
judgements while its policy towards the Western countries was founded on 
specific values. If it dame to the point of 'all or nothing' he would have to 
answer 'nothing', but if an attempt were made to achieve what was now pos-
sible, that would certainly be better than nothing. 
(Handelsblatt, 21 June 1971) 
12. New forms of cooperation in a united Europe - lecture by Mr. Schmidt, 
the Federal German Defence Minister, at the Wilton Park Conference 
Mr. Helmut Schmidt, the Federal German Defence Minister, gave 
a lecture entitled 'New forms of cooperation in a united Europe' to the 133rd 
Wilton Park Conference on 22 June 1971. 
He recalled that all the political parties in the Federal Republic 
had for a long time favoured Britain's entry to the Economic Community be-
cause the EEC could never be a complete solution without the economic and 
political power of Britain. He went on: 'For this reason alone I did not vote 
for the Rome Treaties in the Bundestag many years ago although in principle 
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I was in favour of the EEC. 
But the great majority of my people and the Bundestag saw no other 
possibility than to begin with the "little European" solution. The policy of 
European integration provided the Federal Republic with a suitable framework 
for the development of our economic potential. It gave us the prospect of poli-
tical equality in the European family of peoples. It also offered our partners 
security against a new threat from Germany; that is something which is too 
easily forgotten twenty years after the Schuman plan. For our people, and 
above all for the younger generation of the time, European unification was the 
constructive political idea of the post-war years. In spite of all the setbac~ 
I believe that European policy has lived up to the promise of those days. 
We now stand on the threshold of new developments. Behind the 
persistent disputes surrounding individual interests the broad outline of an 
enlarged Community is beginning to take shape. I see a real prospect that 
its essential features will be partnership, pragmatism, an outward-looking 
spirit and the ability to cope with new tasks. 
The Community cannot be effective unless traditional national rival-
ries are replaced by partnership and cooperation. We Germans welcomed the 
Paris discussions between President Pompidou and Prime Minister Heath. 
The Paris summit was not an occasion for us to revive the historical night-
mare of coalitions. The Federal Republic hopes for good Franco-British co-
operation because that can only strengthen the foundations of Europe. Franco-
German reconciliation has been a cornerstone of European policy. It has now 
been consolidated too far to be seriously threatened by differences, e. g. on 
monetary problems. I believe that good Franco-British cooperation will be 
the best practical introduction to the new chapter of European development 
opened by the Hague summit conference eighteen months ago. 
It is becoming increasingly clear that the Community will continue 
to develop pragmatically and not on the basis of abstract plans which were 
considered a possibility in the early 1950s. Developments of modern econo-
mic life are making increasingly close coordination of economic policy deci-
sions essential. The critical phases experienced by the EEC in recen! years 
are for the most part explained by the fact that integration in one sphere was 
frequently contradicted by divergent national measures in others. The cre-
ation of an economic and monetary union will necessarily lead to further de-
velopment of the Community institutions. illtimately we must work together 
to solve our increasingly difficult tasks. In this process the contribution of 
our British partners will be particularly valuable. I consider effective par-
liamentary control over a strengthened European executive to be particularly 
vital. 
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An enlarged Community will not be able to escape its worldwide 
economic and political responsibilities. As the world's largest trading bloc, 
the EEC must surely advocate the abolition of obstacles to trade throughout 
the world. Trade wars, e.g. with the USA or Japan, would defeat their own 
ends. It would also be incredibly shortsighted if the enlarged Community did 
not make a concerted attempt to bridge the gulf between the industrialized 
and the developing countries which in the long run threatens the economic 
development and security of Europe. 
The Community will, however, only be able to implement an out-
ward-looking economic and development policy if it also speaks with a single 
voice on foreign policy. Its economic interest in an outward-looking policy 
is therefore inextricably linked with its interest in a stable order of peace in 
Europe and throughout the world. The Community has embarked upon the 
creation of machinery to lay down a common foreign policy in the future. 
Regular consultations between Foreign Ministers and the formation of the 
Political Committee are a first step towards harmonization of foreign policy 
and a new style of European diplomacy. 
New forms of cooperation also hold out the prospect of political 
innovation. The Community is, for example, already providing national 
trade unions with the framework for closer cooperation which is essential 
if they are to keep pace with the increasing power of international industrial 
combines. 
The new Community institutions are better placed than individual 
States to solve the problems of environmental protection, regional planning 
and youth which are common to all industrial States. 
Britain's accession will give a new dynamism to the Community. 
Europe has the possibility of developing a pragmatic, outward-looking and 
innovative policy on the basis of partnership. We must seize this opportunity. 
The progressive unification of Western Europe is far more than a 
political experiment in a vacuum. Western Europe is simply a part of the 
European continent, Without the military commitment of the United States 
and partnership in NATO, the small and medium-sized States of Western 
Europe would be exposed to stifling dominance by the Soviet Union. They 
would move into the sphere of influence of a world power which allies tradi-
tional power politics with a rigid ideology and bureaucratic administration. 
In such a Europe the new forms of partnership and cooperation which have 
made a vital contribution to the welfare and political stability of Western 
Europe would become infinitely more difficult if not altogether impossible. 
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Cooperation between European States must therefore also be reflec-
ted in the Atlantic Alliance, This Alliance establishes the balance of forces 
to which we owe our security and freedom to take decisions. Without it we 
can have no foreign policy. The Alliance is and remains the most important 
factor in European security and external policy,' 
(Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung No, 96, 
24 June 1971) 
13, Statements by the Federal Chancellor and the Opposition in the Bundestag 
about the successful conclusion of the accession negotiations with the 
United Kingdom 
On 24 June 1971 all the Groups in the Bundestag welcomed the 
statements by the Federal Chancellor and Mr, Hallstein (CDU), for many 
years President of the European Commission, about the basic agreement on 
the United Kingdom's entry into the EEC, 
The Federal Chancellor made the following statement to the Assem-
bly: 'In my Government statement of 28 October 1969 on the then forthcoming 
summit conference at The Hague I said "The peoples of Europe expect and 
urge statesmen to harness the will to succeed to the logic of history," 
This has been achieved in an important field. At the last round of 
negotiations in Luxembourg, the six Member States of the Community and the 
United Kingdom agreed on enlargement. This means that the European idea 
has achieved a decisive victory. All the Governments involved and the Com-
mission made their contribution to this result in a constructive way. 
Let me refer particularly in this House, as I did before the confer-
ence at The Hague, to the statesmanlike far-sightedness of Mr, Georges 
Pompidou, the French President, without whose decisive contribution.this 
success would not have been possible. The same may be said of Mr. Edward 
Heath, the British Prime Minister. His Government stuck to the decision of 
their predecessors and pursued it with determination. They showed the 
United Kingdom will enter the Community, with its political objectives and 
options, unreservedly. As a result the main difficulties can be dealt with. 
The success of the accession negotiations is also a proof of the strength of 
the Community. Now it will be able to transcend the geographic bounds to 
which political circumstances restricted it at the time of its foundation. If 
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the Community had not had this strength there would have been no lack of sev-
ere criticism and it would have been justified. Conversely the success in the 
negotiations proves that the revolutionary proposal that Robert Schuman work-
ed out with Jean Monnet in May 1950 was a first strategically important step. 
If at a time which can without exaggeration be described as historic 
I mention these two names with gratitude perhaps you will allow me to mention 
too Dr, Konrad Adenauer, the former Federal Chancellor, and Mr, de Gas-
peri, the former Italian Prime Minister, who were so determined in calling 
for a start to Western European integration. Here mention should also be 
made of a member of this House for his pioneering activity in the European 
Community. I mean Professor Walter Hallstein, the first President of the 
Commission, who held that office for many years. 
At The Hague in December 1969 I made it quite clear that the future 
of the Community depended too on whether it succeeded in enlarging. At the 
same time we have allowed no doubt on the point that we could only work for 
and realize this accession provided we fully protected the solidarity between 
the six Member States. During the course of the negotiations, which were 
certainly not easy, we were able in our multilateral and personal contacts 
with our partners to discuss ways and means of expediting the accession ne-
gotiations, 
What has been achieved in these last few days will also have a 
favourable effect on the further development of the Community towards eco-
nomic and monetary union, The Federal Government will do everything in 
its power to bring the present negotiations on the accession of Denmark, Nor-
way and Ireland to an equally unsatisfactory conclusion before the end of the 
year. At the same time we shall make every effort to see that the special 
relationship with each of the non-applicant EFTA Member States is settled 
before the conclusion of the accession negotiations so that these important 
treaties can also come into force when the accession of the four applicant 
States comes into effect. 
The Federal Government is convinced that the enlarged - and. we 
are convinced,internally stronger - Community must show itself equal to its 
international responsibility. An enlarged and consolidated Community is un-
doubtedly an influence in world affairs. Outside observers have perhaps 
recognized even more clearly than those inside Europe the significance this 
Community can have in world affairs, The European Community will pursue 
a policy of peace - how could the European peoples of today want anything 
else, given their historical experience? It will in the future be the duty of 
the European Community not to neglect the Atlantic Alliance or its partner-
ship with the United States but wherever possible to be a staunch partner for 
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the neighbouring States of Europe. ' 
The only spokesman for the Opposition was Professor Hallstein, 
the former President of the EEC Commission. He said inter alia: 'We are 
happy at the successful outcome of the decisive phase in the negotiations on 
Britain's accession. Even those who do not like pathos have got to admit this 
is an historic result. It is a victory for the idea of a united Europe. It is a 
great success for the European Community, and that means a success not 
only in the practical present efforts regarding the now concluded negotiating 
phase - and we shall always be indebted to those on all sides who contribu-
ted to it - it is success that is the result of tenacious efforts going back 
many years. 
From the very beginning, i.e. twenty years ago, it has been the 
objective of European unification policy to embrace the whole of democratic 
Europe. That is why when we founded the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy 
Community, we invited the United Kingdom to take part. We have never re-
garded the limitation of the Community to the Six - that is to the little Europe 
as many have regretfully called it - as anything but a beginning. We always 
regarded it as a precursor to the greater Europe. This enlargement is the 
course on which our Community is set. It is therefore consistent with the 
logic of our enterprise. 
We are not yet at the end of the road but as regards the negotiations 
of the Community with the United Kingqom the basic decision has been taken. 
We, the CDU/CSU Group, have not merely the assurance but the certainty 
that these negotiations can no longer fail. The final result depends now on the 
constitutional bodies of the United Kingdom. Common courtesy prevents our 
making any comment on this decision, which could be quite instructive. But 
we must say that we hope that a confirmation of what has been achieved will 
be reflected in the will of the British people. 
We are convinced that everyone will gain from this accession: the 
British people and the other applicant States in that they will share the proved 
benefits, both economic and political, of a Community, and the Community 
itself. For the greater market and an improvement in economic relations 
will increase the material benefits. Our technological basis will be enriched. 
Our voice in the world will have greater weight and hence we can try and ex-
pect to have a stabilizing influence on world policy and world trade. More to 
the point is the fact that all the peoples in the East and West, with whose future 
and doings we are indissolubly bound, will benefit from this enlargement; 
because the purpose of our undertaking is an order for peace and security, 
freedom and equality, solidarity and prosperity, dynamism and progress. 
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Internally this progress will lead to a greater Community - and 
that will not be the least benefit of enlargement - with greater strength and 
decisiveness and with a greater chance of success, now that we have cast off 
the burdens of uncertainty, doubt and paralysis. The rich democratic tradi-
tion of the United Kingdom will be beneficial to the internal development, to 
the urgently needed consolidation and to the increased democratic authority 
of the organization of our Community. Similarly the high calibre of its diplo-
macy, and the incomparable international experience it has, will help to make 
our Community into a federal entity in which the European nations can assert 
their identity and in which at the same time they can answer the major inter-
national challenges of our time with one voice. That is indeed one of the ulti-
mate political objectives of our enterprise which we all share. 
In our pleasure about such prospects we are not alone. We share 
this with all the members of this House. For in this matter there has never 
been any disagreement between us. We share it with our friends and partners 
in the European Community; we share it with all those in the world who share 
our view of European needs, and we hope that as a result of what has been 
achieved, the insight into the high historical' value - moral, political and 
material - of European unification will prevail everywhere where there is 
still any doubt. For we are confident in the vitality and dynamism of a united 
democratic Europe. ' 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 24 June 1971; 
Das Parlament, 3 July 1971; 
Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung No. 98, 
26 June 1971) 
14. Mr. Scheel, the Federal Foreign Minister, calls for an economic union 
based on stability 
Mr, Walter Scheel is optimistic about the future of European inte-
gration. In an interview given to the 'Handelsblatt' on 30 June 1971 he said 
that a common solution to the present monetary problems would not only be 
an important step forward towards economic and monetary union but would 
also create from the outset the conditions necessary for stability and growth. 
He hoped to see a new attitude develop which would view worldwide inflation 
as a challenge. 
There was an urgent need for common action to protect the Commu-
nity against a massive influx of convertible currencies. He drew attention to 
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the guidelines proposed by the Brussels Commission on 23 June with a cata-
logue of measures to discourage large-scale capital imports and regulate 
domestic liquidity. 'We in Germany are ready to agree to this catalogue of 
measures on the whole, although we cannot accept rigid state intervention 
through direct currency control. We believe that the Commission's pro-
gramme should be supplemented by new exchange rate regulations; by this 
we mean that the fluctuation bandwidths of EEC currencies in relation to the 
currencies of non-member States should be widened with a simultaneous re-
duction in the range of fluctuation within the Community.' Monetary policy 
unification would then pave the way for progress towards closer cooperation 
on business cycle and budgetary policy. 
Mr. Scheel felt that only solutions which were advantageous to all 
members of the Community could be acceptable; these solutions must be 
based on absolute equality. He did not believe in an 'entente cordiale' or 
'entente amicale' between England and France in the framework of an enlar-
ged Community. For him the idea of an 'entente cordiale' was a ghost from 
the past which corresponded neither to the interests of the participating 
States nor to the economic, social and political structures of our own times: 
'Anyone who spoke today in the terms used in 1904 - the year of the 'entente 
cordiale' - in other spheres, such as technology or art would simply be 
laughed to scorn. What then is the merit of such anachronisms in politics? 
As has been the case in the past, many different interests will still be at 
work in the EEC after Britain's accession,' For Mr. Scheel the decisive 
consideration was that all the participating countries were firmly resolved 
to act together. 
He did not like the suggestion that Germany was 'going it alone' in 
the monetary sphere, and stressed that both the Federal Republic and the 
Netherlands had only introduced a floating exchange rate after detailed con-
sultations in the Community institutions. Referring to the common agricul-
tural market, Mr. Scheel signified his awareness of the fact that fluctuations 
in the exchange rate in relation to the 'green dollar' would, in the long run, 
impair the operation of the agricultural market. He stressed that in reaching 
its currency policy decisions, the Federal Republic - in agreement with the 
decisions of the Council of Ministers - had clearly stated that the measures 
would only be enforced for a limited period, 'Although it may seem a capital 
factor at present, we are convinced that the temporary floating of the Deutsche 
mark will not endanger completion of the economic and monetary union in ac-
cordance with the phased plan, 
Mr. Scheel rejected the criticism that EEC trade policy was protec-
tionistic. He drew attention to the fact that the Community, which had com-
mitted itself to a liberal common commercial policy, had only recently con-
firmed its outward-looking approach through two important decisions: by its 
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offer of general customs preferences the Community was the first world 
trading bloc to comply with the recommendation of the UNO conference; the 
largest unilateral reduction in tariffs since the creation of the Common Mar-
ket would enable the developing countries as from 1 July to send more than 
twice the value of their 1968 exports to the Community without payment of 
duty. 
'In relation to the East European State-trading nations, the Commu-
nity is also pursuing a liberal trading policy, as is proved by the planned com-
mon arrangements for liberalization in the East which will shortly be finalized. 
These arrangements provide for abolition of the existing quotas, leaving only 
a "hard core" by the end of 1974. In addition the East European countries can 
open negotiations with the Community, which will of course have negotiating 
powers after 1 January 1973, to increase trade still further.' 
'As to relations with the remaining EFTA countries after the acces-
sion·of the four applicant States, the Foreign Minister said: 'We already 
realized at The Hague that conversations must be held with the EFTA coun-
tries which have not applied for membership on the problems which will arise 
for them after enlargement. These conversations began last November. As 
President of the Council I stated at the time that the Community will consider 
with the countries directly· concerned ways of avoiding the erection of new 
trade barriers in Europe. 
Since then exploratory conversations have been held with the Com-
mission and a report has recently been submitted to us. It shows that the 
wishes of Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, Finland and Iceland differ 
widely, but that all these States wish to maintain free trade with the EFTA 
countries which join the Community; they would also like to remove trade 
barriers between them and the existing members of the Community. If we 
recall the discussions which took place on the European Free Trade Area 
before the creation of the Community it is obvious that ideas have progressed 
considerably for the countries concerned to be now considering opening their 
markets in this way. ' 
(Handelsblatt, 1 July 1971) 
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1, In the Senate Mr. Pedini, Under-Secretary for Foreign Aff,airs, gives a 
reply concerning Italy's participation in the European pool for the produc-
tion of enriched uranium 
In reply to a written question from senators regarding Italy's parti-
cipation in the European pool for the production of enriched uranium, Mr, 
Pedini, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said that as soon as the Italian 
Government had learned of the intention of the United Kingdom, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Netherlands to conclude an agreement for the 
production of enriched uranium by the gas-centrifuge process, it had taken 
appropriate steps to secure Italy's participation in this initiative, which was 
of considerable interest both as regards the supply of an important nuclear 
material and as regards the economic and industrial benefits connected with 
the new process. 
The underlying aim of the Government's constant efforts to get 
Italy included, on an equal footing, in the inter-governmental, technolo-
gical and the industrial aspects of this tripartite undertaking at both the bi-
lateral and multilateral levels, was to ensure that the execution of this pro-
ject was not restricted to the three promoting countries, but that it was, on 
the contrary, possible for Italy to join in. These efforts had been successful. 
Less than a month after the tripartite agreement was signed at Almelo on 4 
March 1970, the three promoting countries had sent the Italian Government 
informal proposals for Italy to participate in the project, 
In view of the attitude adopted by Italy these three promoting coun-
tries said that they were ready to submit an intergovernmental draft agree-
ment and a memorandum of intent to serve as a framework for Italy's parti-
cipation, 
These plans for an agreement had been forwarded to Italy officially 
from the British Embassy on behalf of the British, Dutch and German Govern-
ments. 
The draft intergovernmental agreement contained detailed proposals 
for Italy's participation in tripartite industrial cooperation and outlined how 
this cooperation was to develop. 
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The draft memorandum of intent, on the other hand, dealt more 
particularly with the participation of Italian industries in the organization for 
the production and sale of enriched uranium and in the joint enterptise for the 
construction of the centrifuges and industrial plants. 
After examination of these draft agreements worked out by the 
national administrations, contacts were resumed with the promoting countries 
at a meeting in Rome on 18-19 January 1971; this enabled the Italian repre-
sentatives to obtain further details regarding individual clauses in the tripar-
tite proposals. Meanwhile Italy had repeated that if it were to participate in 
the plans for the development of a gas-centrifuge system, this had to be on an 
equal footing with the promoting countries, both as regards the operation of 
the intergovernmental bodies provided for in the Almelo Agreement, and as 
regards access to technology. The negotiations would continue in the months 
ahead. 
As regards relations between the PEC programme and the produc-
tion of enriched uranium, it may be added that the PEC is being used in the 
fast reactors programme to test fuel elements. 
Obviously there is no conflict between the PEC and the enrichment 
programme: Italy and Germany, the promoters of the pool for the production 
of enriched uranium, are also conducting major research programmes into 
fast breeder reactors. 
CNEN has also set up a uranium enrichment group (GIAU) with the 
help of the main national industries for the design and construction of isotope-
separation plants using the gaseous diffusion and gas-centrifuge methods. 
(Senato della Repubblica - Risposte scritte ad interrogazioni No. 108, 18 
April 1971) 
2. Mr. Colombo, Italian Prime Minister, speaking at the twentieth anniver-
sary of the ECSC 
On 24 April, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, Mr. Colombo, Italian Prime Minister, 
stated: 'The driving force behind Europe has always been political even though 
it has usually been harnessed to economic ends. Today, if we are to go ahead, 
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the political option will have to be brought out with the utmost clarity, 
It is not without significance that one of the factors giat has moulded 
the European Community is to be found in the relations of friendship, alliance 
and, necessarily, of defence between the United States and the European 
democracies .•• 
More recently, European individuality, which cannot but be one of 
Europe's aims, even in our relations with our American friends, has been 
emerging with increasing clarity as the aim which somehow sums up all the 
others. It is an individuality to which we are predisposed by our history and 
culture. It is a common need which recurs everywhere in the rich and varied 
panorama of our peoples .•. 
I do not think this originality and personality, which the Community 
of the democratic peoples of Europe will gradually have to assume, can ever 
lead - and I should like to be absolutely clear on this point - to a position 
of non -alignment, 
We can understand and respect the non-aligned third force posi-
tions that various nations have assumed, either for historical or geographical 
reasons or because of the stage of development they have reached, We have 
links of friendship with some of them, We consider they play a valuable part 
in international affairs. But we do not believe that this is the way in which a 
European Community, which is also growing stronger at the political level, 
can face up to all its responsibilities. , . 
A Europe that is gradually becoming firmer in its political outlines 
too can and must therefore try to assert what we were calling its individuality 
to give it greater weight at every level, beginning with the relationships of 
trust that exist in our defensive alliance, We also need to go further with 
our common European approach to the great problems of development of our 
international society and the tensions and crises surrounding this develop-
ment. 
And here we come to the second natural parameter which the united 
Europe will have to face up to: the problem of d~tente, relations between 
East and West and between the East and West of Europe, European security .•• 
On the whole Europe has been able to act as a powerful factor in 
the liberalization and promotion of trade and international trade relations, 
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even though it has only done so from within the borders of the Six. 
This, in our view, is the course to be followed even though here, 
as in agriculture, we shall need a strong sense of purpose and changes will 
have to take place which are bound to be gradual. 
This beneficial and dynamic influence which the Community can 
exert has not failed to manifest itself in relations both with the Soviet Union 
and with the countries of Eastern Europe, and not only at the commercial 
level.,, 
'Of course there is a lot still to be done. It is still possible to 
make great progress in the economic, commercial, cultural, scientific, tech-
nological and human relations between countries with different systems on 
our continent. Consideration should also be given to new ways of coordinating 
aid to developing countries aimed at broadening its scope and making it more 
effective. 
Our countries do want to achieve these objectives just as they want 
to. couple this progress with an improvement in the political climate, which is 
in any case necessary because they are going ahead and growing stronger.,. 
It is enough to think of Bonris Ostpolitik. But each of us - Italy, 
France, the United Kingdom, the Benelux countries - is pursuing an indivi-
dual policy to achieve dl\tente with the East. The reason why these policies 
should be consolidated and coordinated within a larger-scale Community 
policy are that there would be a practical agreement as a result and that it 
would take our Community further on its way.,. 
I have already pointed out that there is now a third parameter which 
the European Community will have to face up to: that of relations with the 
peoples who are demanding progress both at the human level and in terms of 
their status as citizens. The highly industrialized States of today have no 
right to do no more than systematize their mutual relationships, however 
necessary this may be, They must be aware of the expectations they have 
aroused: these are expectations that are growing and do not leave us with 
very much time. , , ' 
Speaking of the enlargement of the Community, Mr. Colombo said: 
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'We do not wish to underestimate the difficulties. We are convinced 
that it is in nobody's interest to conceal or minimize them. But we are also 
convinced that success in the negotiations will give a new lease of vitality to 
the Community and this factor must not be forgotten. And it i' in the light of 
that success, and because of the dynamism and the new confidence there 
would be and because all the social and productive movements of our countries 
would play a bigger part in building Europe as a result, that we should - as 
of now - look at the problems raised by the accession of Britain and the 
other applicant States. 
It would be a serious mistake to be shortsighted now. We do not 
even wish to think about failure and its consequences. But we should make 
it as clear as possible that if there is anything less than complete mutual 
trust - and this would be the inevitable result of failure on the part of all 
concerned to enter into a serious political commitment to solve the problems 
of enlargement in a constructive way - then the consequences, at this point 
in the development of the Community, could be very serious indeed ••. ' 
With reference to consolidation of the role of Parliament, Mr. 
Colombo stated: 
'Preparations have been made. Those who believe in Europe may 
be dissatisfied - it is reasonable they should be - but it must be admitted 
that the time is nearly ripe for this vital step towards political Europe. 
The way to this has been paved by the agreements on own resources 
with the greater powers that stem from this for the Commission, the bid to 
consolidate the role of Parliament and the forms of organized political con-
sultations, which also envisage dynamic institutional developments, that have 
been achieved. The way has been paved even more decisively by the agree-
ments reached on economic and monetary union which have a vital effect on 
political affairs. 
It is clear however, that a lot remains to be done to achieve agree-
ment on making the Community more democratic and on the highly novel 
forms we expect it to assume. Universal suffrage for the election of the Par-
liament is one aspect of this and, I should say, an essential prerequisite. We 
have long been convinced that only through universal suffrage will we bring 
home to our peoples what the aims of the European venture are. In this way 
we shall be creating a vital relationship leading to constant reappraisals and 
improvements ..• ' 
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Mr. Colombo also said that the Community could become a new 
organizational model and he added: 
'To end up by achieving a great, unified European democracy does 
not of course mean it should lose its own traditions and character. It means 
the opposite: only European democracy can give a new and valid sense to our 
values. It can do it, however, with a respect for and with the free acceptance 
of certain rules. These rules are also the rules of democracy: an under-
standing of others and a respect for them. ' 
(L'Europa, No. 6, 30 April 1971) 
3. Discussion of the monetary crisis in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate 
(a) Chamber of Deputies 
On 12 May the Treasury Minister, Mr. Ferrari-Aggradi, explained 
the monetary measures taken in Brussels on 9 May to the Budget and State 
Holdings and Finance and Treasury Committees of the Chamber of Deputies. 
After confirming the validity of the theory that without a monetary 
union the Community would remain exposed to the risk of serious disruption 
which would hamper the process of integration, the Minister explained that 
his faith in the future stemmed from four points on which agreement had been 
reached in Brussels. 
The commitment to prior consultation and multilateral action had 
been affirmed. The measures adopted were exceptional and temporary pro-
visions which would subsequently be revoked. Effective measures to control 
internal liquidity had been considered even by those countries which hitherto 
had resisted this type of control. Finally the adoption of unilateral measures 
had been avoided and the Community left with the responsibility of deciding 
whether certain compensatory measures should be adopted for specific sectors 
such as agriculture. 
Mr. Ferrari-Aggradi then stated that the Italian Government had 
attempted to safeguard the interests and requirements of Italy itself by firm 
action to bring about a renewed expansion of productivity and by placing that 
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action in a European setting. 
Mr. Colajanni (Communist) stated that explanation of the massive 
flow of Eurodollars by the US balance of payments deficit though objectively 
correct did not reflect the whole picture; the underlying cause lay in the 
structural nature of the deficit and in the American desire to continue the 
disequilibrium for an indefinite period of time. The policy of capital COJJ.trol 
was useful but it must be applied by all the EEC countries because it was the 
only serious alternative to successive fluctuations of European currencies. 
Mr. Vittorino Colombo (Christian Democrat) said that the most 
disturbing aspect of American hegemony was economic and not military; the 
dollar's leading role was not justified by the real economic circumstances, 
For reasons of prestige, the United States was avoiding devaluation and pass-
ing its difficulties on to foreign countries. With regard to the action to be 
taken, Mr. Colombo thought that control of capital movements was essential. 
Cooperation at European level was necessary to fix tax exemption for non-
resident accounts and to create a central community bank which, even in the 
absence of a single European currency, would fix official interest rates, com-
pulsory reserve levels and forms of control over capital movements. 
Mr. Scotti (Christian Democrat) mentioned the need for Europe to 
lay down its own effective monetary policy as an answer to the United States; 
this policy must be drawn up independently, even if the task of doing so was 
long and difficult because of the links which existed between economic inter-
ests and political objectives and because of the internal imbalances in the 
Community. The Italian Government must make an effort to review the inter-
national agreements dealing with the problem of flexible exchange rates and 
the role of the special drawing rights for the European monetary unit. 
Mr. Orilia (Independent Left) stressed the contradictory economic 
and political aspects of the policy followed by the different EEC Member 
States in face of the crisis which had occurred in the monetary sector, and 
expressed the opinion that genuinely effective measures could only be taken 
by developing adequate machinery to control the movement of capital; and 
then only if the European line differed from the policy followed in the past. 
After pointin€, out the need to remedy certain monetary policy short-
comings of the past, Mr. Serrentino (Liberal) stressed that the policy of the 
Italian Government on this occasion deserved support to the extent that the 
present stagnation of the Italian economy had made it impossible to fall in with 
the measures taken by other Member States. But all that now existed were 
immediate safeguards which offered no guarantee for the future because the 
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problem of adjusting the different currencies to their true value, as the only 
way of arriving at a single European currency, remained open, 
Mr. Fabbri (Christian Democrat) regretted that no preventive 
measures had been taken even though the present situation had been foreseeri. 
This meant that the existing machinery did not function properly. The imme-
diate consequences might not be serious to Italy but were damaging to the 
EEC, The United States on the other hand was satisfied with its position and 
practically indifferent to the fate of the dollar on foreign markets. The risk 
for the future was not so much that of speculation as of wide fluctuation in the 
exchange rates. Progress must be made towards a coordinated European 
monetary and economic policy because all other expedients, even if useful, 
could only give temporary benefits. 
(b) Senate 
On 21 June, the Senate held a debate on a number of oral and writ-
ten questions and motions, submitted by many senators belonging to different 
political groups, on the monetary policy measures adopted at international 
level. The debate ended with the adoption of a majority motion approving the 
policy followed by the Government at the recent meetings of the European 
Community institutions, 
Senator Nencioni (Italian Social Movement) stated that, bearing in 
mind the likelihood that a speculative wave of Eurodollars might unfurl on 
Italy if the lira were revalued, it would be necessary to recommend, through 
the appropriate channels and by pressure on the Community organizations, 
the creation of a new system to control international liquidity and exchange 
rates, while respecting the interests of the different national communities, 
He expressed his concern at the proliferation of multinational companies 
which found the great volume of mobile capital and Eurodollars a perfect 
means of satisfying their growing requirements, since stringent currency 
regulations prevented the immediate transfer of currency and financial capital, 
Senator Li Vigni (Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity) 
stressed that in the present state- of affairs there was no prospect of estab-
lishing a stable monetary system, That would only be possible if Italy and 
Europe showed the political will to clarify their basic positions and possibly 
face a political confrontation with the United States, 
Senator Anderlini (Independent Left) stressed in turn the possibility 
of a political turn-around by the United States which would entail risks for the 
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European economies, and regretted the fact that the Italian and Community 
authorities had not adopted a clear position on the dollar problem. If Europe 
had in fact reacted in unison, the crisis could have been solved in a variety of 
ways and it would have been possible to create the framework for a new mone-
tary and political equilibrium, The return to a gold standard must be exclu-
ded and it would be necessary to move towards a world monetary unit whose 
management would involve the responsibility of all the nations of the world, 
Measures could be adopted to control the movement of capital to and from 
foreign countries not only as a long-term proposition but also in the imme-
diate future in order to coordinate those movements with the economic policy 
of the Community; to apply controls not only to the banking sector but also to 
the non-banking sphere and to work out a European calendar for Euro-bond 
issues in dollars; to apply compulsory reserve coefficients to dollar holdings 
in the European banks and finally to adopt means of dissuading American in-
vestments in Europe, 
After criticizing the fact that the EEC member countries had tried 
to find separate answers to the problem instead of showing a common front, 
Senator Pirastu (Communist) stressed that the results of the June meeting of 
the EEC Finance Ministers had superseded the statements made in May to the 
Chamber of Deputies by the Treasury Minister, since it was evident that the 
Federal Republic of Germany did not intend to terminate the floating exchange 
rate for the DM and wanted to strengthen its economic supremacy, The 
speaker hoped for a new international monetary system based on a new cur-
rency unit which would enable exchanges and trade to develop between all 
countries even if their systems of government differed. 
Senator Formica (Socialist) stated that in face of the situation of 
crisis and disequilibrium, European Governments had placed excessive faith 
in the possibility of prevention and therapy through the system of special 
drawing rights, demonetarization of gold and international monetary coopera-
tion, But agreements of an exclusively monetary nature could not fill the gap 
created by the lack of common action at the econo;mic and political level which 
had appeared when no coordinated and unified measures had been taken by the 
Community countries to dissuade or regulate the influx of hot money. He said 
that the floating exchange rate of the Mark was a measure which would only 
dissuade speculation temporarily and he asked for the Federal Republic to fix 
a precise date on which the rate would cease to float. After indicating-meas-
ures which would be capable of controlling the influx of dollars, he pointed out 
that these measures, which were useful only for a brief period, should be 
accompanied by major political action to coordinate the strategy of the indi-
vidual States in the sphere of development rates, price levels and tax arrange-
ments; all these were economic policy objectives. 
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Senator Pella (Christian Democrat) stated that it was exaggerated 
to suppose that inflation in Europe was a direct result of inflation exported 
from the United States because in Europe there was an independent phenome-
non of inflation which was masked by the concept of 'imported' inflation. With 
reference to monetary reserves, after stating that it was impossible to return 
to a pure gold standard, he said that while being convinced that a currency 
was guaranteed by the stability of the economy and correctness of financial 
policy it was important not to elevate this theory into an absolute value. He 
called upon the Government to give an assurance that it would favour appro-
priate action to achieve the necessary objectives and ensure that the Commu-
nity States would harmonize their economic policies while awaiting the cre-
ation of a politically integrated Europe. 
Senator Cifarelli (Italian Republican Party) stated that the estab-
lishment of an economic and monetary union was a point of no-return and went 
on to draw attention to the qualitative move forward taken in European integra-
tion; he said that from this angle the shock of the monetary crisis last month 
had been salutary because it had favoured uµion; he then pointed to the impor-
tance of the Italian Government's commitments in relation to the need to over-
come this system of floating exchange rates and control the abnormal level of 
international liquidity. 
After outlining the background to the monetary system at the begin-
ning of May the Treasury Minister, Mr. Ferrari-Aggradi, justified the Italian 
position not to suspend dealings in the lira as follows: faced with the internal 
situation which was characterized by sharp rises in production costs it was 
important not to make exports more expensive; the parallel floating of ex-
change rates would have deprived Italian monetary policy of any content by 
tying it to a currency which was in constant difficulties, namely the DM; as 
regards imports, those of raw materials would not have been affected while 
imports of firl:ished products could have been transferred to other markets. 
The Minister then stated that the European will to make progress 
towards the economic and monetary union had never been less apparent. He 
added that the Council had ruled out the adoption of quantitative recommenda-
tions which, because they would have been based on an arithmetic mean in-
stead of on the real situation of the individual countries, would have been 
difficult to adapt to the structural and short-term position which varied widely 
from country to country. 
The Italian delegates had been firm on this matter. However, as 
gradual progress was made on the difficult road towards economic and mone-
tary union, further integration would be essential. All the countries were 
extremely disturbed by the present rate of inflation which was much higher 
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than that foreseen in the short-term development programme. 
This problem also concerned Italy and must be highlighted; but here 
again the Italian requests had been fully met by the Community; inflation 
could not be counteracted purely by the classical methods which were suitable 
for countries with full employment, but rather by methods tied to the commit-
ment to a policy of productive expansion and social reform. 
Consideration of the problems relating to the dangers of inflation 
necessarily led on to certain basic aspects of the current international prob-
lems: internal and international liquidity, their interaction and the means of 
controlling liquidity. 
This interaction not only affected the Community and its Member 
States but also the Group of Ten and ultimately the International Monetary 
Fund. There was no miraculous solution for any of the parties concerned. 
We should continue to work day by day through official and unofficial contacts 
to establfah cooperation. Here too everyone concerned wanted to find a solu-
tion. 
Returning to the Eurodollar market, the Minister said it was pri-
marily a reflection of the persistent disequilibrium in the American balance 
of payments. However, the problem was further complicated by indirect 
movements which were added to the direct flow of dollars. 
The first effects of this multiplication were the direct deposits by 
central banks and indirect deposits through the Bank for International Settle-
ments. 
Finally as regards the influence of the Eurodollar market on inter-
nal liquidity, attention was being given to the regulation of non-commercial 
transactions; some proposals including two which had been in use in Italy for 
several years, would be examined; special permits for loans to companies 
and regulations governing the net external positions of the banks. 
The Minister concluded by stressing that while the solution to Euro-
pean monetary problems must be found on a realistic and practical basis, at 
the same time the Italian position had been fully safeguarded. 
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(Camera <lei Deputati - Bollettino delle Giunte e delle Commissioni Parla-
mentari, No, 492, 12 May 1971; 
Senato della Repubblica - Resoconto stenografico, No, 495, 21 June 1971) 
4, Talks in Stockholm between Italy and Sweden 
At the end of his meeting with Mr, Torsten Nilsson, the Swedish 
Foreign Minister, Mr, Moro, the Italian Foreign Minister, said: 'Today we 
examined the political rather than the economic aspects of a rapprochement 
between Sweden and th.e EEC. The Swedish have made proposals which un-
doubtedly deserve to be taken into consideration, Their contribution to the 
technological and industrial development of Europe is indisputable, We have 
always appreciated Swedish neutrality because of its function in maintaining 
a balance in northern Europe, and we should look into special forms of parti-
cipation for that reason. 
It would be absurd to suggest that Europe can do without a country 
as advanced as Sweden, just as it would be difficult for Sweden to isolate it-
self. In fact I am convinced that the European road also goes through Stock-
holm. Europe should not create divisions but communities based on more 
varied premises, For Sweden there will probably be a special formula which 
takes its special condition into account; just as special separate agreements 
will have to be looked into for other nations such as Austria, Switzerland and 
Finland which cannot, for various reasons, join the EEC,' 
(Corriere della Sera, 19 May 1971) 
5, Mr, Romita, Under-Secretary for Public Education, calls for the estab-
lishment of the European University 
In an interview given to 'Informazioni universitarie europee' Mr. 
Romita, Under-Secretary of State for Education, said that the Italian Govern-
ment was expecting the autumn meeting of the six Ministers of Education to 
work out agreements for the creation of the European University at Florence, 
'I would recall the Italian Government's commitment to revive the 
project which has now reached maturity, The idea is to set up in fact a Euro-
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pean post-university institution in Florence which could give a special impetus 
to the study of and research into problems raised by European integration, by 
the great changes in our continent and by its relations with other civilizations. 
The four departments envisaged (history and civilization, political 
and social sciences, legal sciences, economic sciences) will give research 
students an opportunity to contribute to the advancement of knowledge affecting 
the common heritage of Europeans, in its unity and diversity, at the very 
highest level. The University of Florence could be a means of encouraging 
the Europeanization of existing universities and university cooperation in 
general. The University should not compete with existing university or post-
university institutes in Europe which have carried out praiseworthy work and 
which are going to be called upon to an ever increasing extent in the wider 
context of a European educational Gommunity, 1 
(Informazioni Universitarie Europee, No. 53, June 1971) 
6, Italian support for the UNIPEDE initiative on nuclear programmes. 
The programmes drawn up by CNEN (National Nuclear Energy 
Committee), ENEL (National Electricity Establishment) and the industries in 
the nuclear sector were examined by CIPE (Inter-ministerial Committee for 
Economic Planning) at a meeting on 4 June attended by the Ministers con-
cerned. 
At the close of the meeting, Mr. Gava, Minister for Industry, said: 
'We made a close study of the CNEN programmes and issued directives for 
research into convertor reactors, fast breeder reactors and nuclear fuel. We 
also decided to join in the UNIPEDE (Union of European Electricity Producer~ 
programme for the manufacture of fast breeder reactors in which France and 
Germany are also participating. 
I 
In all, CNEN programmes will involve expenditure of 430,000 mil-
lion lire, while the plan scheduled for the previous five years was based on a 
total of 150,000 million lire. 
As regards its participation in the UNIPEDE programme approved 
by CIPE, ENEL will be able to avail itself freely of the technical knowledge 
and information gained during the planning, construction and operation of the 
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two power stations equipped with fast breeder reactors which will be built in 
France by 1974 and in Germany by 1978, The full expenditure involved in the 
programme has not yet been worked out, 
The fact that the two power stations are planned in France and Ger-
many raised criticism in Italy, just as there was criticism of the fact that 
Italy was only participating on a minor scale, In this context ENEL pointed 
out that supplies, including some of great technical value, were to be provided 
by the industries of the three countries in proportions equal to the participa-
tion of the national electricity producers, 
(11 Corriere della Sera, 5 June 1971; 
11 Sole - 24 Ore, 16 June 1971) 
7. Visit of the Italian Foreign Minister to Ireland 
Speaking at a press conference in Dublin on 11 June on the occasion 
of his visit to Ireland, Mr. Moro, Italian Foreign Minister, spoke of the com-
mon resolve of Italy and Ireland to speed up the negotiations for Ireland's ac-
cession to the European Communities by developing and stepping up contacts 
and exchanges of views both in the Community and every other diplomatic 
arena. 
In this context, Mr, Moro - as he pointed out to the journalists -
noted the comments made by the Irish on outstanding issues, assuring them 
of Italy's full support for every attempt to solve them and to dissipate any 
doubts or confusion. 
There were many points of similarity between the problems of Italy 
and those of Ireland. In both countries an active policy of incentives for pro-
moting the less developed areas was being pursued, On joining the Common 
Market, Ireland intended to try and safeguard these regional policy interests, 
in pinpointing and developing which Italy's Community experience would be 
most useful. 
Mr. Moro added that in his talks with Mr. Hillary, Irish Foreign 
Minister, their discussions had covered not only economic problems but poli-
tical ones too, including detente and peace in the light of the NA TO Council 
meeting in Lisbon. In particular, they discussed the European Security Con-
- 100 -
ference and a balanced reduction in military strength, 
(11 Popolo, 12 June 1971) 
8, During his visit to the United Kingdom, Mr, Colombo, Italian Prime Min-
ister I gives his views on the political integration of Europe 
In interviews given to 'The Observer' and 'The Guardian', and at a 
press conference, Mr. Colombo, the Italian Prime Minister, stressed the 
political importance of Britain joining the EEC. 
'Italy has always viewed the problem of Great Britain's entry into 
the Community in a predominantly political light. We are pleased that this 
view has finally prevailed over the important and delicate but, at the same 
time, narrow technical and economic considerations which formed the subject 
of the negotiations, 
For the Italians the chief reason of existence of the Community has 
been political throughout, Twelve years ago their doubts about some of the 
economic consequences of membership were as pronounced as those in Bri-
tain today.' According to Mr, Colombo, Italy, then primarily an agricultural 
country, hoped to obtain some advantages for her citrus fruits and vegetables, 
but was fearful of the industrial.implications. But today the Italian Prime 
Minister declares: 'We were wrong, The reality is the reverse. 
Inside the European Community we discovered the thrust for the 
complete transformation of our economy. And I believe that by joining the 
Community and finding herself alongside the big economies of Germany and 
France, and also the Italian economy, Britain will also find the means for 
her economic transformation, ' 
He did agree that Britain and Italy had a common interest in the 
development of regional policies on a European scale: 11 am really convinced 
that on this we can work together within the Community. ' But ~s Mr, Colombo 
sees it, 'it is not a question of transferring Community resources from agri-
culture to regional development but of creating additional Community funds 
for this purpose. ' 
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Mr. Colombo gave a strong priority to the creation of an economic 
and monetary union (the two being inseparable) and believed that no such union 
could last long without a supporting political structure. 
He remained faithful to the 'federalist thesis' and an advocate still 
of direct elections to a representative European Parliament. 
The Prime Minister indicated that he expects the West European 
democracies to follow the path of the Italian States towards full union, but he 
made it plain that 'our Community does not tend to level out or to denature the 
peculiar contribution of each member but to give value to it. ' 
Looking towards the creation of what he called 'an ensemble of 
nations which will make their voice heard in the world', he indicated that he 
would expect the enlarged Community to take over Chancellor Brandt's Ost-
politik. 
He claimed that the developing of clear economic and political links 
with the Communist bloc 'depends greatly on the strength of Western solida-
rity. I 
Although he conceded that the Soviet Union had not recognized the 
Brussels institutions, he expressed the conviction that they would soon do so. 
He said he had noted several hints that China was interested in doing business 
with the Community, and he did not expect the Russians to trail too far behind. 
(The Observer, 20 June 1971; 
The Guardian, 28 June 1971; 
The Times, 29 June 1971; 
Avvenire, 30 June 1971) 
9. European policy debate in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee 
On 24 June Mr. Moro, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, outlined in 
the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee the international policy pursued by the 
Italian Government in recent months. 
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Referring to European problems, Mr. Moro spoke of the successful 
outcome to the negotiations on Britain's membership of the Community and 
stressed that since the very beginning of the historical attempt to establish a 
united Europe, Italy had always hoped that the British people w.9uld participate 
fully. During the past year, in which conditions had been more favourable, 
the Italian Government had worked discreetly but tenaciously and effectively 
for accession of Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway to the EEC as part of 
a great common venture. 
He pointed out that the aims and structures of the Treaties of Rome 
had been safeguarded while equitable conditions had been offered to the appli-
cant countries; he added that ways and means must still be found of associ-
ating with the Community those EFTA countries which, because of their 
special historical traditions or international commitments, could not parti-
cipate in the process of political unification of Europe but wished to share in 
its economic and social life. The conditions had now been created for Europe 
to achieve its true dimensions as well as the economic and political weight 
needed to· play throughout the world, and in particular in the Mediterranean 
and African areas, an effective role for cooperation, civil progress and peace. 
Referring to the Mediterranean area, Mr. Moro spoke of his re-
cent journey to Algeria during which he established direct and friendly con-
tacts with all the Maghreb countries; he stressed that this region was an 
important factor of stability in the Mediterranean, all the more so as the 
development towards increasingly close forms of economic and political co-
operation between the individual countries concerned as well as between the 
latter and Community Europe was becoming increasingly rapid. 
He then touched on the subject of relations between Italy and Africa 
and the problems of that continent in the light of his conversations with states-
men and members of government of the African countries. He stressed the 
importance which must be given to relations between Italy and the African 
States in the general context of Italian foreign policy and said that from the 
outset relations had been developed on the basis of respect for the internal 
situation and foreign policy options chosen by the governments of the young 
nations now emerging on the international scene. Italian policy was founded 
on full recognition of the independence of the African peoples and on rejection 
of colonialism and racial discrimination. 
Senator Nenni (Italian Socialist Party), associating himself with the 
entirely positive opinion expressed by the Minister on the agreement reached 
by the Six in Luxembourg for Britain's entry into the Common Market, pointed 
out that time and the hard arguments of the past had left traces which were 
not easy to erase: this was reflected in the arguments currently raging in 
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Britain over the conditions of accession; these arguments were in fact more 
heated than had been expected. He felt that realization of the fact that Europe 
needed Britain as much as Britain needed Europe would help to overcome any 
remaining British hesitation; the early accession of Denmark, Norway and 
Ireland would also facilitate matters. 
He concluded by pointing out that the European Economic Commu-
nity was not an end in itself but a means of achieving a genuine European poli-
tical community which would enable the continent to become an essential com-
ponent of a new world equilibrium based on a policentric concept of interna-
tional life. 
Senator Bettiol (Christian Democrat) expressed his own concern 
at the obstacles which he felt the British mercantilist mentality might place 
in the way of the construction of a political Europe based on the ideals of Mr. 
Schumann, De Gasperi and Adenauer; he saw a further stumbling block on 
the road to European political union in Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik which 
was turning Germany towards the Eastern countries on a strictly German and 
non-European basis. 
Senator Calamendrei (Italian Communist Party) also stressed that 
action for a united Europe must be bound up as closely as possible with the 
policy of dHente; the action for European unity could be placed in this wider 
context: British membership of the EEC would only be significant if the Com-
munity was enlarged on the firm principle of creating a united and independent 
Europe with the agreement and participation of the people. 
Referring to the problem of Britain's membership of the Commu-
nity, Senator Brusasca (Christian Democrat) stressed the implications this 
important event would have outside Europe. Europe could rapidly become a 
fourth pole in world policy, able to work effectively to consolidate security 
and peace: it would also have significant and useful ties with the Pacific area 
through Britain. This situation could open exceptional prospects for world-
wide action, especially in the sphere of relations with the great Asian conti-
nent. 
Senator Oliva (Christian Democrat) expressed the hope that Austria 
and Switzerland would soon move closer to the European Economic Communi-
ty and stressed that Britain's entry was liable to highlight the northern 
character of the Community by further isolating Italy, which was committed 
to the task of solving the great Mediterranean problems, 
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Senator Fabbrini (Communist) said that Britain's entry into the EEC 
was being welcomed with excessive optimism and stressed that European 
unity would not gain from this new development. In addition the European 
Community was unable to achieve genuine independence becau~ of US military 
policy which tended to burden Europe with the economic consequences of the 
war in Vietnam, 
Senator D' Andrea (Liberal) and Senator Dindo (Social Democrat) 
stressed that Britain's entry meant the achievement of an enlargement which 
had long been hoped for: united Europe would become the fourth world power 
and European problems would have to be solved in a continental rather than 
national content, 
Closing the debate, Mr, Moro confirmed in reply to the various 
speakers the political significance of the successful outcome to the negoti-
ations with Britain and the other applicant countries, He said that Britain's 
entry would not jeopardize the prospects for political development which was 
inevitable in the long run. The economic and monetary union would inevi-
tably lead to integration, 
(Senato della Repubblica - Resoconto stenografico, 24 June 1971) 
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Netherlands 
1, Approval by the Second Chamber of the gas-centrifuge agreement with 
Britain and Germany 
The Second Chamber approved the agreement drawn up in Almelo on 
4 March 1970 between the Netherlands, Britain and Germany on cooperation 
in the development and operation of the gas -centrifuge method for the produc-
tion of enriched uranium, The Chamber, which discussed the matter on 3 and 
9 March 1971, signified its approval only after the Government had agreed to 
a number of guarantees against misuse of the project for the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons. 
Mr, Westerterp, speaking on behalf of the three main Christian 
Democrat Parties (Catholic People's Party, Anti-Revolutionary Party and 
Christian Historical Union) listed ten guarantees which must be given by the 
Government, The three groups wanted specific confirmation of these points 
by the Government: 
1, The Netherlands enters into negotiations with the two other countries on 
the assumption that arrangements will be made to prevent the gas-centri-
fuge process from being misused to further the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, 
2, Cooperation between the three countries must not interfere with the Nether-
lands' desire to continue on the path of peaceful development in Europe 
and reduction in the stocks of nuclear weapons. 
3, Tripartite cooperation is an additional guarantee that the process will not 
be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic, 
4, If Britain should decide to further enrich in its own plants uranium ob-
tained from a tripartite plant so as to make this uranium suitable for the 
production of nuclear weapons, this must be done exclusively with uranium 
originating from a tripartite installation established in the United Kingdom 
and not in the Netherlands, 
5, In the framework of the Joint Committee which must reach its decisions 
unanimously, the Netherlands Government will not cooperate in exporting 
information, equipment or material developed or produced as a conse-
quence of tripartite cooperation to countries other than Eura tom Member 
States, unless such exports are accompanied by the guarantees required 
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
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6, The policy of the Netherlands representatives in the Joint Committee will 
in general be directed towards giving priority to the prevention of proli-
feration arising out of tripartite cooperation on the gas-centrifuge process 
over the commercial advantages which may result therefr~. 
7. In the Joint Committee the Government will not support transactions re-
lating to the exporting of data, licences, equipment and material to coun-
tries which have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty unless they have 
first discussed the matter with the Second Chamber of the States-General. 
8. In the framework of the Joint Committee the Government will not support 
transactions with countries which have signed the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty but fail to respect its provisions. 
9. In negotiations on the accession of other countries, the basic principle 
followed shall be that applicant countries must be willing to enter into the 
obligations accepted by the Netherlands, the Federal Republic and the 
United Kingdom in the Almelo Treaty, in order to prevent the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons, ensure control over the latter and maintain the 
secrecy of information. 
10. Bearing in mind the above considerations, the contracting parties advo-
cate links between the tripartite system of cooperation and Eura tom com -
patible with the industrial and peaceful nature of the gas-centrifuge pro-
ject. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Luns, agreed to the condi-
tions laid down by the three Christian Democrat parties. 
The Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. Nelissen, signified that 
there was an increasing likelihood of Italy acceding to the Treaty. 
At the end of the debate the Second Chamber passed a motion, 
tabled by Mr. Oele and Mr. De Goede: 
'The Chamber, 
after discussing the Treaty of Almelo and the obligations arising 
for the Netherlands from the development of the gas-centrifuge method; 
finding that in the present phase of the development project there 
is insufficient information on the consequences for European industrial policy 
and the role which the Government must play in the transition to the commer-
cial phase in the interests of consumers and European cooperation; 
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believing that no efforts must be spared to ensure that this project 
gains wider backing in the Community; 
calls for further discussions between the Chamber and Government 
before deciding on the construction of a commercial installation with a pro-
cessing capacity of more than 350 tons per year, 
and continues with the agenda, ' 
(Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1970-71 Session, Sitting of 3 March 1971, 
p,3103; 
1970-71 Session, Doc, 10 469, 10 733, No, 11) 
2, Parliamentary questions 
The competence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
Mr, Visser and Miss Goudsmit (Democracy '66) addressed a written 
question to the Government on Judgment 22/70 of the European Court of Jus-
tice of 31 March 1971 which was critically reviewed by 'Le Monde' on 21 April 
The question read as follows: 
- Does the Government feel that by delivering this judgment the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities has substantially promoted the further 
development of the European Communities by enabling it to appear as an 
independent unit in the conclusion of agreements governing international 
transport? 
- Does the Government think that in delivering this judgment the Court has 
remained within the powers assigned to it by the EEC Treaty? 
- Is the Government ready to do everything in its power, both within and out-
side the EEC, to ensure the observance of this judgment by the Community 
bodies, particularly the Council of Ministers and the European Commission? 
- Is the Government ready to ensure that the powers of the Court, in so far 
as they are laid down in the Treaty, will in future also be applied without 
restriction? 
Mr. De Jong, as interim Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave an an-
swer on 26 May on behalf of the Prime Minister. The Government answered 
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the questions in the affirmative, It referred, however, to the circumstance, 
which was also described as relevant in the Court's judgment, that the proce-
dure for negotiations on the conclusion of treaties with third countries was 
not regarded as being exclusively a matter for the bodies of th.fl Community 
and the Member States, 
(Tweede Kamer, 1971 Session, Annex 129) 
The Europ!=)an Eolicy re~arding the Middle East 
On 2 May Mr. Dankert (Labour Party) submitted a written question 
concerning a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the European Communities 
that was held on 13 May, at which an attempt was made to agree on a Commu-
nity policy regarding the Middle East. 
On 3 June Mr, Luns, Foreign Minister, replied that he had cate-
gorically denied that he had come to an agreement with his colleagues from 
the other five Member States about the need for Israel to withdraw behind the 
frontiers existing before the Six Days' War in 196 7. 
Mr. Luns further stated that as a result of Dutch pressure it had 
been carefully stated in the working document@.rawn up by the Directorate-
General of Political Affairs of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Six 
and approved by the Ministers) that nothing had been deleted from the terms 
of Security Council Resolution No, 242 of 22 November 1967, In this the 
withdrawal from the occupied areas is regarded as essential to any fair and 
lasting peace settlement, which must be surrounded with guarantees. The 
Minister added that in view of his own attitude and the reserves of his col-
leagues regarding French policy in the Middle East, it would be wrong to 
suggest that an agreement had been reached in Paris on 13 May on a common 
policy regarding the Middle East, 
The Ministers had noted that between the six countries there was 
agreement on the conditions to be met for achieving a fair and lasting peace 
in the Middle East, such as was formulated in Security Council Resolution 
No, 242, A common policy on the part of the Six was not agreed on, 
(Tweede Kamer, 1971 Session, Annex 173) 
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Statement by Mr. Mansholt on the transfer of the textile industry to the devel-
02iJ\!f countries · 
On 17 March Mr. Berkhouwer and Mr. Portheine (People's Party 
for Freedom and Democracy) addressed a written question to the Government 
about the statement made by Mr. Mansholt, Vice-President of the Commis-
sion, in which he had suggested that the textile industry in the highly industri-
alized areas - such as Europe - should be transferred to the developing 
countries. 
The question called for a statement by the Government to the effect 
that it would not support the policy advocated by Mr. Mansholt. 
Mr. Udink, Minister without Portfolio, stated on 14 May on behalf 
of the Government that Mr. Mansholt had expressed his views much more 
guardedly than appeared from the various newspaper reports. In particular 
Mr. Mansholt had stated: 'Should we not offer more opportunities to the tex-
tile industry in countries that have to become industrialized? Is it so neces-
sary to have protected textile industries in our industrialized countries? We 
ought to be able to re-train the workers in the industry, but this must be or-
ganized separately for each branch of industry as was the case for the coal-
mines. While this is being done protectionism is admissible.' Mr. 
Udink added: 'The policy of the Dutch Government is directed towards an 
optimum international division of labour without distorting competition, by 
freeing international trade and phasing out the subsidy system. Within Eur-
ope, this will be achieved through integration in the EEC. At the interna-
tional level an attempt has been made to achieve the same objective, notably 
through a reduction of tariffs. As a result of this integration and through 
these trade policy measures there will be a natural reorganization. This 
process must be coupled with adjustment regulations to deal with any serious 
disturbances, e. g. by overhauling the industries concerned and, whenever 
this fails to have the desired effect, by retraining employees. In this con-
nection reference must be made to the Government-financed investigations 
into the structures of the cotton, rayon and linen industry, the worsted and 
woollen material industry, and the clothing industry, as well as to other 
forms of support for enterprises which may be faced with difficulties. In the 
view of the Government these difficulties are only partly the result of compe-
tition from enterprises in the developing countries. ' 
This policy was not, Mr. Udink felt, in conflict with the statement 
referred to made by Mr. Mansholt with regard to the protection of the textile 
industry. 
(Tweede Kamer, 1971 Session, Annex 41) 
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3. Discussions between Mr. Rippon and the Dutch Foreign Minister I Mr. 
Luns I at The Hague 
On 20 April, during discussions with Mr. Rippon, Mr. Luns stated 
that British flexibility towards Paris in the sphere of defence cooperation 
could have a favourable influence on the French attitude to British accession. 
The Minister made no secret of the fact that he considered discussions bet-
ween Mr. Heath and President Pompidou to be highly desirable. During a 
press conference Mr. Rippon stated that he did not look upon a Franco-British 
summit meeting or a British offer to share nuclear information with France 
as a key to the negotiations on accession. It was wrong to give the impression 
that something dramatic must be done, That was just not realistic. 
State Secretary De Koster shared Mr. Rippon's opinion. Bilateral 
discussions should only be held if they became absolutely necessary. But how 
could the Netherlands, a State of only 13 million inhabitants, take the initiative 
in this matter? 
Mr. Rippon did not exclude the possibility of arranging such a 
meeting. But he said it was wrong to give the impression that Britain was 
moving towards a meeting, What Britain wanted was significant progress 
during the negotiations in Brussels on 11 May, This was necessary if British 
parliamentary and public opinion was to be won over. 
(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant-Handelsblad, 21 April 1971) 
4. Discussions between three Parliamentary Committees and the Govern-
ment on the economic and monetary union 
On 25 April a report was completed by the Standing Committees on 
Finance, Foreign and Economic Affairs with the cooperation of the Ministers 
of Finance and Economic Affairs and the Secretary of State for Foreign Af-
fairs on the phased implementation of the economic and monetary union. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr, De Koster, ex-
plained that the major advantage of postponing the decision on institutional 
problems was that progress towards obtaining real powers for the European 
Parliament must not be blocked. Efforts to force decisions at this stage 
would provoke lengthy arguments because of the need to arrive at unanimity, 
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and it would be difficult to achieve good results. 
So as to prevent the economic and monetary union from functioning 
under control of the Member States completely outside the provisions of the 
Treaty and without consideration by the European Parliament, the following 
paragraph had been included in the text after many French objections; 
'The European Parliament will discuss and supervise the implemen-
tation of common policy in the framework of the economic and monetary union 
The Secretary of State suggested that an accurate interpretation bf 
this paragraph would be that 'the European Parliament will consider and de-
cide upon as well as supervise etc. ' 
Even this in his opinion did not represent a real breakthrough as 
regards the powers of the European Parliament; however the door to the sys-
tem which the Netherlands wanted had been kept open. 
· One of the members drew attention to the fact that Part I of the 
resolution outlining the final phase of the monetary union made no specific 
mention of the fact that this final situation would only become a reality after 
ten years. It was conceivable that certain powers might be withdrawn from 
the national Parliaments before the European Parliament was able to take 
them over. The member concerned gave a firm warning against allowing this 
to happen and asked the Government to make sure that the powers of the Euro-
pean Parliament were determined before the Member States moved forward to 
the next stages. 
It was then asked by what constitutional right the Government had 
approved the Council resolution. Confusion was possible on this point because 
it was 'a resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the Member 
States' Governments.' Representatives of the Governments could only enter 
into agreements if they were constitutionally empowered to do so. Why was 
no clause to that effect included in the resolutions? Because, in the opinion 
of some Governments, the Treaty of Rome did not cover the decisions which 
had been taken, there was mention of an agreement under international law 
which would then have to pass through the normal constitutional procedures 
before the States were bound by it. In the context of the limitation of the bud-
getary rights of the Parliaments, legal approval and perhaps even an amend-
ment to the basic law would be necessary if appropriate provisions were not 
contained in the Treaty of Rome. If n!J binding decisions had yet been taken 
for the final phase, what then was the significance of participation 'by the 
- 112 -
representatives of Member States' Governments?' 
The member who made this remark said he was disappointed by the 
meagre results contained in the resolution, which amounted to saying that the 
European Parliament would merely retain the powers it already had. Would 
the position of the European Commission vis-A-vis the Council be streng-
thened by the resolution? It seemed that it would not. The Finance Minis-
ter, Mr. Witteveen, said tnere would be no change in the budgetary rights of 
the people's representatives in the first phase. That would be the case in the 
final phase. But at that stage Treaty amendments and other constitutional 
changes would be necessary; these could naturally not be brought about with-
out the approval of the States-General. In addition the Minister felt that more 
frequent discussions would be necessary in future between the Government and 
Parliament on European policy than was now the case through annual discus-
sion of the report of the European Communities on the previous year's acti-
vities, This would prevent the Government being placed in the invidious posi-
tion of having to implement decisions reached in advance. The question as to 
whether the powers of the European Commission would be increased could not 
yet be answered. The Dutch Government was certainly attempting to obtain 
provisions to that effect in the resolution. 
The desire to have the national budget presented at an earlier date 
was described by the Finance Minister as completely premature from the 
standpoint of harmonization in the framework of attempts to establish econo-
mic and monetary union. In the European Community arrangements must be 
made for all Member States at an identical date so that for the present the 
outcome of the discussions must be awaited before making changes in the 
Netherlands. 
The resolution was drawn up with the cooperation of the Government 
representatives because the preamble refers to amendments to the Treaty 
which the Council as such is not competent to introduce. 
Finally the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that the 
Governments of the four countries with which negotiations were now in pro-
gress on accession, did not consider the content of the resolution to present 
any obstacle to their membership. Naturally it was not known what their 
attitude would be to the content of the second and final phases. 
In the long run all Member States would recognize that suprana-
tionality was the only practical way of bringing about an economic and mone-
tary union. The resolution gave no certainty as regards the granting of real 
powers to the European Parliament. On the other hand it contained no provi-
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sions which would make the granting of such powers any more difficult, Mr. 
De Koster considered the efforts to bring about a monetary union could be a 
breakthrough in providing real powers, because of the guillotine clause. The 
Dutch Government would, he believed, use this clause at the end of the first 
phase in 1975 if no agreement had then been reached on the powers of the 
European Parliament, No Dutch Government could accept a monetary union 
without genuine control by the European Parliament, However improbable it 
was that this matter would not have been satisfactorily settled by 1975 - five 
of the six Member States were already in agreement - the absence of a satis-
factory settlement for the European Parliament would tend to outweigh all that 
had now been agreed on economic and monetary cooperation, 
(1970-1971 Session, Doc, 11 146 No. 3, Report on Discussions) 
5, Report on the discussion between Mr, Westerterp and the special commit-
tee of the Second Chamber on the bill fot direct European elections 
On 26 April a report was drawn up on the discussion that took place 
on the special committee in preparation for the public consultation on Mr, 
Westerterp's bill for the provisional settlement of the nomination of the Dutch 
members of the European Parliament on the basis of a general election, 
At the beginning of the discussion, two new factors of interest in 
assessing the bills were put forward. 
(a) On 27 March 1971 the Benelux Group's Consultative Inter-parlia-
mentary Council accepted a recommendation by general agreement containing 
the following passage: ' .•• calls explicitly on the three Governments to bring 
pressure to bear in the Council of the Communities to introduce direct general 
elections for the European Parliament in compliance with Article 138(3) of the 
EEC Treaty and - failing any agreement between the six Governments - to 
press for direct elections, as far as possible in compliance with the uniform 
system to be adopted in the EEC countries, in particular the Benelux coun-
tries, that are ready to hold such European elections.' 
(b) The Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament deci-
ded to invite the various M, P. s in five of the six Member States, who have 
taken the initiative and put forward bills on the European elections, to a talk 
on possible coordination, 
- 114 -
On the special committee it was asked whether the decision referred 
to under (b) taken by the Political Affairs Committee was not yet a sufficiently 
good reason to put the bill to the European Parliament as an opinion. 
Mr. Westerterp thought that the Political Affairs Committee's move 
did not affect the argument that he had put forward in his memorandum against 
consultation about the basic issue. But he thought it desirable that the Parlia-
ment should be consulted about the timing of its entry into force. 
The members of the special committee who had already stressed, 
in their draft report, the negative aspect of holding European elections solely 
in the Netherlands, regretted that the sponsor had not accepted their sugges-
tion to include appropriate clauses so that these elections could take place in 
at least a few of the Member States simultaneously. If Article No. 6 were 
also accepted in its new version, they doubted whether the coordination would 
be successful. 
Mr. Westerterp agreed about the desirability of achieving maximum 
coordination with as many other Member States as possible. The advantage 
of the new version of Article 8(1) was that it would leave the future legislator 
completely free to achieve the greatest possible coordination. If, in due 
course, agreement was reached with a number of Member States, there was 
already this provision in Article 6(2). If agreement was not yet reached, then 
the future legislator would, under Article 8, be free to do as he thought fit. 
If later it appeared that the law did not fit in entirely with the system to be 
applied in other countries, then it and the implementing law could always be 
amended. It was unlikely that this would be necessary because the text of the 
law allowed for flexible application. If no country lays down a legal basis 
there is a danger that we shall be left waiting for each other forever. 
On the Committee it was pointed out - and the argument that one 
country had to take the first step was taken into account - that the Dutch 
Parliament would find it difficult to pass a law in the knowledge that this mat-
ter was in the pipeline in other countries. If talks with those taking the initia-
tive in other countries produced some practical result, then the bill would 
have a much greater impact on the general public. It will be asked: Fhen is 
the impact greater - when the bill is there as an example or when it is cut-
and-dried and hence nationally screened and simply waiting to be put into 
effect? 
Mr. Westerterp replied - and some of the members of the special 
committee concurred - to the effect that in other Member States similar bills 
had been on the table for many years; until these were discussed and agreed 
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on it was meaningless to discuss their impact. What was necessary was an 
explicit statement by the Parliament in the form of approval for this proposal. 
Then again it was up to the legislator to decide about its introduction. 
On the Committee a proposal was made about the possibility of a 
public debate to take place in the near future and to postpone the final vote 
until the point about the coordination consultations is cleared up. It would 
not be desirable to have to amend the implementing law within a short time 
by adding clauses to suit circumstances that were already apparent when the 
law was at the discussion stage. Great political importance was attached to 
coordinated legislation on this point in the Benelux context, especially now 
that the consultative Inter-parliamentary Benelux Council had adopted unani-
mously a recommendation to this effect. On the other hand there were objec-
tions to holding a public debate in the near future and to leaving the final vote 
till later: what mattered was to get an agreement on the principle from the 
Chambers. 
Mr. Westerterp added that it wou1d be wrong to imagine the coordi-
nation consultations would be particularly difficult. The only point of differ-
ence was that Germany wished to couple European elections with elections to 
the Bundestag, whereas in other countries where the initiative had been taken 
there was a preference for separate European elections. 
The special committee had looked particularly into the proposal -
put forward in Germany and in Italy - that the number of members of the 
national Parliament be increased by a corresponding number of members of 
the European Parliament so that their members of the European Parliament 
would be freed from their national parliamentary work.- It realized that how-
ever attractive this idea might be, it would not be implemented within the 
framework of the bill: it would involve changing the constitution, simply to 
resolve a temporary problem. It was also pointed out that the numbers of 
members in both Chambers had been increased by half in 1956 on the grounds 
that so many had parliamentary commitments at the international and supra-
national levels. As was pointed out, overloading the Members of the European 
Parliament was not only a purely physical problem for those concerned; it 
was also a political problem of the first order. Membership of the European 
Parliament necessarily implied that certain national parliamentary tasks had 
to be neglected - not only within the Chambers but above all regarding con-
tacts with the electors. More than once an active member of the European 
Parliament had stood down as a candidate for one of the Chambers because 
he had become a 'back number' in the national context. It was no solution to 
say that the Groups should free them from these tasks. It was important to 
stress now, when the bill was still at the preparatory stage, that the legisla-
tor must not overlook this point. 
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(Session 1970-1971 - Doc. 10 696, No. 13) 
6. Mr. Witteveen, Finance Minister, on the monetary crisis 
Mr. Witteveen, Finance Minister, told the Second Chamber that 
the Government's view was that at present there was no fundamental imbalance 
in the Dutch balance of payments and that therefore there was no reason for 
any permanent measure in the form of a change in the parity of the guilder. 
It was his view that the temporary floating·of the guilder should be 
sufficient to check the inflation that was having its effects on the Dutch econo-
my from the outside. In view of the fact that the period during which the 
parity would be free to find its own level was only expected to be of limited 
duration, the effects on employment would be barely noticeable. The conse-
quences for the European Economic Community and for monetary integration 
would, he thought, not be serious; similarly he did not expect it to affect the 
accession of new members to the Community. Moreover it did not seem 
likely that the developing countries would be harmed by the short-term 
floating of the guilder and Deutschemark. 
He further stated that measures to prevent any repetition of the 
financial crisis should not be restricted to the Community. 
During the debate in the Second Chamber the Minister explained 
that the time when the period of a free floating guilder could be ended would 
depend on how other measures that would have to be taken in the EEC in order 
to bring the international capital flows under control actually worked out. 
With this statement the Minister dealt with the argument that Mr. 
Drees (Democrats 170) had put forward for a revaluation of the guilder. 
He was, however, the only member of Parliament who regarded 
the revaluation of the D-mark and guilder as inevitable if there was no change 
in the fundamental imbalance in the American balance of paymf?nts. 'When 
Germany revalues then the Netherlands will have to move in the same direc-
tion. If we do not do this we shall in fact be devaluing the guilder and increas-
ing the tensions in our internal economy.' 
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Mr. Drees found revaluation preferable to a rise in wages. He 
considered that the balance of payments deficit had originated through infla-
tionary spending. The increase in costs was relatively less significant in 
view of the growth of exports. 
Mr. Witteveen recognized that costs developments in the Nether-
lands were not yet so unfavourable in relation to the outside world. But the 
deficit on the current account in the balance of payments allowed for no re-
valuation. He said that special measures were needed to control the Euro-
dollar market. This market, which had been so far wholly beyond the grasp 
of the monetary policies of the national States, formed a core of inflation 
which, in recent years, had added ten to twelve thousand million dollars per 
year to already abundant liquidities. In Basie the central banks were now 
looking into how the Eurodollar market could be kept within bounds. He 
agreed with the members of the Chamber who advocated that the EEC coun-
tries had first of all to work out a common standpoint so that they could 
jointly negotiate with the Government of the United States about a solution 
to the problem of the American balance of payments. Mr. Witteveen was 
not so optimistic about the results of the meeting. In his view the United 
States would need to finance its deficit in some other way than through dol -
lars available in Europe, for example through the International Monetary 
Fund. 
(Handels & Transport Courant, 25 May 1971; 
Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant-Handelsblad, 26 May 1971) 
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New Zealand 
New Zealand's Prime Minister visits Paris 
On 26 April 1971 Sir Kenneth Holyoake, Prime Minister of New 
Zealand, was received by Mr. Maurice Schumann, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, and Mr. Georges Pompidou, President of the Republic. 
Following the talks Mr. Kenneth Holyoake stated: 'I explained to 
the President of the Republic the disastrous consequences that Britain's entry 
into the Community of the Six would have on our country if no provision were 
made for us. For us it is a matter of life and death. 
Our country is the world's largest exporter of butter and milk and 
its economy would be stifled if the Six were to decide overnight to give us no 
further support - through special arrangements - to market our agricul-
tural products. Mr. Pompidou, whom I find is quite familiar with these 
problems, seems to have understood our concern. No practical decision was 
taken but I am still optimistic, despite the difficulties.' 
(L'Aurore, 27 April 1971) 
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Statements by Foreign Minister Cappelen to the Storting on Norway's acces-
sion to the Common Market 
On 1 June 1971, the Norwegian Government presented a detailed 
report to Parliament on the state of negotiations on the enlargement of the 
EEC. It states in this report that membership must be dependent on satis-
factory arrangements for agriculture and fisheries and suggests that fishing 
rights should be reserved within specific limits to fishermen who are resident 
in the coastal zones concerned. 
In rejecting two motions on 17 June, the overwhelming majority of 
the Norwegian Parliament decided clearly in favour of Norway's accession to 
the EEC. After a two-day debate Parliament rejected by 113 votes to 37 an 
application by the Centre Party to break off negotiations with the EEC. The 
Party wanted membership of the EEC to be replaced by a trade agreement 
between the European Community and Norway. 
A motion by the Left-Wing Liberals and Christian People's Party 
calling for an examination of other forms of cooperation with the EEC in paral-
lel with the continuation of negotiations on entry in Brussels was rejected by 
94 votes to 55. 
In the same debate the Foreign Minister, Mr. Andreas Cappelen, 
made a speech from which the following extracts are taken: 
'At a Norwegian meeting of deputies on June 8, a memorandum on 
the market organization for fisheries products was submitted. In Norwegian 
quarters there is a desire to assist in an effective stabilisation of the fish 
markets in an extended Community. But various changes in the present set-
up will be necessary; among other things it is important that all sales of fish 
should be carried out through the producers' organizations. Norway reques-
ted that the Commission should also be entrusted with the task of evaluating 
the market set-up in the light oLthe Norwegian proposals that had been sub-
mitted. It was confirmed that this will be done. 
At the same meeting, the Norwegian delegation submitted a memo-
randum requesting a transitional set-up for rules of establishment. The pur-
pose of a transition period of this kind is to utilise it to implement the neces-
sary internal protective measures which would ensure that important Norwe-
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gian industrial interests are not made the object of undesirable acquisition by 
foreign firms. Let me emphasize that our system of concessions will be 
maintained after the expiry of the transitional period too, .. 
The original provision in the Treaty on a majority resolution as 
the dominant element in the decision-making process was, as we all know, 
substantially modified already by the Luxembourg compromise of 1966. Dur-
ing the ensuing years the rule of unanimity has been firmly incorporated and 
may today be regarded as a rule based on custom. Today discussions on all 
important matters in the Council are conducted until unanimity has been 
achieved, and it is difficult to imagine this well-established practice being 
changed. This was firmly emphasized in connection with the meeting between 
Heath and Pompidou, and as revealed in Heath's statement in the House of 
Commons on May 24 there was agreement between those two that the "mainte-
nance, strengthening and formulation of cooperation in a community of this 
kind demands that resolutions must be unanimously adopted whenever the vital 
national interests of one or several member countries are affected." Accord-
ing to the statement made by the British Prime Minister this is completely in 
agreement with the interpretation he had long entertained. "In the same way 
as the history of the Common Market clearly proves, it provides an assurance 
that joining the Common Market does not involve the loss of national identity 
nor an undermining of essential national sovereignty." It was furthermore 
emphasized that the Council of Ministers is the body that will make decisions 
in future, and that "the process of adjustment would not take precedence over 
essential and national interests. 11 
There is in other words an expressed desire on the part of leading 
politicians within the Community and among applicant countries that the iden-
tity of national States should be maintained within the framework of a Commu-
nity in development. One consequence of this is that the responsibility for all 
resolutions of particular importance is presumed to lie with the representa-
tives of the governments of the individual member countries and not with the 
Community's independent institutions. This means that the Commission will 
not be able to make any binding resolution over the heads of individual mem-
ber countries. 
In Norway's case membership of the European Community, even 
though in certain fields it would limit the formal decision-making authority of 
Norwegian political organs, would not entail any real loss of sovereignty, but 
it would mean that Norway, in cooperation with other countries, will achieve 
control or a better check on circumstances which were formerly determined 
from outside, or which hitherto have not been subject to any State decision-
making authority. 
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In my opinion, however, the problem of democr::i.tic control must be 
given considerable emphasis in an enlarged Community. It is essential that 
the European Community should be a democratic association and that it should 
safeguard the democracy that exists. But this democracy must be further 
developed, it must be given new forms and an extended sphere of action. Un-
less it is firmly anchored in democratic aspirations and democratic aims the 
Community will gradually lose its vitality. As a member of an enlarged Com-
munity Norway will in this respect have a clear responsibility to bear. 
With regard to the various spheres of cooperation which are dealt 
with in detail in the report, the Ministers involved will deal more specifically 
with the current problems. I refer you in particular to the Minister of 
Trade's statement on the subject of economic and monetary cooperation. 
In conclusion I shall quite briefly deal with the cooperation that has 
been initiated in the field of foreign policy between the EEC countries on the 
basis of the so-called Davignon report. In accordance with the report the 
Foreign Ministers of the EEC countries are to meet at least twice a year for 
consultations on questions of foreign policy. The meetings of the Foreign 
Ministers will be prepared by senior civil servants who will meet every quar-
ter. The establishment of permanent institutions for the purpose of coopera-
tion has not been proposed. There is no question of transferring authority to 
joint institutions. 
The report was submitted for comment to applicant countries before 
it was adopted on October 27 1970. All applicant countries were agreeable to 
the recommendations contained in the report. The Borten Government signi-
fied its acceptance of cooperation of this kind on September 30 1970. 
The Foreign Ministers of the EEC countries have held their first 
two meetings on the lines contained in the report. In connection with these 
meetings, in accordance with the report, exchanges of opinion have taken 
place on questions of foreign policy between the EEC countries and the 
Foreign Ministers of the applicant countries, most recently in Paris on May 
18 of this year. At these meetings all the Foreign Ministers present have 
taken part in the preliminary discussions that have been held on a non-com-
.mittal basis. 
The foreign policy consultations that have been inaugurated among 
the EEC countries are prompted by a growing recognition of the fact that West 
Europe must assume a greater share of responsibility for the development in 
relations to East Europe and in relation to the world at large, particularly 
with regard to the developing countries. 
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There is general agreement among all EEC countries that a close 
link exists between West European cooperation and the opportunity of pursuing 
an active policy vis-A-vis the East. The trend among the EEC countries is 
for this reason an important part of a larger overall pattern e~racing the 
whole European continent, in which the EEC will constitute an important ele-
ment in a future pattern of pan-European cooperation.' 
(Communication from the Norwegian Embassy in Brussels; 
Die Welt, 1 and 22 June 1971) 
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Portugal 
Portugal and the EEC 
In an interview published in the Spanish daily 'La Vanguardia Espa-
nola' on 20 June Mr. Pintado, Portuguese. Minister of Trade, discussed rela-
tions between Portugal and the EEC. 
With regard to the Spanish proposal to create a free trade area 
between Spain and Portugal, he said that until the details of the agreement on 
the negotiations with the Common Market were known, it would be difficult to 
say precisely what the basis for discussions with Spain would be. However, 
despite the fact that priority was being given to the agreement with the Com-
munity which should come into force on 1 January 1973, the talks would con-
tinue to bring their respective Spanish and Portuguese points of view closer 
so as not to waste twelve months of precious time. 
With regard to the negotiations with the Common Market the Portu-
guese Government was awaiting a reply concerning the preferential agree-
ment which was expected to be concluded by the end of the year. As regards 
the effects of Portugal's membership of EFTA, the links it had with the EFTA 
countries would continue to be important: 'Because the operative criterion 
for the negotiations is that there should be no reduction in the degree of trade 
liberalization already achieved, it is natural that the attitude adopted at the 
outset should be similar, with the exception of one or two agricultural pro-
ducts.' 
In reply to a question on the overseas provinces and the selling of 
their products on the new markets, he said: 'We must remember that our 
overseas provinces do not belong to EFTA; still less therefore do they come 
within the scope of the present negotiations with the Common Market. They 
only enjoy the benefits of GATT. 85 per cent of their products are primary 
products with no right of entry into the EEC or restricted to a maximum quota 
of 5 per cent. As regards their industrial products, we hope we shall be able 
to include these in the generalized preference agreements. Thus no difficulty 
arises over the prices of Portuguese overseas products higher than those in 
the Common Market. ' 
Regarding the trade agreements with certain East European coun-
tries, the official attitude of the Portuguese Government is outward-looking. 
If there were any talk of restrictions this would be not a politico-economic 
but a technical issue because the state-trading principle operates in those 
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countries whereas Portugal belongs, by tradition, to fr..:2 trade areas. 
(Relazioni Internazionali, No. 27, 3 July 1971) 
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Sweden 
1. Statements on integration policy in the Swedish Parliament 
The first major foreign policy debate held in the Swedish Parlia-
ment this year on 1 April 1971 was dominated by the EEC question. 
Mr. Feldt, the Minister of Trade, expanded on the Government's 
statement of 18 March to the effect that membership of the EEC was impos-
sible for Sweden. 'Membership of the EEC involves cooperation on foreign 
policy and approval of the underlying political objectives,' he said. Swedish 
participation in an economic and monetary union, which signified the renun-
ciation of national freedom of action in important spheres, was not compatible 
with the Swedish policy of neutrality. Mr. Feldt drew attention to Sweden's 
readiness to join a customs union for industrial and agricultural products; 
exports, economic growth and full employment must be ensured by free trade. 
Referring to the possibilities of a customs union he said: 'We are 
ready to take part in a customs union but every solution has its complications. 
A customs union implies the harmonization of tariffs applicable to non-mem-
ber countries and in this case Sweden would have to bring its own duties into 
line with those of the EEC; with one exception - oil - the consequences 
would not, however, be too heavy for us to bear.' But Mr. Feldt stressed 
that other problems remained to be solved in connection with the customs 
union. 
In the same debate the Foreign Minister, Mr. Torsten Nilsson, 
said that the question whether Sweden could enter into a customs union with 
the Common Market was still unresolved. Trade policy might be given a 
foreign policy slant and in that case Sweden with its neutral status must re-
tain the right to act independently. At present it was unlikely that this prob-
lem would arise but Sweden must not give up its right to intervene. It was 
not known whether special provisions of this kind could be obtained in a cus-
toms union; he could therefore not say at present whether an agreement on 
a customs union could in fact be concluded. 
The opposition spokesmen drew attention to the fact that trade with 
Eastern Europe and the developing countries was not an alternative to the 
EEC. The Chairman of the Liberal Party, Mr. Helen, said that the EEC 
could live without Sweden but the opposite was not the case. If Sweden's rela-
tions with the EEC were 'frozen at too low a level' the country's development 
would suffer. The Liberals accepted the Government's statement as a fact 
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but now called upon it to come out firmly in favour of a customs union at the 
very least and to ensure that more information about the EEC was published 
in Sweden. 
Mr. Bohmann, leader of the Conservative Party, believed that the 
Soviet Union would soon begin to negot_iate with the EEC rather than individual 
countries on major economic projects. The EEC would then have an even 
stronger voice in the policy of d~tente. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 April 1971; 
Le Monde, 2 April 1971 ; 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung, 2 April 1971) 
2. The Swedish strategy of integration 
The Swedish Foreign Minister, Mr. Torsten Nilsson, who visited 
Berne on 8 June 1971 at the invitation of the Swiss Federal Council to estab-
lish closer contacts between the two countries, emphasized at a press confer-
ence that Sweden was willing to go further than Switzerland. The differences 
between the initial positions of the two countries were explained by their di-
vergent economic interests. The Swedish Government would not, however, 
allow its neutrality to be eroded. A common attitude had not been agreed 
upon: the EEC report was still being examined. 
On 21 June 1971 Sweden described the free trade arrangements for 
industrial products proposed to the neutral States in the EEC Commission's 
report as a 'good starting point for the forthcoming negotiations.' This was 
stated in an official communiqu~ and at the press conference given by Mr. 
Feldt, the Minister of Trade. 
Abolition of customs duties would make for a system of free trade 
which would also be an important component of any agreement between-the 
EEC and Sweden. Above all the Swedish Government welcomed the fact that, 
contrary to original fears, the Commission's report did not propose customs 
exceptions for products processed from wood but set out a nu:rµber of alter-
natives for the transitional period. Mr. Feldt expressed the opinion that the 
Commission's report did not come as a disappointment to Sweden but was in 
fact a welcome surprise, even if he considered that the document only had an 
'exploratory function.' The real work of considering Swedish interests would 
now begin in discussions between the Governments and the Council of Ministers 
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of the EEC, without allowing its neutrality to be threatened. 
The communiqu~ therefore mentions once again that Sweden would 
like a customs union within the framework of close, multilateral cooperation 
which must be institutionalized and consist of more than mere free trade 
agreements. Sweden had recently opted for the formula of 'close, permanent 
and wide-ranging contacts with the EEC.' The communiqu~ now states that 
however natural the EEC's ambition may be to maintain its autonomy in 
reaching decisions, it is still in the mutual interest of the countries concerned 
to arrive at an agreement which would not only provide for an exchange of in-
formation and consultations but also allow a reciprocal influence on the deci-
sion-making process in the specific areas where this is necessary. It was 
perfectly feasible to find adequate, flexible procedures for this purpose which 
would also allow cooperation to be gradually widened, As regards agricultur-
al products, a study should be made in the negotiations to see whether trade 
could be facilitated in a manner likely to foster the interests of both partners. 
(Neue ZUrcher Zeitung, 10, 21 and 23 June' 1971; 
Handelsblatt, 22 June 1971) 
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United Kingdom 
1. Mr. Rippon, the proposed referendum and the meeting between Mr. Pom":". 
pidou and Mr. Heath 
Addressing the General Assembly of the International Public Rela-
tions Association in London on 3 May, Mr. Rippon made the following obser-
vations on the question of a referendum which some Opposition members were 
calling for prior to Britain's accession to the Community: 
'The Government believes firmly that it is in our national interest, 
as well as that of Europe, that we should join if the terms are right. 
But it is not easy to give a convincing account of the wider issues 
while membership remains an uncertainty. 
It will be easier to do this if negotiations develop positively. 
Yet despite these difficulties, the Government is already doing 
much to explain what is at stake. 
Inside and outside Parliament, my colleagues and I - and those 
many people of all parties who support our European policy - are giving 
what information we can. 
I am convinced that the British people will respond in their own 
good time, if they get the encouragement and information they deserve. 
At the same time I must explain that the decision whether or not 
to join cannot be based on public opinion polls. 
National policy, and particularly policy which has international as 
well as national significance, cannot be made by the techniques of market 
research. 
There is another factor here which is of great importance to this 
country. 
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Britain has founded its liberties, ever since the Middle Ages, on 
the representative principle. 
This is a parliamentary democracy. 
Other democracies though according great importance to parlia-
ments may have alternative traditions, 
In Britain any departure from the doctrine of Parliamentary res-
ponsibility in deciding national policy would set a precedent which we would 
all live to regret. 
The holding of a referendum on this issue would thus be unthinkable 
in this country. 
You probably know that the leader of the opposition is himself one 
of the most distinguished defenders of this wise principle, 
Ultimately, Parliament - those whom the people have elected to 
govern - must decide this issue. ' 
A few days after the meeting between Mr. Pompidou and Mr. Heath 
in Paris, Mr. Rippon recalled that Britain's attitude to the Atlantic Alliance 
remained unchanged. On 25 May during a press conference after an official 
two-day visit to Norway he stated: 
'It should be clearly understood that the defence arrangements of 
Western Europe remain exactly as they are now under Nato, entirely separate 
and distinct from the question whether or not we enlarged the EEC.' 
Earlier he said that defence cooperation within an enlarged Commu-
nity could be more effectively carried out, particularly concerning procure-
ment and logistics, but there was no question of any change in defence struc-
ture or nuclear matters being part and parcel of the negotiations. 'A lot of 
people have suspected this but there are no grounds for such suspicion, ' 
Mr. Rippon, hitting out against anti-Marketeers, said: 'What I 
find so curious is that people who claim to be internationalists and look for-
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ward to greater influence of the United Nations, nevertheless draw back from 
the concept of a uniting of Europe and of peoples with common history and 
heritage in culture and tradition, 
What I find so astonishing is the people who claim to be interna-
tionalists and who want to build peace, yet wish to remain at arm's length 
from their own neighbours and allies.' 
The talk about a confederation or a federation was a false issue. 
What Europe was trying to do was to harmonize her policies. 
'Those people in Britain or Norway who say that by joining Europe 
we should be losing our sovereignty, are raising a totally false issue. We 
can join and still retain our identity, our national traditions and way of life. ' 
Mr. Rippon was speaking after completing two rounds of talks with 
Mr. Andreas Cappelen, the Norwegian Foreign Minister and other Govern-
ment leaders. 
Asked about reports that Mr, James Callaghan, the Labour Party 
Treasurer, had stated his opposition to joining Europe, Mr. Rippon said: 'I 
have no reason to suppose that Mr. Callaghan has changed the very forceful 
views in favour of our application which he expressed when he was Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. No doubt he, like everybody else, is concerned about the 
terms of entry. ' 
Answering other questions, Mr. Rippon said the Treaty of Rome 
was intended to apply for an indefinite period. He said it was not 'dishonour-
able' to hope for a socialist Europe, but in his opinion, it was a 'great illu-
sion' that a future Europe would be 'socialist, Catholic or marked by any 
other isms. ' 
'What we are creating is a European Europe where all voices can 
be heard.' 
(The Times, 27 May 1971) 
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2, Debates in the Commons after the meeting between President Pompidou 
and Mr. Heath 
A few days after his meeting with President Pompidou, the British 
Prime Minister reported on the results of his conversations during a debate 
in the House of Commons on 24 and 25 May. This debate gave Members of 
the Opposition an opportunity to put a large number of questions, 
Reporting on his conversations with the French Head of State, Mr. 
Heath said in particular: 
'Our main area of discussion was the whole field of European policy. 
It was heartening to discover how close are the views of the French and Brit-
ish Governments on the development of Europe and its role in the world. 
Our talks showed that both Governments wish to bring about the 
development of a united Europe through an enlarged European Community. 
We do not intend this as a defensive alliance against external threat. We see 
it as certainly the best means and probably the only means, in the world of 
today, of guaranteeing peace within Europe, providing prosperity for her 
peoples, and restoring to Europe that political, economic and cultural influ-
ence in the world that her traditions and her potential justify. 
We also found an identity of view on the role which a united Europe 
can play in relation to the problems which face us in other parts of the world, 
and particularly in relation to the developing countries, where there is so 
much than an enlarged Community which included Britain and France could 
contribute. 
We discussed the development of the European Community and the 
working of its institutions. We agreed in particular that the identity of na-
tional States should be maintained in the frame-work of the developing Com-
munity. This means, of course, that, though the European Commission has 
made and will continue to make a valuable contribution, the Council of Minis-
ters should continue to be the forum in which important decisions are taken, 
and that the processes of harmonization should not override essential national 
interests. We were in agreement that the maintenance and strengthening of 
the fabric of cooperation in such a Community requires that decisions should 
in practice be taken by unanimous agreement when vital national interests of 
any one or more members are at stake. 
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This is indeed entirely in accordance with the views which I have 
long held. It provides a clear assurance, just as the history of the Commu-
nity provides clear evidence, that joining the Community does not entail a 
loss of national identity or an erosion of essential national sovereignty. 
As to the means by which greater unity and cooperation could be 
achieved, our primary concern was with the development of common econo-
mic policies, in the context of the British application for entry into the Euro-
pean Communities. But we both saw this as the basis for closer political 
collaboration, if the negotiations for enlargement of the Communities could 
be brought to a successful conclusion. We had only a brief discussion of de-
fence questions, recognizing that these were matters for the future, after 
enlargement. 
We reviewed the progress made in the Community towards econo-
mic and monetary union, following the meeting of the six Heads of Govern-
ment in The Hague in December 1969. I told President Pompidou that Britain 
looked forward wholeheartedly to joining in the economic and monetary devel-
opment of the Community, if negotiations for British accession could be satis-
factorily concluded. We both arrived at a clearer understanding of each 
other's anxieties and objectives in this field; and I was able to dispel any 
reservations which the French Government might have felt about the British 
Government's willingness, which my right hon; friends the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster have often ex-
pressed, to accept the consequences of this development for its own policies. 
We agreed upon the need to negotiate suitable arrangements for 
those members of EFTA who are not applying for membership of the enlarged 
Community, and thus to avoid the re-erection of trade barriers between them 
and the Community. 
We discussed the problems which would arise as a result of en-
largement of the Communities, when the time came to renew the Yaound~ 
Convention. The House will have noted that our agreement on the need to 
safeguard the existing rights of present associations under the Convention 
was matched by our agreement on the need to safeguard the interests of fu-
ture associates under a new Convention, and particularly of those who would 
depend largely on exports to the enlarged Community of sugar or other pri-
mary products. 
Finally, the President and I reviewed the progress of the enlarge-
ment negotiations. We did not attempt to reach definite conclusions on issues 
which fall to be considered within the negotiating conference in Brussels and 
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Luxembourg. But the President emphasized the importance attached to the 
system of Community preference and his welcome for Britain's acceptance 
of this principle immediately upon entry into the Community which had been 
agreed upon at the last Brussels meeting. I went over the main issues invol-
ved in a settlement of Britain's contribution to the Community budget in the 
years leading up to the full implementation of the Community's system of 
financing its expenditure. And I emphasized to President Pompidou the im-
portance of reaching satisfactory arrangements for New Zealand. I also 
explained the difficulties presented for us by the existing fisheries regulation. 
On all these points, though we did not seek to arrive at final conclusions, 
President Pompidou's attitude was positive and constructive.' 
Mr. Harold Wilson then asked Mr. Heath whether the problems of 
nuclear defence and of Britain's financial contribution to the enlarged Commu-
nity had been raised during these conversations. Mr. Heath answered as 
follows: 
'I have told the House that the amount of time which we devoted to 
the discussion of defence was very small indeed. We both accepted that the 
position of Britain, within NATO, and that of France, which is a member of 
the alliance but has withdrawn from NATO, is different. If when the Commu-
nity is enlarged Europe is, in accordance with its other policies, to develop 
a defence policy, these matters will have to be discussed at that time, but 
there could have been no discussion last week at our meeting. As far as nu-
clear questions are concerned, both France and Britain are nuclear powers, 
and there was no discussion of any arrangement. I was not asked for any 
offer; I made no offer; and the matter was left exactly where it stands today .. 
• . . I discussed with the President the new proposals on Community 
financing put forward at the last Brussels meeting. I said that I thought these 
would help to remove any suggestion that we were not accepting the full sys-
tem of Community financing which had, after all, been accepted by both ad-
ministrations. I said that the arrangements for it should not be such as would 
appear at the end of the period to be too great a burden for us to assume so 
that there might be a desire to try to change the whole system. It was agreed 
that the actual arrangements, to be satisfactory, must not place an unbearable 
burden on the balance of payments or across the exchanges, and that was 
accepted.' 
Another speaker, Mr. Marten, then asked the Prime Minister for 
his views on the institutional future of the enlarged Community. 
- 134 -
Mr, Marten: 'Could my right hon, friend clear up one small point? 
He said that the Council of Ministers should continue to be the forum, when, 
at the banquet at the Guildhall in July 1969 he said that Britain would be the 
first to press for democratic and parliamentary control of the,Community. 
Chancellor Brandt when he was in London said that there should be a European 
Government in the end, Surely, if Europe is to speak with one voice, as we 
are told, can it not speak with one voice on this somewhat important matter 
before we start?' 
The Prime Minister: 'My hon. friend began by saying that that was 
a small point and ended by saying that it was a very important matter. I 
agree with his last remark rather than his first - it is a very important mat-
ter. When I urged that there should be democratic control, I had in mind that 
Ministers are the representatives of their Governments and they are the ones 
who take the decisions. They are responsible to their own democracies. But 
I have also never hidden my view that, were Britain to be a member of the 
Community, it would be members of this House who would contribute most 
towards the development of satisfactory parliamentary institutions in Europe.' 
On 25 May, Mr. Marten repeated his question, asking the Prime 
Minister in particular whether he was still in favour of the election of the 
European Parliament by universal suffrage. 
Mr. Marten: 'May I return to the question which I asked my right 
hon. friend yesterday? Is he now saying that he is against the control of the 
European Commission by a directly-elected European Parliament, and that 
it should be left to the Council of Ministers? If so, this is in direct contra-
diction to what the Germans, the Dutch and the Italians are saying. With this 
dichotomy of view, is it not important that this matter should be cJeared up 
before we see the terms for entry?' 
The Prime Minister: 'The position is quite clearly laid down in the 
Treaty of Rome, and the Council of Ministers has the responsibility for taking 
all major decisions. At the same time, the European Parliament, as it at 
present exists, also has powers, and those have recently been increased in so 
far as finance is concerned, Our position is that that should be maintained -
that the Ministers should be maintained - that the Ministers should take the 
major decisions. I also agree with the President of France - and this is a 
view shared by many other European leaders - that no major interest of any 
nation should be overruled by the other members. This position is quite clear, 
If there is to be an enlarged Community, and as it develops, it may well be 
that the European Parliament itself will grow in its power and influence. This 
has been a democratic process throughout the ages. I repeat that we can make 
a considerable contribution towards that. ' 
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(Weekly Hansard - Issue No. 861, 21-28 May 1971) 
3. Statements by Mr. Heath and Mr. RipPon to the House of Commons on the 
accession agreements with the EEC 
'At first, we hope that it will be possible to resolve the issues out-
standing in the negotiations by the end of this month. As soon as possible 
thereafter the Government will publish a White Paper setting out in detail the 
arrangements that have been agreed and the Government's conclusions on 
whether the arrangements so negotiated are satisfactory and whether they con-
stitute a satisfactory basis for joining the Communities. 
The timing of subsequent stages depends upon striking a balance 
between a number of conflicting considerations. On the one hand uncertainty 
will persist until Parliament has taken its decision. 
We owe it to our partners in the negotiations, to our fellow-appli-
cants for membership, whose decisions will to some extent depend on ours, 
and to ourselves, to resolve this uncertainty as soon as we can. Moreover, 
the marketing and investment planning of British industry, and future planning 
in many other sectors of our national life, are vitally dependent on the deci-
sion. It is right that all concerned should know as soon as possible where they 
stand. 
On the other hand, the Government has always acknowledged the 
need for the whole question to be fully considered and discussed by Parliament 
and by the public before Parliament is asked to take the decision of principle 
on it. 
Although it is true that the main arguments for and against our 
joining the Communities have been before the public since the first application 
for membership ten years ago, it is right that we should take time to consider 
them in the light of the outcome of the negotiations in Brussels and 
Luxembourg. 
In the light of these considerations the timetable which the Govern-
ment proposes is as follows -
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The House will be invited to debate the White Paper before it rises 
for the summer recess. The detailed arrangements for this debate will be 
discussed through the usual channels. The Government envisages that it 
should be an expository and exploratory debate, on a motion which does not 
invite the House to take the decision of principle at the end of this debate, 
though we must of course reserve our freedom of action in the event of any 
substantive amendment to such a motion. 
Then, when Parliament meets again after the recess, there will be 
a second debate, at the conclusion of which the House will be asked to decide 
in principle whether Britain should join the European Communities. 
In the meantime our delegation in Brussels will continue to negotiate 
on such issues as still remain outstanding. The aim will be to carry forward 
these negotiations and work on drafting a treaty of accession so that, if Parlia-
ment decides in the autumn that Britain should join the Communities, the trea-
ty of accession can be signed by the end of this year. 
This would allow the whole of 1972 to complete what would require 
to be done before our accession. In parliamentary terms, this would mean 
that Parliament would be invited to consider and to pass the consequential 
legislation, which would be substantial, by the end of the session 1971-72. 
Thereafter the instrument of ratification of the treaty of accession would be 
deposited, in time for our accession to the Communities to be effective from 
January 1, 1973.' 
After his return from the negotiations in Luxembourg, Mr. Rippon 
reported about the agreement reached between Great Britain and the six mem-
bers of the European Communities. 
'Briefly, these arrangements will give this country a place in the 
institutions equal to that of France, Germany and Italy. Certain further de-
tails, including our participation in the European Court of Justice, remain to 
be decided, but I think it is already clear that there will be no difficulty in 
making arrangements which are perfectly satisfactory to us. 
We also reached satisfactory agreement on the problems connected 
with our entry into the European Coal and Steel Community. In the first place 
the Community delegation confirmed that it had no intention of calling in ques-
tion the size or the legal position of the British Steel Corporation or the Na-
tional Coal Board. We ourselves had never regarded this as a matter for the 
negotiations. But I was glad to have the Community's statement on the record 
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For our part we have accepted the Treaty of Paris and its imple-
menting legislation and have undertaken to remove incompatibilities between 
our legislation and practices on the one hand and the Treaty of Paris on the 
other, either before or at any rate very soon after our accession.' 
Mr. Rippon went on to refer to the period which would have to 
elapse between the signature of an accession treaty and the entry into force of 
the treaty after the completion of processes of ratification here and in the 
member countries of the Community. 
'We have agreed with the Community that in this period joint pro-
cedures would be established to ensure that decisions taken by the institutions 
of the Community took due account of the interests of candidates as prospec-
tive members and that consultations would take place before such deci'Sions 
were taken. 
It was perfectly reasonable that the Community on its side should 
ask for the same procedures to apply to decisions to be taken by the candidate 
States which might affect their obligations as prospective members of the 
Community. ' 
The negotiations had been successful, Mr. Rippon said, but he 
added: 'There is still plenty of work to be done. We have to reach agreement 
with the Community on transitional arrangements for our movement to Com-
munity policies regarding capital movements, on the European Investment 
Bank and on the safeguarding of employment in Northern Ireland, on the posi-
tion of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, and, of course, on fisheries. 
But the agreements reached in Luxembourg mean that we have now 
broken the back of the negotiations. We have been able to progress so far be-
cause the Community has demonstrated its political will to see the Community 
enlarged and to have Britain in as a full member.' 
Having delivered his statement, Mr. Rippon was asked by members 
of parliament about the consequeJ!ces of a possible entry. 
The leader of the opposition, Mr. Wilson, wanted to know more 
about the costs of entry: 
'Recalling the White Paper on estimated costs and benefits of 
February 1970 when there was a very wide spread of estimates because of 
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assumptions that could not be clarified then, is Mr. Rippon now able to say 
that since many of them have been clarified, particularly by negotiations and 
by the Six among themselves, he will be able to give a narrower range or a 
single figure ? 
While we all recognize that New Zealand has obtained the best 
terms that have ever been granted to any third country by the Six, he will 
surely recognize that to Britain, New Zealand has never been regarded as a 
third country. 
Recalling that on Monday, in the obviously rough set of exchanges, 
the French were heard to say that Mr. Rippon did not understand the Common 
Market if he wanted to continue permanent arrangements with New Zealand, 
have we the right to permanent arrangements with New Zealand?' 
Mr. Rippon answered: 
'Certain comments were made in the course of the negotiations on 
and off the record. But it is clear that the original text of the Community 
which was unacceptable to us has been drastically changed, so that it is now 
acceptable to us and New Zealand, subject only to this question about price. 
New Zealand is not, of course, for us a third country and we have 
always had the closest possible trading arrangements with her. Under this 
agreement New Zealand earnings will be at a far higher average rate than 
when they were dealing directly with us. We have always had negotiations. 
Every trade agreement of this kind has to be re-negotiated at a certain point 
over quantities and price levels. This we have agreed to do, but the principle 
of continuity is built into the agreement. 
There will have, of course, to be a general agreement between all 
the parties but it will be dealt with in the Community whether they are prob-
lems which concern us, any other country or New Zealand. 
So there is a similarity of treatment in the final analysis in the re-
view procedure, as arises in every other case.' 
Coming back to the first question, he answered: 
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'I do not know if you can ever get absolutely precise figures for a 
period so far ahead as 1977. When we are in the Community we will have an 
interest in changing the size and the shape of the budget so that we have more 
spent on regional and industrial policies which are of interest to us.' 
The Conservative M. P., Mr. Tapsell, mentioned the future poli-
tical structure of the enlarged Community: 
'It is a matter of agreement between the British Government and the 
governments of the Six that if we enter we will be entering an organization 
which will in its political form for the foreseeable future be confederal and 
not federal. ' 
Mr. Rippon answered: 
'I believe the President of the French Republic was right when he 
said that at this stage to talk of a united Europe, to talk of confederal or fed-
eral, is unrealistic. We will go forward step by step with realism. 
What it develops into is not a matter we can take a decision about 
today. People vary in their ideas as to how fast progress should be. 
All these matters will be fully inside our control when we are inside 
the Community and nothing like a constitutional change of that kind could take 
place without the unanimous agreement of all the members in the Community. ' 
- Mr. Orme (Labour) believed, that the terms of the Luxembourg 
agreements would be a disaster: 
'Can Mr. Rippon tell the British people when they will have to pay 
out of their own earnings and production for the next five years hundreds of 
millions of pounds, and when they will have to pay extra for New Zealand pro-
ducts which they now get by Commonwealth preference ? 
When are the benefits supposed to start? We have got five years 
now of penalties. When will the benefits begin to start ? ' 
Mr. Rippon answered: 
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'They can only start when we join the Community. They will start 
then and be manifest at a very early date. Wise people have said that when 
you are considering the balance sheet, joining the Community or not, it ·is 
important to consider the cost in lost opportunities if we fail to join. 
The opportunities which will be afforded to British industry when we 
join the Community are tremendously important to everyone who works and 
earns in British industry. 
When we begin to harmonize our policies with the Community, bear 
in mind that although there may be some problems of harmonizing some food 
prices, social benefits and pensions in the Community, as a result of the 
growth they have generated, have risen considerably above our own level. 
I hope that when Mr. Orme and others put to constituents some of 
the difficulties, they will not forget to emphasize the enormous opportunities. 
We talk about the price of butter, let us not confuse it with our sentiment for 
New Zealand. 
If people are really concerned that New Zealand should prosper and 
New Zealand farmers get a fair deal, they must not complain if the latter get 
a higher price for what they produce.' 
(The Guardian, 18 and 25 June 1971; 
Financial Times, 18 and 25 June 1971; 
The Times, 18 and 25 June 1971) 
United States 
1. Secretary of State Rogers discusses the United States' European policy in 
his report to Congress (27 March) 
On 27 March 1971, Secretary of State Rogers, presented a report 
to Congress entitled 'American foreign policy: a new unity and purpose'; the 
first chapter deals with European problems and states in particular: 
'Collectively, in NATO, the allies have made European reconcilia-
tion a major objective. In our own policy we too are seeking to improve 
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relations not only with the Soviet Union but also with other Eastern European 
States, dealing with them individually and taking into account each state's 
distinct aspirations and attitudes. 
Our goal is a healthier relationship between the states in Eastern 
and Western Europe, a relationship of increased security, greater trade, 
freer movements of people, and open exchange of information. 
The question is whether we can translate this goal into concrete 
progress. The effort should be made; we are supporting practical measures 
to test the prospects. 
Among the most important of these is the series of steps initiated 
by the Federal Republic of Germany to improve relations with the U.S. S. R. 
and the countries of Eastern Europe and to lessen the tensions caused by the 
continuing division of Germany. 
I expressed our support for this approach during a visit to Bonn in 
December 1969. The conclusion of satisfactory agreements between the Fe-
deral Republic and its Eastern neighbours, including East Germany, would, 
we believe, enhance prospects for reducing the barriers that still divide the 
continent. 
Unfortunately on the most critical issues arising from the division 
of Europe - the status of Berlin and relations between West and East Germany -
there has so far been little progress. 
Since early 1970 the United States, the United Kingdom, and France 
- in consultations with West Germany - have been negotiating with the Soviet 
Union on secure, unhindered civilian access to Berlin, improved circulation 
and communication within and around Berlin, and Soviet acknowledgement of 
the existing ties between Berlin and the Federal Republic. These talks have 
not yet produced any substantial result. Our efforts are continuing, and in 
February of this year we and our allies introduced comprehensive proposals. 
The Federal Republic's effort to achieve a modus vivendi with East 
Germany also remains in preliminary stages. 
Apart from Berlin, we believe that the most concrete approach to-
wards improving security relations in Europe at this time is through a "mutual 
and balanced" reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, a NATO objective 
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since 1968. In 1970 we joined our allies in approving principles to govern 
such a reduction and in urging the countries of Eastern Europe to join in pre-
liminary talks. 
Although the Warsaw Pact subsequently expressed a willingness in 
principle to discuss reductions of "foreign" (but not indigenous) forces, it 
sought to postpone discussion until after a conference on European security 
had been held. In response the NATO allies again urged the desiribility of 
early exploratory talks. We have also indicated that a satisfactory conclusion 
of the Berlin talks will be central to NATO's appraisal of the utility of a 
broader security conference - even if the agenda proposed by the Soviet Union 
were to deal with matters of serious significance to European security, which 
it does not now do. 
Meanwhile, changes in the European situation do not justify uni-
lateral reductions in Western defense capabilities. In recognition of this 
conclusion, NATO in December approved a new policy of strengthening Euro-
pean contributions to the collective defence. At the same time President 
Nixon stated that, given a similar approach by our allies, the United States 
would maintain and improve its own forces in Europe and not reduce them un-
less there was reciprocal action from our adversaries. 
Our European allies are able to assume greater military and eco-
nomic responsibility because of their increasing economic strength and their 
renewed movement toward political unity. If any one development can be 
singled out as the most important in Europe in the last two years, I believe 
it is the impetus toward Western European unity supplied by the negotiations 
to enlarge the European Economic Community to include the United Kingdom, 
Denmerk, Norway and Ireland. 
As the Common Market enlarges, a production and consumption 
areas comparable to the United States will be created, Europe's economic 
growth will be further accelerated, and the prospects of closer European po-
litical cooperation will be enhanced. An already strong Western Europe will 
become an even more powerful and selfconfident participant in the political, 
economic, and security affairs of the world. 
The Administration firmly and unequivocally supports this process 
of European integration. We support it because we are confident that the 
people of Western Europe and the people of the United States share the same 
values and that European and American strength can only supplement each 
other. We support it even though we recognize that the process of integration 
may produce some economic dislocations and disagreements between us as 
Europe develops new economic policies and as our economies adjust. 
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It is axiomatic that the United States desires close cooperative re-
lations with our friends and allies and with nations which have recently 
achieved independence. ' 
(USA Documents Public Affairs Office United States Mission to the European 
Communities) 
2. Enlargement of the EEC would, in the opinion of the US Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Economic Affairs (2 April), for the first time merge all 
the major West European powers into the same political and economic 
system 
'Enlargement of the European Community would for the first time 
bring all of the major Western European powers into the same politico-
economic system. 
This is the primary importance of enlargement, says Nathaniel 
Samuels, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. 
Mr. Samuels assesses the implications and effects of a wider Com-
munity in the latest of a series of policy papers published April 2 by the New 
York University Center for International Studies. 
When the four applicant nations have joined, the State Department 
official says, the enlarged Community "can develop an authentic Western 
European identity both in the political and economic spheres", and while ad-
mission of the four is not likely radically to alter the fundamental character 
of the Community, "by virtue of their political and economic traditions they 
cannot fail to influence its future development. " 
He declares that while entry of the four may not bring about a 
change in the basic institutional structure of the Community, or the common 
agricultural policy as policy, it might bring new efforts to overcome the prob-
lems of high agricultural prices, high support costs and large surpluses. What 
impact the new members would have on other Community policies yet to be 
developed remains to be seen, he adds. 
Some consequences are already clear: In addition to swelling the 
population of the Community, GNP would increase from an equivalent of 
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425 thousand million dollars to an equivalent of 562 thousand million dollars. 
The Community's 28 per cent share of world trade would go to 36 per cent, 
making it the world's largest single trading unit. 
All of this, Under Secretary Samuels points out, would increase 
even further if the other EFTA nations establish special economic relation-
ships with the Community. 
Noting the difficulty of estimating the dynamic growth effects of 
enlargement on the Community's domestic production and growth of income 
and on its external trade, Mr. Samuels declares that removal of trade bar-
riers between the Six and the new members should significantly increase 
competition among them. 
"Thus, the share of an enlarged Community in world trade, and its 
weight in commercial, agricultural, investment and monetary policies should 
increase. 
This being so, it seems reasonable to hope and to expect that the 
responsibility incumbent on an enlarged Community for the growth and stabili-
ty of the world economy and for the pursuit of liberal economic policies to 
achieve that end would become ever more manifest", he says. 
... As for the effects of enlargement on the United States, Mr. 
Samuels discusses in some detail problem areas that can presently be fore-
seen - such as pertain to non-tariff barriers to trade, international monetary 
agreements, the flow of capital and the production of multinational corpora-
tions, agriculture, and others. 
Despite areas of possible conflict, the Under Secretary says, the 
American belief remains that closer European unity is "in the interest of the 
United States and of the whole community of nations, as well as of the Euro-
peans themselves". 
The economic strength and cohesion of the Community, he adds, 
will continue to increase, particularly with enlargement, and as a consequence 
its power to pursue particular economic policies will also increase. 
'The areas of potential cooperation between the two sides of the 
Atlantic may be enhanced, but so, also, may certain areas of disagreement 
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or. divergent interests. 
On many of these latter questions neither the United States nor the 
Community will be able unilaterally to determine the solutions. Both will 
have to seek common, outward-looking remedies that will reflect their mutual 
interests as well as their need for an orderly development of the world eco-
nomy. Both, therefore, must be prepared to rethink and to modify some as-
pects of their present policies.' 
(USA Documents, Public Affairs Office, United States Mission to the European 
Communities, 6 April) 
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II. PARTIES AND PROMINENT POLITICIANS 
1. Europe and foreign policy in the election programmes of the Dutch political 
parties 
Joint programme of the Catholic People's Party, the Christian Historical 
Union and the Anti-Revolutionary Party 
The European Community must be on a larger scale and not only in 
social and economic terms; it must also be made politically stronger and 
more democratic. In view of Europe's international responsibilities, and 
hence obligations, a greater effort should be made to achieve an open and out-
ward-looking Community. Common European socio-economic, trade, mone-
tary, regional and foreign policies are needed; similarly, the position of the 
European Commission and of the European Parliament, which should be direct-
ly elected, should be strengthened. 
The Netherlands must make an appreciable contribution to an inter-
national development strategy so that the poor countries can stand on their own 
feet within a foreseeable period. This should be done (i) through trade policy 
measures, (ii) by the rich countries adjusting their own socio-economic struc-
ture and (iii) through a further increase in the financial and technical develop-
ment assistance given by the Netherlands, which should be dovetailed with 
such private activities as those of missions. 
An attempt should be made to double the total contribution available 
from public funds during the next cabinet period, so that by 1975 a total level 
of approximately 1750 million guilders is reached. 
The idea of a separate Western European nuclear power in addition 
to the United States should be rejected but a fresh effort should be made to 
coordinate the national British and French nuclear capabilities as part of 
NA TO' s strategy. 
The Netherlands ought to take the initiative to improve East-West 
relations, both independently and together with other European countries. 
The A. R. P. (Anti-Revolutionary Party) is pressing moreover for 
the division of responsibilities between Council and Commission to be re-
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established and for the decision-taling procedure to be brought into line with 
the terms of the Treaty of Rome. 
Labour Party 
The European Communities would have a democratic structure. The 
European Parliament would be directly elected and get legislative and full 
budgetary powers and a right of veto over the appointment of the members of 
the European Commission. The European Commission would get more powers. 
The Council of Ministers would take its decisions publicly by a majority vote. 
The Netherlands would endeavour to establish as soon as possible 
standing European consultations on security to bring about a mutual reduction 
in armaments and curtail the risk of war; it would also help to organize talks 
so that an all-European peace treaty can be concluded and a non-aggression-
treaty signed with the Warsaw Pact countries. 
The Netherlands would try to normalize relations between East and 
West by: 
a) stepping up cultural and economic relations with East Europe; 
b) recognizing East Germany in international law; 
c) giving support to the efforts to bring the status of West Berlin into 
line with the wishes of its citizens. 
The Netherlands would be ready to enter into a European security 
system with the NATO States together with the Warsaw Pact countries. The 
nuclear threshold would not be lowered. Europe would get no atomic power of 
its own and the Netherlands would advocate phasing out those of France and 
the United Kingdom. The enlargement of NATO to include such non-democrat-
ic countries as Spain would not be acceptable, nor would the enlargement of 
the Treaty area. The Netherlands would call for the removal of both Greece 
and Portugal from the NATO Council. Failing this, the Netherlands would 
still exert maximum political and economic pressure in the interest of demo-
cratic relations. The Netherlands would refrain from supplying weapons to 
Portugal and Greece. 
The European Communities would be enlarged to include the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Norway and Denmark and the other democratic countries of 
Europe which subscribe to the aims of the EEC. The enlargement of the EEC 
to include the United Kingdom should not be effected at the expense of support 
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for the poor countries. On the European Council of Ministers decisions must 
be taken on a majority basis. Portugal and Spain cannot be members of the 
EEC, nor can they be associated with it as long as there is no democratic sys-
tem in these countries. The application of the Association Agreement with 
Greece has been suspended. 
As the largest trading bloc in the world the EEC should pursue a 
policy directed at enlarging the marketing opportunities in Europe of the 
developing countries, particularly through the application of a world-wide 
system of preferences for the products of these countries, including manufac-
tures. 
The sugar agreement should be signed by the EEC at once. 
The procedure for frontier checks on goods and commodities should 
be the same in all the EEC countries. 
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy 
An improvement in relations between East and West, particularly 
through (i) participation at a European security conference, (ii) an inquiry into 
the possibilities of establishing a permanent body to keep up contacts which 
would, inter alia, prepare multilateral negotiations, and (iii) a mutual reduc-
tion in conventional and nuclear expenditure. 
The German question should be tackled within the framework of the 
Alliance as part of an improvement in relations between East and West. 
The People's Party for Freedom and Democracy supports the Ost-
politik pursued by the present Socialist-Liberal Government of the Federal 
Republic. That means that it is now the turn of the Government of the German 
Democratic Republic to take the next steps towards a further detente. This 
would include humanizing relations between East and West and settling_ the 
status of West Berlin. This could involve the recognition of the German 
Democratic Republic in international law. 
To do everything which is possible to promote democracy in those 
countries where there is none. Rejection of any discrimination based on race, 
colour, religion, sex or language. 
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Promoting European integration through: 
a) enlargement of the EEC to cover as many as possible like-minded 
European countries; 
b) stepping up cooperation between the present EEC States; 
c) promoting political and military integration; 
d) an anti-protectionist attitude in relations with the rest of the world; 
e) democratizing the internal structure of the European Communities; 
f) giving a directly elected European Parliament real budgetary and 
legislative powers; 
g) strengthening the position of the European Commission; 
h) getting the Council to adopt the majority principle in their decisions 
and introducing the principle of taking decisions publicly; 
i) consolidating the links between the liberal parties of Europe. 
Only by being more united can Europe play its future role in world 
affairs, particularly in promoting peace and the development of the backward 
countries. 
The promotion of fiscal harmonization in the EEC, particularly in 
order to prevent competition distortions. 
A policy for industrial structures - in the EEC too - directed at 
promoting the growth of the economy and also including environmental health. 
The Government should make capital available from its own sources (shares 
in enterprises, etc.) and make additional funds available for the promotion of 
this structures policy. 
To combat competitive distortions at the EEC level through the EEC 
and other countries; if necessary to take the counter measures to protect 
our national interests. 
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Democrats '66 
Under present circumstances the policy that the Netherlands has 
pursued with regard to agricultural problems in the EEC can be broadly sup-
ported. In tlie near future an attempt must be made to achieve greater harmo-
nization in the field of competition, particularly through the harmonization of 
fiscal legislation, social security provisions, transport policy and subsidy po-
licy in agriculture. European price policy should be related to the cost levels 
of efficient modern farms. 
This policy, including structure policy, must offer the farmer the 
same potential income as operators in other sectors. For this purpose and 
for the purpose of guaranteeing developing countries an equal, increasing share 
of the EEC market for agricultural products, Democrats '66 are in favour of 
2,500 more farmers leaving the land. This should be accomplished through 
compensatory measures. In addition to financial compensation from the Agri-
cultural Reorganization and Redevelopment Fund, there should be better ar-
rangements for retraining those who want to leave agriculture. 
Development of the European Community Market into an economic 
and monetary union, which should be achieved by 1980. 
The supranational character of the Communities should be strength-
ened. The Luxembourg Agreement of 1966 should be annulled: the European 
Council of Ministers should accept the procedure of taking decisions by a ma-
jority of votes as laid down in the Treaty of Rome, and the independent posi-
tion of the European Commission should be recognized. 
The democratic character of the Communities must be strengthened. 
Full budgetary and legislative powers for the European Parliament; the powers 
of the European Parliament to be extended to external policy and defence. The 
European Parliament should be directly elected. If we are to get out of the 
dead-end in which we have been for years, these elections should not yet be 
held at the European level. 
Appointment of the European Commission by the European Parlia-
ment. 
The enlargement of the Communities to include the applicant States 
of the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark and Ireland. 
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Proposals for changes in the Treaties of the European Communities, 
whereby the powers of the Communities would be enlarged to include regional 
planning, the care of the environment and international development coopera-
tion. The enlargement of the European Commission may perhaps be neces-
sary for this purpose. 
Rejection of a separate European nuclear power. Speedy conclusion 
of an agreement between Eurayom and the International Atomic Agency in 
Vienna on control over the observance by the EEC States of the non-prolifera-
tion Treaty. 
Establishment of a standing consultative body to supervise prepara-
tions for a European security conference. This should comprise all future 
members of a European security conference, i.e. it should include the United 
States, Canada, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. 
The opening up of the EEC market to the industrial exports, i.e. 
manufactures, semi-manufactures and processed agricultural products, of the 
developing countries through their participation in a generalized non-recipro-
cal preference system. 
Giving the developing countries the right to have their say when the 
EEC frame their farm policy, particularly regarding the scale and composi-
tion of agricultural production in the EEC and the markets and prices policy; 
the FAO should be given a chance to attend the appropriate meeting of the 
European Council of Ministers and express its views on the relevant proposals 
both there and at public hearings in the European Parliament. 
·Proposals at the EEC level on the complete implementation of the 
proposals on restructurization. An effort should be made to achieve a gradual 
restriction in the production of sugar-beet in the Member States. Guarantees 
should be given to the developing countries that they will have an increasing 
share of the EEC's agricultural products market. 
Communist Party of the Netherlands 
- A drastic curtailment of the EEC's expenditure. 
- An immediate stop to the forced liquidation of agricultural enterprises. 
- No implementation of EEC provisions that conflict with the interests of 
the Netherlands. 
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- Absolute rejection of a 'European nuclear power'. 
- Collective security in Europe. 
- A de facto recognition of the German Democratic Republic as a first 
step towards full recognition. 
Socialist Pacifist Party 
The Socialist Pacifist Party favours large-scale agricultural enter-
prises in the interest of producers and consumers, but rejects both capitalist 
large-scale enterprises and forced collectivization as a way of achieving this 
aim. 
It considers that the European Communities are unacceptable in 
their present form. They serve to hold back socialist developments in the 
individual Member States and they encourage monopolies and the formation of 
a power bloc in relation to the second and third world. Hence the Socialist 
Pacifist Party is against the enlargement of the Communities to include the 
United Kingdom and the other applicant States; it is against association with 
other countries and in favour of further democratization with a view to the 
replacement of the present structure of the Communities by a socialist struc-
ture. 
The rejection of - i.e. withdrawal from - NATO, the EEC, etc. by 
the Netherlands because these bodies (which serve the interests of the monop-
olies) stand in the way of peaceful development in the world and spell the per-
manent destruction of democracy. 
Political Party of Radicals 
Enlargement of European cooperation on democratic lines. Euro-
pean cooperation should at the same time fit in with the needs of detente be-
tween East and West and of cooperation with the developing countries. This 
means in particular: 
- no European nuclear power; 
- no protectionist European Community. 
Neither full nor associate membership should be open to countries 
subject to a dictatorship. 
- 153 -
Social Democrats '70 
Social Democrats '70 direct their efforts towards the enlargement of 
the European Community and will support efforts to develop this into a federal 
state on a democratic basis. Social Democrats '70 are critical of the policy 
pursued by the EEC in various fields including agriculture, because too much 
importance is attached to national interests in the short term and too much 
emphasis is placed on the prices of products and too little on individuals. This 
makes prices too high and yet many farmers are in financial difficulties. This 
policy also conflicts with the necessary national and international division of 
labour. 
Reformed Political Alliance 
Recognition of powers for the European Parliament, organization of 
direct elections to that Parliament and the formation of European parties will 
unintentionally strengthen the power of the great European States. On the con-
trary an effort should be made to modify the Treaty of Rome in such a way that 
the decisions of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities are 
submitted for the approval of the national Parliaments whenever they have an 
effect on the national budgets. 
The Dutch Government must continue to give strong support to the 
enlargement of the European Communities to include the United Kingdom, Ire-
land, Denmark and Norway. The economic isolation of the United Kingdom and 
Scandinavia from the European Communities harms the interests of all con-
cerned. 
European monetary union should not be aimed at. The EEC States 
are too litfle united both morally and politically for such a union to come into 
operation. 
To promote balanced relationships in the European integration pro-
cess, cooperation is needed between the small North Sea States: Norway, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxe:::nbourg (particularly to promote 
the linguistic and cultural interests of the smaller units in Europe and to en-
able them jointly to promote projects in the developing countries). In fact this 
cooperation could be directed towards an enlargement of the Benelux-Union 
with the Scandinavian.NATO-countries. 
(Beleid Beschouwd - Politieke programma's 1971-1975, 7 April 1971; 
Verkiezingsprogramma 1971-1975vandePartijvandeArbeid, 6 February 1971; 
Bulletin "De Waarheid", 30 January 1971) 
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2. The Belgian Socialist Party examines the problems of the European Com-
munities 
On 27 March 1971 the General Council of the Party e'.fa.mined a 
report submitted by Mr. Fayat on behalf of the working party of the Executive 
of the Belgian Socialist Party. Subsequently, on 19 April 1971, the Executive 
approved a resolution on the problems raised by the development of the Euro-
pean Communities. 
The General Council noted the considerable achievement represented 
by the Council decisions of 8 and 9 February 1971 regarding economic and 
monetary union. It thought it important to inform the general public in the 
Member States in as much detail as possible. In its opinion the national Gov-
ernments and Parliaments should be very precisely informed about the nature 
of these decisions and about the measures for putting them into application. 
'It is the duty of the Ministers sitting on the Council to act as a liaison be-
tween the European Community, the Governments and the national Parliaments 
to avoid any distortion prejudicing the psychological, economic and social 
conditions of the union. . . It is essential to define the nature of relations 
existing between the Community bodies and the national public authorities 
sufficiently clearly. ' · 
The General Council also asked that both sides of industry should be 
associated in the preparation, elaboration and execution of the work in pro-
gress. At regional level the decisions of 8 and 9 February 1971 should not 
prejudice the objectives pursued at the national level. 
The General Council would examine the question of strengthening 
the powers of the European Parliament. 'Appropriate supervisory and legis-
lative powers must be granted to the European Parliament when we go on to 
the second stage of the economic and monetary union; similarly, for this pur-
pose the revision of the Treaty of Rome should be looked into, in accordance 
with the Treaty provisions. 
With reference to political union, the General Council described the 
means utilized to achieve progress in this field as quite inadequate - bearing 
in mind the decisions of the meeting at The Hague in December 1969. The 
General Council proposed a first stage to succeed the present phase of half-
yearly consultations and beginning no later than 1 January 1973, which could 
be the final date for the actual entry of the four applicant States into the Euro-
pean Community. This first phase would consist of (i) consultations between 
the Member States of the Community prior to any initiative in the field of 
foreign policy and (ii) consultations between ministers with a view to decisions 
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affecting the foreign policy of their respective Governments, whether the 
issues involved were European or international. 
As it was the intention of the Council of Ministers of the European 
Community to table a second overall report not later than two years after the 
introduction of the present system of consultations, it was suggested that the 
final date referred to should be brought forward and constructive proposals 
made no later than the end of this year; it was also proposed that the Commi&-
sion of the European Community should be associated in this work so as to 
allow for the presentation of a plan of action in relation to the increased re-
sponsibilities of the enlarged Community in the world.' 
The resolution also refers to other questions, such as social prob-
lems which, like agricultural and industrial policy, agriculture, scientific 
research, education and the enlargement of the European Communities, should 
be the subject of a memorandum. 
(Documents forwarded by the Belgian Socialist Party) 
3. Twentieth Congress of the Belgian Communist Party 
The Belgian Communist Party held its twentieth Congress in 
Charleroi on 26 to 28 March 1971. Mr. Marc Drumaux presented a report on 
the prospects for the class war in Belgium. The resolution passed at the end 
of the Congress includes a passage on European policy. 
'The Belgian Communists attach great importance to the conference 
of Communist Parties from the European capitalist countries held last January 
in London. The aim of this conference was to contribute to the common 
struggle of the European workers, their unions and parties, at the level of 
multinational concerns. The Belgian Communists believe that in order to 
promote joint action by the workers' movement in capitalist Europe against 
the international trusts which dolll.inate the institutions of the Common Market, 
it is important to make arrangements at an early date for the exchange of 
experience and information between the Communist Parties concerned, to 
unite Communist trade unionists engaged on militant action in multinational 
companies, and to foster cooperation between all unions in the Europe of the 
Six, irrespective of their international affiliations. At the same time the 
Belgian Communists are calling for the democratic and workers' organiza-
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tions in our country to strengthen their links with fraternal organizations in 
the Socialist countries.' 
(Document forwarded by the Belgian Communist Party) 
4. Mr. Chabert (Christian People's Party), Belgian MP, proposes partial 
direct elections to the European Parliament 
Mr. Chabert, who with Mr. Nothomb has introduced a bill for direct 
elections in Belgium for the Belgian members of the European Parliament, 
states in an article published in the organ of the European Movement in the 
Netherlands that transitional measures should facilitate a final settlement. 
'In order to increase the psychological impact on the general public 
- and we deliberately wish to cause this - talks are being held with Mr. 
Westerterp, our colleague from the Netherlands, about the possibility of or-
ganizing European elections on the same lines in the three Benelux countries. 
Benelux has always been the laboratory of European integration. Why not in 
this case too? 
Why-are these direct elections of the European Parliament still only 
being talked about ? In my view this is because the national Governments still 
lack the will to take this matter earnestly in hand. The only solution therefore 
is to subject the Governments to pressure from national political movements, 
political parties and socio-economic groups. This would only be a temporary 
measure but I am absolutely convinced that it would be an extremely valuable 
way of arousing enthusiasm among the general public for a European integra-
tion which has until now been exclusively a sterile synthesis of economic in-
terests. Political enthusiasm must be aroused by appropriate means and in 
the first place by elections. These elections, and the special climate in which 
they are to take place, should undoubtedly bring into being the highly necessary 
European mood among the great majority of people who are now submitting 
passively to European integration. They should enable people to increase their 
knowledge about integration so that they can deliberately set their sights on a 
Europe that cannot become a real Europe if it is completely lacking in any con-
trol by a democratically elected Parliament. This is why I made this move in 
Belgium and why my colleagues in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and 
West Germany have made similar moves. How can we bring the Europe of the 
individual into being without involving him directly ? ' 
('Nieuw Europa', April 1971) 
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5. Conference of the Italian Socialist Party on the theme of European political 
integration 
The International Section of the Italian Socialist Party organized a 
conference on 2 and 3 April. ('The Italian Socialist Party and Europe') 
In an opening address the President of the European Parliament, 
Mr. Behrendt, stated: 'It is not enough for the European Parliament to coop-
erate in a purely consultative capacity in the preparation of European legisla-
tion. Nor is it sufficient for all current problems to be discussed in public in 
the European Parliament. The Parliament must have power to take decisions 
on regulations and laws. It must become the legislative body in Europe. But 
that will only be possible when the national parties have also been Europeani-
zed. Closer cooperation between the parties may lead to the creation of Euro-
pean parties; and it is also necessary to arrange for closer cooperation bet-
ween European trade unionists without which it will be impossible to effective-
ly safeguard workers' rights.' 
Mr. Altiero Spinelli, a member of the EEC Commission, made the 
following statement: 'The central problem for the Community remains the 
creation of a political union. The renewed interest in this subject shows that 
there is a new sense of urgency. But the political union will never see the 
light of day with the diplomatic methods of the Davignon Group. 
To obtain popular support it will be necessary for the parties and 
Governments to adopt a different approach to European problems. They will 
have to negotiate with the firmness and perseverance they show in dealing with 
other problems. The debate surrounding direct elections to the European Par-
liament is part of the general pattern and reflects the need for democratic 
decision-taking on matters which are central to our own future.' 
The deputy leader of the Foreign Affairs Section, Mr. Finocchiaro, 
referring to the problems of the European Parliament, again called for action 
on the proposal laid before the Senate for unilateral election of the Italian re-
presentatives by direct suffrage. He then stressed the desirability for each 
Community State to appoint a Minister of European Affairs and he proposed 
links between the secretariat or executive of the Socialist Parties in the EEC 
and the applicant countries. 
The Minister of Foreign Trade, Mr. Mario Zagari, said that the 
present European policy was not satisfactory. The Left must be restructured 
and participation of the masses ensured to give a popular and democratic reply 
to the structural crisis of a Europe which was guided essentially by neo-
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capitalist forces. It was increasingly urgent for the workers' movement to 
make a definite choice without which it would not be possible to implement 
effective reforms in the Community. 
Senator Giusto Tolloy emphasized the need to allow a place for the 
Communists in the Community. The Communists could neither cut themselves 
off from the social forces nor remain isolated in Europe since in many coun-
tries such as Germany, Sweden and Great Britain the great majority of workers 
belong to the socialist camp. The development of the Italian Communist Party 
(whose position on Europe had now changed) would be easier if ittookaclearer 
decision in favour of a democratic and united Europe. 
Mr. Corona said that the basic choice which the Conference must 
indicate to all Socialists was one ill favour of political unity in Europe. This 
implied the transfer of responsibility from national to supranational level. 
Simultaneous strengthening of democratic control together with 
active participation by the popular and social forces was another prerequisite. 
Sticking at the half-way mark would be tantamount to perpetuating a 
crisis situation. Conservative and nationalist forces were opposed to political 
unity because they wanted to impede progress towards democratic control. In 
the field of foreign policy there was therefore a desire to restrict contacts to 
simple consultations which the British Government had considered too modest. 
For the same reason the institutional consequences of the plan for economic 
and monetary union were being rejected, thus depriving it of any real Commu-
nity content. 
It was not enough for the Italian Communists simply to note the 
reality of European integration and make statements in favour of a common 
currency. Progress must be made beyond the earlier negative attitudes which 
could not be maintained in face of the need for political unity. That unity 
would give Europe its role and independence in the world. 
Finally, Luciano De Pascalis emphasized the fact that the Confer-
ence had unanimously decided that the time had come for the Italian Socialist 
Party and other left-wing forces in Italy and Europe to consider seriously the 
problem of an alternative to the present European system. Faced with a 
Europe which up to now had been built largely to suit capitalist interests, and 
having overcome the mistaken desire of certain left-wing sectors to block the 
process of integration, it was now necessary to coordinate the activities of 
the political and trade union forces which in fact wanted to create a Europe of 
the peoples. 
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Above all, the need for a greater sense of responsibility on the part 
of the European Socialist parties was stressed; the Italian Socialist Party 
could play a leading role in this respect. Its role stemmed from the changed 
world situation and a realization that the struggle for political unity and secu-
rity of the European continent were closely linked; the achievement of greater 
balance at national level must be accompanied by the creation of a counter-
vailing power at European level, with a European Parliament elected by direct 
suffrage. 
(Avanti, 4 April 1971) 
6. Professor Hallstein on the Pompidou Plan 
On 8 and 13 April 1971 Professor Hallstein, CDU Member of the 
Bundestag and former President of the EEC Commission, published two arti-
cles on the Pompidou Plan. 
The following comments are taken from these articles. 
'In a democratic Europe which has made a considerable advance 
towards unification, the interim results of the summit conference at The 
Hague in December 1969 also provided the impetus for a discussion about po-
litical unification. But this amounted to no more than a "milepost" in the 
action programme. The "qualified cooperation in foreign policy", in the form 
of voluntary consultations, which was the only practical result is hardly much 
of a beginning compared with what is needed: i.e. for free Europe to speak 
with one voice. 
In view of this shortcoming, it is consistent both with objective and 
historical logic that there should recently have been a revival of the discussion 
on the final political solution of the European unification process, which would 
include a common foreign policy. The most significant signs of this are the 
hypothesis put forward by the French President for a European 'Confederation', 
and the statement Chancellor Brandt made to the Monnet Action Committee 
for the United States of Europe: "The aim is obviously a reasonably organized 
European Government which can take the necessary decisions in the field of 
common policy and whose administration would be subject to parliamentary 
control." 
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The fact that the discussion of this key point of any European design 
was begun by Mr. Pompidou is all to the good. Even today it still appears 
(in spite of everything) that by an unwritten law, France should be the initiator 
in European affairs. The way in which President Pompidou had developed his 
ideas by going on from the existing Communities as if it were a· matter of 
course is thus particularly significant. This is in happy contrast to the way 
in which, in the consultation practice of the Six referred to - not least at the 
instigation of the Federal Government - any organic link with the European 
Community has been meticulously avoided. 
All this should not make us overlook the negative factors in Presi-
dent Pompidou's ideas, especially the suggestion that the European Govern-
ment is comparable to a coalition government, in which majority voting would 
not be desirable because of the danger of a split. This comparison and above 
all this demand that there should be unanimity are not acceptable. For under 
present conditions this practice would mean that a government geared to una-
nimity would be completely unable to operate (especially for a Community of 
ten members). 
Furthermore the President puts forward no complete design but just 
one or two ideas. Unfortunately he also re-introduces false problems. He 
takes issue with the concept of "supranationality" which is in fact a bad word 
for a good thing. But he puts forward in its place the (at all events to German 
ears) misleading concept of confederation. But today it is less a matter of 
the terms used to describe the shape of the European enterprise than of a clear 
recognition of the nature of the thing itself which is going on here: and that is 
the continuing existence of the European nation States as members of a Euro-
pean State authority jointly exercised by them. 
President Pompidou spoke in favour of appointing national ministers 
for European affairs who would in time "have only strictly European powers 
and no longer belong to the national governments". Mr. Schumann, the Fbreign 
Minister, added: "One can imagine that as integration progresses and as 
powers are transferred to the EEC Council of Ministers, the time is bound to 
come when we won't be able to put off the appointment of such special Euro-
pean Ministers any longer," possibly by promoting the present Permanent 
Representatives of the member governments in Brussels. 
The French are obviously thinking of replacing the Permanent Re-
presentatives and the periodically meeting Council of Ministers by European 
Ministers, to be responsible for Community policy, before the final phase. 
What emerges here is not a false problem but a real and serious one. Because 
there can hardly be any doubt about it that changing the Council of Ministers 
from a body meeting periodically into a permanent one would mean a decisive 
shift of emphasis at the expense of the Commission in Brussels. That this is 
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in fact what Mr. Schumann means appears to emerge from his further com-
ment (which is otherwise incomprehensible): "That the present Council of 
Ministers and not the European Commission should be the starting point for 
the future government of the political confederation." We really should have 
to be on our guard, if the Commission were to lose status without there being 
any corresponding quid pro quo for,the Community, apart, that is, from the 
simple "hypothesis" of a future European Government.' 
(Europa-Union-Dienst, 8 April 1971; 
Die Welt, 13 April 1971) 
7. Senator Fintan Kennedy asks for guarantees for industry before any deci-
sion is taken on Ireland's entry into the EEC 
Ireland's existing package of fiscal and grant incentives for new in-
dustries must be maintained, or replaced by equivalent attractions, after this 
country joins the EEC, Senator Fintan Kennedy said in his presidential address 
to the annual conference in Galway of the Irish Transport and General Vvbrkers' 
Union (ITGWU). 
Sen, Kennedy told delegates that the trade union movement as a 
whole must not approach a decision on the Common Market unbriefed and uni-
formed, or with a feeling that the country was being hi-jacked into Europe. He 
suggested that the Government, having committed itself to EEC entry, was 
now seeking to distort the facts and figures and possibilities to support its 
initial attitude. 
The 150, 000-strong ITGWU, the largest trade union in the country, 
was told by its president of six 'necessary safeguards' which trade unionists 
must insist upon as part of the EEC entry package. These included a continu-
ation of 'the same or equivalent incentives for newandexpandingmanufacturing 
concerns as we now have'. 
Other safeguards which the union is to demand are: satisfactory 
measures to offset unemployment resulting from free trade; full national con-
trol over the economic and social destinies of the country; freedom to develop 
a comprehensive social programme covering health, pensions and unemploy-
ment; the retention of native control over all natural resources, including 
protection for Irish fishermen and sanctions against foreigners acquiring land, 
and a guarantee that 'restrictive trade union law in other European countries' 
will not be extended into Ireland. 
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Sen. Kennedy promised that his union would consider convening a 
special national conference to plot future strategy in the event of the govern-
ment failing to win these safeguards, and he left the distinct impression that 
such a failure would bring trade unionists out against EEC membership in 
next year's referendum announced on June first in a statement given by Prime 
Minister Lynch to Parliament. 
(Financial Times, 9 June 1971; 
Le Soir, 3 June 1971) 
8. Speech by ·the leader of the Netherlands Anti-Revolutionary Party on the 
development of the European Community 
The Chairman of the A.R.P. Group in the Second Chamber, Mr. 
Biesheuvel, a former member of the European Parliament, gave a speech in 
Middelburg on 13 April 1971 in which he expressed the opinion that the Euro-
pean Common Market must continue to progress in two directions. Internally 
there must be a movement towards a federal structure and externally a com-
mon foreign policy. 
The Member States would face an increasing need to make progress 
in both these spheres. Mr. Biesheuvel dealt first with all external relations: 
as yet there had been no real progress towards a flexible but firm external 
commercial policy. At least equally important, although in the rather long 
term, was the relationship between the EEC and the developing countries. As 
the world's largest trading group, the Community had an enormous responsi-
bility to the Third World. Europe's policy towards the developing countries, 
which was probably the most important problem of the times, could only be 
effective and gain credibility if the fragmentary and often egocentric approach 
made way for a common concept and a rational coordinated system of mea-
sures. This also called for real political integration which was still lacking 
in the Community. 
The enlargement of the Community, by the accession of the United 
Kingdom, was a political necessity and therefore an eminently political prob-
lem. Difficulties concerning financing and New Zealand butter or Common-
wealth sugar could not ca.mouflage the underlying issues. However, little was 
heard about the basic problem of enlargement, namely the vital need to make 
the enlarged Community stronger. Some tended to consider enlargement the 
most important political issue and looked upon strengthening of the Communi-
ty as the main economic objective. 'I do not agree with this attitude. There 
- 163 -
is a political and economic need for both objectives to be achieved. Enlarge-
ment without strengthening would amount to dilution of the Community and 
would not bring us much further than a large customs union. That is not a 
satisfactory solution. ' 
Finally Mr. Biesheuvel referred to the internal political develop-
ment of the Community, i.e. its progress towards a federation on a demo-
cratic basis. A federation was the only possible outcome of creating a body of 
policy to deal with the tasks and responsibilities which exceeded the resources 
of individual Governments. This necessarily entailed transfer of certain na-
tional administrative functions to the Community. Joint responsibility for 
these problems was inconceivable without a common and democratic structure 
of administration on a supranational basis. This was the only logical conclu-
sion even though it was not accepted by all the partners. 
Intensifying the process of integration confronted both the Communi-
ty itself and the Member States with problems and responsibilities which Mr. 
Biesheuvel considered more important than those of strengthening the customs 
union in recent years. The methods used in the process of integration must 
be adapted in the light of these needs. This adaptation was not something 
which could be achieved simply. Some Heads of State were still afraid of a 
real Community policy. But Mr. Biesheuvel was not pessimistic. 
The increasing inability of individual Member States to solve the 
essential problems affecting their society as a whole would make the adapta-
tion to integration essential. The speaker said there was no alteruative. 
In the next ten years, members of the enlarged European Communi-
ty must accept the consequences of what they themselves considered necessary 
before they even embarked upon the work of unification. This meant not only 
integration in the social and economic spheres and in monetary and short-
term economic policy but also acceptance of the consequences in terms of 
constitution and institutions as well as at the political level. 'But it also 
means, and this is perhaps the most important point, that having regard to the 
development in Europe itself we must not concern ourselves solely with im-
proving our own welfare but must adopt a more emphatic and rational policy 
towards the modernization of our own society. We must give real attention to 
the world outside Europe and in particular to the Third World.' 
A Eurocentric attempt to achieve greater prosperity was an inade-
quate political impulse to maintain enthusiasm for the process of integration. 
A more ambitious programme of activity was necessary. 
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According to Mr. Biesheuvel, European unification was the greatest 
task facing the western peoples since the Second World War if a framework 
was to be created in which Europe could assume its responsibilities both to 
its population and to the world at large. 
(De Tijd, 13 April 1971) 
9, Statements by the SPD, FDP and CDU on the negotiations for the United 
Kingdom's accession to the EEC 
On 19 April 1971, the Deputy Chairman of the SPD Group in the 
Bundestag, Mr. Apel, published an article on the United Kingdom's accession 
to the EEC in the SPD press bulletin. The following extracts are taken from 
his article: 
'It has become abundantly clear that the Brussels negotiating ma-
chinery always places a partner who makes demands, i.e. attacks the status 
quo, in a precarious position. If in addition he sets himself a tight time 
schedule his position becomes still more complicated. All genuine advocates 
of British entry are confronted by this risk. Their position is not even 
strengthened by realization of the fact that failure of these negotiations would 
have far-reaching consequences for the Community as a whole. If too much 
emphasis is placed on reaching a quick decision, the British will probably be 
made an inadequate offer by the EEC countries which they will have to reject 
while we shall not have time enough to exert political pressure - behind the 
scenes but all the more effectively - on our partners in the EEC. 
We must negotiate in real earnest up to 11 May. Britain must join 
the EEC, otherwise Europe will remain weak and divided with no strong demo-
cratic spirit. If Britain does not join, the foundation of our policy of peaceful 
co-existence with Eastern Europe will be shaken and in the long run the EEC 
of the Six will be weakened. We therefore want, and need politically, real 
progress towards a successful outcome in the negotiations on Britain's.. entry 
by the summer; on the other hand this date must not be the sole factor in 
determining the ultimate success or failure of these decisive negotiations. 
Only the opponents of Britain's entry in the United Kingdom and in the EEC, 
who want the negotiations to fail have anything to gain from rigidly fixed time 
limits.' 
The leader of the FDP in the Bundestag, Mr. Deneke, made the 
following comments on the same subject: 'One important point to remember 
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in any debate on Britian's entry to the EEC is that detente in the East must be 
accompanied by closer ties between West European countries. A consistent 
policy for the whole of Europe must include Western European integration as 
the basis for a credible policy of detente in the East. Failure of the negotia-
tions on Britain's entry would be a psychological obstacle to this policy. 
Strictly material problems are still the main obstacle to Britain's 
entry. Three specific points must be settled: Britain's contribution to Com-
munity finances, the problem of New Zealand butter and Caribbean sugar, and 
a third question which has arisen more recently, namely the position of the 
pound sterling whose role as a reserve currency still remains to be discussed. 
The basic need, however, is for an act of political will rather than 
the solution of purely mathematical, commercial problems. But this calls 
for political insight and understanding. If Europe is to become a single eco-
nomic and political unit, the continental partners must be as forthcoming to-
wards the British "profit and loss accounts" as they have been in the past to-
wards the French.' 
Mr. Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag, 
wrote as follows on this problem: 'The negotiations which are now under way 
in Brussels should be guided by the historical significance of the British 
readiness to join the European Community. We in Germany know just how 
important Britain's contribution to the Community will be with its wealth of 
democratic parliamentary tradition and worldwide political experience. We 
also realize that it took great political courage for the British Government to 
reach its decision to apply for membership of the European Community. 
Britain has accepted the European Treaties and their political objectives to-
gether with the body of Community law enacted since the Treaties came into 
force and the options taken out for the development of the European Commu-
nity. 
We paid tribute to this British attitude on an earlier occasion and at 
the same time expressed our conviction that it paved the way for a positive 
outcome to the negotiations on entry which faced no more major obstacles. 
We therefore call once again upon all the European governments 
- and particularly the Federal Government - to take steps to facilitate Britain's 
early accession to the European Community and to solve the material and 
financial problems which are bound to arise when the Community is enlarged 
in a spirit of mutual understanding. 
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If Britain's application for membership of the Community fails 
through a lack of solidarity in Europe, this will not only affect the very exis-
tence of the Community but also the European States themselves which have 
prepared to create through the Community a means of political action to solve 
the internal and external problems of Europe.' 
(Deutschland-Union-Dienst, No. 64, 2 April 1971; 
Freie Demokratische Korrespondenz, 6 April 1971; 
Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, 
22 April 1971) 
10. Mr. Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag, publishes 
a stage-by-stage plan for the political union of Europe 
On 4 May 1971 Dr. Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU Group 
in the Bundestag, published a stage-by-stage plan for the political union of 
Europe. 
One notable feature of his plan is the succession of steps in the de-
velopments aimed at. Dr. Barzel here links up with the hitherto successful 
model of the European Community. As well as discussing the aims of the 
European Community (economic and monetary union) this paper also attempts 
to bridge the gaps in the integration process which had so far been carried 
forward in sectors. He justifies his approach by saying that the Davignon 
Plan for political consultations, (approved by the EEC Foreign Ministers in 
Munich on 19 November), could neither prevent any disintegration in the po-
litical field nor hold out any prospect of political union. 
In detail Dr. Barzel proposed the following stages: 
"First stage:_ Consultation 
The Heads of State or Government and the Foreign and Defence 
Ministers would undertake to consult each other on all questions involving the 
general European interest, particularly questions affecting the relationship of 
the European Community with the Soviet Union and the other East and South 
European States, the United States of America, and those European States 
that are not members of the European Community. The competence of the 
Community bodies would not be encroached upon. The Commission would 
participate in the consultation process. It would thus be able to ensure that 
subjects falling within the competence of the Community would be discussed 
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and decided upon by the appropriate procedure. This stage would end with the 
entry into the second stage of the plan for establishing economic and monetary 
union. 
Second stai~:- Coordination and cooperation 
The governments would appoint European ministers from their na-
tional cabinets; they would reside in Brussels and there take over the tasks of 
the present Permanent Representatives and a great many of the tasks of the 
present expert ministers on the Council. This measure is a bid for efficiency 
for which there will be no guarantee in the Community of Ten, given the pre-
sent-day practices. The decision-taking procedure laid down in the Treaty, 
whereby the Commission has the right to make proposals and the Council 
takes decisions, would remain intact. To offset the shift in the Community's 
institutional balance resulting from the enhanced status of the Council of 
Ministers, the European Parliament, which would be directly elected in this 
stage, could be given the right to appoint the President of the Commission. 
The decisions of the Council of Ministers would require the approval of the 
European Parliament. The Heads of State or Government and their Foreign 
Ministers should undertake to go beyond consultations in this stage to common 
attitudes and action. The second stage would end with the conclusion of the 
transitional period for the new Member States, i.e. around 1978. The Com-
munity would then be completely self-sufficient financially and the budgetary 
powers of the European Parliament become operative. 
Third stage:_ Political union 
The Council of Ministers would assume responsibility for all rele-
vant political decisions of the Community. The Commission would prepare 
the decisions of the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers would be 
answerable politically to the European Parliament. 
A European federal assembly, which could consist of members of 
the European Parliament and a corresponding number of members of the par-
lisments of the Member States of the Community, would be set up as a consti-
tution-making assembly. A federal constitution, which would have to be 
worked out with due regard for the various existing treaties and rules, would 
have to be adopted on the eve of the beginning of the economic and monetary 
union (1980). 
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Fourth stai!l: _ 'Confederation' 
Such a stage-by-stage plan, of which only parts could be shown 
- for the purpose of discussion - should be formalized in a statute on the fur-
ther development of the European Community into a political union. The state 
of Western European integration in the economic and social policy fields and 
its planned further development into an economic and monetary union would 
only be secure if external poik/ ,. ere put on a Community basis. 
On 25 July at the economic congress of the CDU in Dlisseldorf, Mr. 
Barzel said: 'The time is long overdue for a German move for a stage-by-
stage plan for a political Europe.' He called on the government to tackle this 
problem. It should not go on repeating the argument that there was no pro-
gress in this field because the British and French attitude made any advance 
illusory. Dr. Barzel said that Chancellor Brandt was pursuing only the objeo-
tive of European cooperation and not the aim of a political Community. His 
view was that both Mr. Heath and Mr. Pompidou wanted a Europe which would 
in the end speak with its own voice, a political Community with a government, 
parliament and European administration. 
Dr. Barzel advocated rounding off the Community. It had not yet 
got all the powers that it needed; but the national governments no longer had 
all the powers that they needed either. No one would be prepared to transfer 
national powers on monetary and economic affairs to the Community so long as 
there was no common policy in the Community and no parliamentary control. 
(Europa-Union-Dienst No. 19, 4 May 1971; 
Die Welt, 26/27 June 1971) 
11. Mr. Jeanneney outlines the reasons for his opPosition to the accession of 
the United Kingdom to the European Communities 
In an article published by 'Le Monde' on 5 May 1971, Mr. Jean-
Marcel Jeanneney, former Minister, put forward three reasons against 
Britain's joining the EEC. 
Mr. Jeanneney wrote that the negotiations between the Six and the 
United Kingdom were only concerned with the scale or the duration of arrange-
ments for a transitional period. 
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'This was the wrong way to put the question. If the feeling is that 
Britain's presence in the European Community will make things better for 
France in the centuries to come and that it will be easier to safeguard the 
cultural heritage of our Western European civilization, it is neither here nor 
there whether the length of the transitional period is five or seven years or 
whether the initial contribution of the United Kingdom to Community financing 
is reduced or increased by this or that percentage, or even whether larger or 
smaller quantities of New Zealand butter or Jamaican sugar are imported 
duty-free into the United Kingdom. It would be ridiculous to make the success 
or failure of such a grand design subject to such trifles for this is certainly 
going to have a profound effect on our future and on that of Europe. The real 
issue is whther it would really be in our interest. 
All those who want a European Europe have three major political 
reasons for opposing British entry into the EEC. These reasons are as valid 
for our five partners in the present Community as they are for France. None 
of these arguments applies in quite the same way regarding the membership 
of other European States. ' 
The first reason hinged on economic policy. Mr. Jeanneney said 
that the United States in particular and third countries in general would not 
feel very inclined to tolerate the protectionism of a customs union that included 
the United Kingdom. 'Obviously, therefore, third countries would try to get 
this enlarged Community to become a free trade area and it is to be feared, 
with the wide range of ways in which the United States can exert pressure, 
that they would succeed. This would be a dangerous trend because it would 
make Europe even more dependent on the United States. Economic dependence 
between the two sides of the Atlantic would continue to be lopsided. More 
often than not the power to take decisions in their own interests would be in 
the hands of American enterprises because of their technological lead and the 
support of their Government; European enterprises on the other hand would 
simply have to toe the line. Similarly Western Europe would be unable to 
pursue an independent economic policy in such a free trade area. Any cy-
clical action to reflate or slow down the economy taken in Europe alone would 
be quite ineffective in the vast expanses of such an Atlantic economy. 
The second reason for opposing Britain's entry into the European 
Community is diplomatic and military. The United States have real or imag-
inary interests which often fail to coincide with and sometimes clash with 
ours. To promote these interests throughout the world they use methods we 
sometimes disapprove of. A proper concern for purely European interests 
and for our own self-respect make it our duty to see to it we are not drawn 
along inexorably in the American wake. Yet there is no reason to believe that 
just because Britain enters the EEC it will sever the close links it has with 
the United States and which have suited Britain very well for many years. If 
Britain were unable or unwilling to sever these links we too would be affected 
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AY them for Britain would acquire a deoiai,e weight in the European Commu-
nity because of the American support it would enjoy and because of the great 
flair British diplomats have always had for dividing and ruling. ' 
Mr. Jeanneney's third reason for being against Britain's joining the 
EEC was the danger that the French language might lose the position it now 
enjoys in the Community. 'If French is more widely spoken in Community 
ircles than German, Italian or Dutch, these languages are still being used. 
rench cannot hope to become the sole language for diplomacy, business or 
science of continental Europe. Hence the linguistic plurality and originality 
of Europe will be preserved for they are an integral part of its culture and 
help to secure an international linguistic balance which is already under 
hreat. Britain's entry into the Community would make English the common 
political, scientific and business language. The scope of the other languages 
·would be restricted to literary or domestic matters. Ultimately they might 
even disappear. But for Europe to be able to keep and develop its originality 
it is vital for Europeans to express their views about life in their own lan-
guages.' 
To ignore these three problems would be a serious mistake. 'Let 
us be on our guard against the reactions of a people which found out, when a 
erious economic crisis occured, that it had no freedom to act or which 
lized, when an international conflict broke out, that it no longer had any 
edom of choice or saw its language, the symbol and substance of its national 
rsonality, gradually fading away. What a disaster it would be if the Com-
mnists (always quick to criticize mistakes) then appeared as the last resort 
r national feelings that go down to the very roots of a people. Because it 
would be into a different state of dependence on others far worse than the first 
t they would quickly lead us. ' 
There were certain French people who were in favour of British 
"'lbership 'because they are attached to the idea of keeping up our friend-
, with the British and the Americans and because they fear that any rejec-
__ ,1 of Britain's application might compromise this friendship. Any shadow 
this might throw over releations between us is, however, much less to be 
feared than the bitterness and lasting animosity that a state of subservience 
even to our friends - would entail. 
Other French people for whom national independence is an obses-
sion, are befuddled by their antipathy for any supranational authority within 
the Community of the Six. They are relying on the British to destroy what is 
there already or at least to arrest any further progress. They sincerely be-
lieve that they can defend our independence in this way. But they are miscal-
ulating. It is far from certain that the British, with their empiricism, would 
· ome to terms with European institutions empowered to take binding 
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decloion, , tl they ,uceeeded In putting them to lhe ,e,vice of the!, policy . An. l 
even if the British did oppose the workings of the supranational institutions, 
what good would it do to escape from institutional restrictions if one were ac-
tually still dependent, in a far more prejudicial and humiliating way, on others? 
What would be the point of preserving the appearance of total French legal 
sovereignty at any price if this merely served as the cloak for our subjection 
to external powers ? ' 
'As technology stands today, the French economy is obviously too 
limited in scale and scope for us to be able to fall back on our own resources 
without this doing a lot of damage. Hence it is far better for our monetary 
and credit policies, our budgets and our external trade to be subject to rules 
and directives drawn up by a European Community body because all members 
of this Community will be able to wield their rightful share of the commo" 
sovereignty guaranteeing that the vital interests of each country will be re-
spected. 
The choice that we are going to have to make is, in the last analysis, 
quite clear. 
Either we agree to integrate our economy in a vast Atlantic con-
glomeration over which we have no control, in which case it is to be feare 
our interests will be sacrified and our European civilization will finally van 
or we do all we can to improve the structure of the present Community of the 
Six and to develop a spirit of Community independence in relation to one and 
all. Then and only then will Europe have grounds for hope.' 
(Le Monde, 5 May 1971) 
12. Views of the Swiss parties on integration questions 
At the meeting of Europa-Union delegates in Switzerland held in 
Berne on 22 May 1971, four representatives of the Swiss political p:-
their views on relations between Switzerland and the EEC. 
Whereas the representative of the Farmers', Trade Unions' and 
Citizens' Party was decisively against full ni.embership and even recommended 
restraint in the attempt to find an alternative, the representatives of the Free 
Democrats, of the Landesring and of the Social Democrats supported exnl"'"". 
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l-31.tory talks with the EEC initiated by the Federal Council, although to some 
extent they too had reservations. The most important of these reservations 
was safeguarding Switzerland's neutrality. 
Mr. Erwin Freiburghaus (Berne), representative of the Farmers', 
Trade Unions' and Citizens' Party, said a distinction must be made between 
the healthy and the weak democracies in Europe. States that had an age-old 
, •
0
-iition of local and regional independence had a school for citizenship that 
, , not exist in some large States. Switzerland should not trifle with its 
neutrality. Hence his party rejected full membership of the EEC, although 
it would welcome a rapprochement between the peoples. 
,. Mr. Richard Forster, representative of the Landesring, pointed 
~~- .hat his party had been looking into foreign policy questions for some con-
siderable time. In 1958 Mr. Gottleib Duttweiler advocated Swiss entry into 
the EEC; later he argued in favour of a bridge between EFTA and the EEC. 
As the first party the Lndesring had discussed European questions with its 
members in 1960. It was for negotiations with the EEC and argued that 
Switzerland could not give up its European responsibilities. But if progress 
·as to be made, the problem had first to be clarified. The public had to be 
better informed, in preparation for accession. 
rec:.:, 
frr., Mr. Daniel Muller, National Councillor, (Solothurn) said the Free 
p,.::mocrat Party agreed the EEC must be taken seriously. For the individual 
~conomic partners, industry, the trade unions, agriculture, and the workers, 
fr,_ advantages and disadvantages of accession must be fairly divided. There 
had, moreover, to be the will to enter into a commitment. The principle of 
tu& ' 1ty must be upheld because Europe could only be interested in a neutral 
.•.. :·rland. This necessarily debarred Switzerland from the political aims 
of the EEC. Alternatives must be sought which afforded protection against any 
one-sided dependence. Armed neutrality could not be given up. Independence 
should not be sacrificed on the altar of any momentary success. European 
integration affected Switzerland but if giving in meant giving up its neutrality, 
~witzerland should stay out. 
Mr. Jean Riesen (Freiburg), National Councillor, gave an assurance 
, :-1iial Democrat Party would support every effort that lead to a united 
t "'ld a free world. Armed neutrality must however be maintained. 
Swiss neutrality could have a contagious effect on Europe. Similarly Switzer-
land, with its increasing measure of interdependence, could not escape its 
international commitments. For neutrality, solidarity, help for the third 
world, peace in the world, and a realization of a European security conference, 
integration was one possible way. 
not · ''"'!Urcher Zeitung, 24 May 1971) 
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13. Mr. Thomson and the constitutional future of Europe (25 May) 
I 
Addressing the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham 
House on the Common Market, Mr. George Thomson, who was the Labour 
government's negotiator in Europe, said that the economic departments of 
governments, as much as the foreign ministries, would,be a powerful force 
for the creation of European political institutions. 
'The present practice that Community decisions must be taken on 
the basis of unanimity is tolerable among a group of Six: it will ultimately be-
come intolerably cumbersome with a group of Ten. As the arrangements for 
dealing with economic and monetary matters develop, the demand will grow 
for democratic political institutions to control them. 
If Britain joins the Communities I foresee some of the sturdiest 
democrats among the anti-Marketeers facing that new situation by leading the 
campaign to strengthen the European Parliament in order to put the bureau-
crats of Brussels under more representative control. 
There is a particular fear on the left of British politics that we 
shall be losing our ability to have radical national policies of economic planning 
and social reform. What we shall gradually see is the transfer of the left-
right conflict from a national to a European plane. Trade unions are already 
discovering they must learn to act on a European basis if they are to match 
the power of the multinational corporation. There is much talk of the impor-
tance of the quality of life. 
Problems of pollution, of control of the environment, cannot be 
sensibly tackled on a national basis. Inter-governmental agreements llre 
clumsy instruments. The :iuality of life will be more effectively tackled by a 
European political authority. ' 
Mr. Thomson added: 'It was said that Britain acquired her empire 
in a fit of absent-mindedness. If we now decide to join in the monumental task 
of building a united Europe, it will be after a decade of agonizing self-ques-
tioning, which none of the present members of the Six had to undergo.' 
(The Times, 26 May 1971) 
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14. Mr. Callaghan complains about rush tactics 
Mr. Callaghan, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer and now the 
Labour Party's treasurer, was speaking in Southampton on the 25th May. He 
argued that Mr. Heath had revealed in his Commons statement that he had 
taken his own personal decision to enter the European Economic Community, 
and he was going in "as quickly as he can". 
Parliament was to be confronted with a decision in a matter of 
weeks, and 'it may well be that the Southampton, Bromsgrove and Goole by-
elections will be the last opportunity that the British people will have to speak 
on these issues before a decision is taken' . Voting in the by-elections takes 
place tomorrow. 
Mr. Callaghan demanded more time before Parliament commits it-
self. 'The discussion should go on during the summer months and be picked 
up at the conferences of the Liberal, Labour and Conservative Parties in 
October,' he said. 
'Parliament will begin a new session with the Queen's Speech early 
in November and by that time public opinion will have had three months in 
which to form and reach a decision. That is not too long and would be time 
enough for Parliament itself to reach a final conclusion. 
Mr. Heath owes it to the nation to give us this sort of time~table, 
nd he and the Government will hot be forgiven if people suspect that they are 
+being manoeuvred into a rush decision without full discussion on such a mo-
entous question. ' 
What were Mr. Callaghan's doubts and reservations ? He said 
President Pompidou had made it clear that where differences existed between 
Britain and the French-dominated EEC, 'Britain must subordinate them to the 
extent of a complete rupture with our identity'. He asked if Mr. Heath'soffer 
to participate in a European spirit, which signified a French spirit, me_ant 
that 'we are honour bound not to try to upset the principles of the common 
agricultural policy ? ' Had Mr. Heath made it clear that no one believed it 
made sense to give up buying cheap food from New Zealand to buy dear food 
from France ? 
Mr. Callaghan said that in the light of what had happened since the 
Labour application in 1967, he had growing doubts about whether an economic 
and monetary union inside the EEC would be advantageous to the British 
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people: 'It would be a handicap at the present time if Britain were to tie her-
self to a fixed system of exchange rates with the other Common Market coun-r 
tries at the expense of detaching herself, even partially, from the dollar. ' 
He questioned the effect of entry on employment in Britain, and 
asked about the reserve role of sterling. Sterling's importance as a reserve 
currency should contract, but the prior need was to create a healthy interna-
tional monetary system, not a regional European currency, although that 
might come later. 
'In this field,' Mr. Callaghan said, 'I do not feel myself to be very 
much in sympathy with the way in which events have developed during the past 
two years.' ..,.,, . 
(The Times, 26 May 1971) 
15. Mr. Benn, Labour, and the proposal for a referendum prior to British 
membership 
While the meeting between President Pompidou and Mr. Heath re-
moved the problems which had hitherto stood in the way of the British appli-
cation to join the Common Market, Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn, the Lat 
M. P. , was intensifying his campaign to make the Government accept his .-
posed referendum on the subject of membership. 
In 'The Times' a discussion began between Mr. Benn and read, 
of the newspaper. On 27 May, Mr. Benn wrote to 'The Times': 'After l..,_ 
turing the unions about the need for ballots to control the exercise of power 
in industrial disputes, you now make it crystal-clear that the use of gove!"'-
mental power on the question of Britain adhering to the Treaty of Rome rr 
not be delayed by allowing trade unionists - or anyone else - to be consulted 
on this question. 
m 
This decision cannot be made on our behalf by Mr. Heath and Mr. 
• il 
Pompidou with the consent of the Cabinet carried in the Commons by a three-
line whip. 
To recommend this as "a judgment of history" is no answer. :r ,,. 
political history has been made by continually broadening the area of c'~ ~he 
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cratic consent and increasingly judging leadership by its power to persuade 
·ather than its authority to dictate. 
The European decision is a massive and historic one.that will bind 
future parliaments in perpetuity and involves taking the nation into a compact 
which will only work if it is backed by a genuine will to do so. There is no 
single member of Parliament, on either side, who can claim one shred of a 
mandate to justify his voting Britain into the EEC without further and explicit 
~ ublic support expressed after the issues have been made clear, in an elec-
tion or a referendum. 
Nor is it any good quoting my predecessor Edmund Burke, as Mr. 
i:r,,ath did on Monday. Burke's famous speech was delivered in Bristol to an 
· :qively male electorate made up of less than two per cent of the people 
,ived in this constituency. The idea of universal adult suffrage would 
'ave horrified him. Even the concept of the House of Commons controlling 
·· Government was only in its early infancy. His is a voice from 1774, 
uttering sentiments that may then have been commendable, but which cannot 
now be used to support the idea that in 1971 M. P. s have any right to decide 
the future of Britain for all time. 
Burke is dead and so is his view of democracy. Times' Leaders 
would be more helpful as a guide to the future if they could advance beyond an 
eighteenth-century view of what British democracy is all about.' 
. , On 31 May, Mr. Geoffrey Alderman, a reader answered as follows: 
'ii behoves Mr. Wedgwood Benn to tell us (May 27) that M.P.s ought to be 
••0 ates and not representatives on the Common Market issue. I recall that 
. Benn voted for the second reading of the late Mr. Silverman's Bill to 
:+Bh the death penalty for murder. That Bill was supported by the majority 
· _i_:.our M. P. s and by many Conservative ones. But it cannot be denied that 
no M. P. had a mandate to vote for it; indeed it is probable that over half the 
01 ei:;torate were in favour of the retention of hanging. 
Or, to take other controversial issues, what mandate did M!', 
's government have for committing British troops to Northern Ireland? 
.andate did his government have for devaluing the pound, or for imposing 
sanctions against the illegal regime in Rhodesia ? If Mr. Benn were to take 
his argument to its logical conclusion, I fear he would discover that many of 
the measures and policies he supports would have to be abandoned. His argu-
·ould imply that an unpopular government is, ipso facto, an undemocrat-
,,~. Yet it was Mr. Wilson's great boast that his government suffered be-
it took decisions which, though unpopular, were nonetheless in the na-
\terest, 
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The Burkeian view of democracy is far from dead. It is no good 
Mr. Benn hidding behind his constituents. He, and every other M.P., will 
have to come out into the open on the Common Market issue, and be prepared 
to suffer the electoral consequences. The alternative would be for the 
Burkeian concept to be abandoned in toto. It would be both intolerable and im-
pertinent for M. P. s to say that they will be delegates on some issues and re-
presentatives on others. If they are going to adhere strictly to the views of 
their constituents on the issue of entry into the EEC, then they should adhere 
equally strongly to their constituents' views on all other issues which come 
before them. What is sauce for the goose, Mr. Benn, is sauce for the gander.' ~ 
On 9 June, a third reader wrote: 'In fact the doctrine of the mandate 
hardly exists today in the calculations of practising politicians who generally 
adopt a realistic attitude to the role of the electorate in the political process. 
Modern political parties do not conform to the classical model that both Mr. 
Benn and Mr. Johnson obviously prefer. Indeed an examination of the histor-
ical record would show beyond reasonable doubt that the classical view of the 
"sovereign people" endorsing or rejecting specific mandates exists only in the 
minds of academic writers and legal purists. 
Such commentators have distorted the actual meaning of the special 
elections of 1831 over the Reform Bill and the special elections in 1910 held in 
connection with the Finance Bill and the Parliament Bill. None of these time-
hallowed examples - nor indeed the election of 1906 and 1923 over tariff re-
form - proves the existence of the "electoral mandate" as a viable constitu-
tional reality. In any event in 1846 Peel simply ignored it when he repealed 
the Corn Laws, and Gladstone in 1886 did exactly the same over his Home 
Rule Bill. Churchill in 1925 put Britain back on the gold standard without so 
much as a deferential glance towards the electorate and, of course, in 1927 
the Trade Disputes Bill appeared on the statute book without a mandate. 
Macmillan in 1962 sought entry to the EEC without revealing his 
complex thoughts to the electorate. And Wilson having successfully fought a 
general election in March, 1966, eight months later, without presumably a 
specific mandate, did precisely the same. 
The truth is more banal than the constitutional purists imagine: the 
concept of the mandate is a convenient political device pre-empted of real 
meaning and which is resorted to as a tactical manoeuvre to exploit a demon-
strably favourable public opinion. 
The anti-marketeers want the Government to seek a mandate fr 
the "people" on the EEC question because it is likely to be refused by the· 
But the Government in refusing a general election, or a referendum, o 
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question, is not acting unconstitutionally and faces only the remotest prospect 
of defeat at the hands of the electorate in four years' time for its failure to 
consult it over the issue of the EEC. This may be lamentable but this is how 
the British parliamentary system works. It is up to the Labour Party to de-
clare whether it accepts present constitutional arrangements as binding and 
whether as a government it would act differently. ' 
(The Times, 27, 31 May, 9 June 1971) 
16. Mr. Roy.Jenkins, Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, comes out in 
favour of Britain joining the EEC 
Speaking to his Birmingham constituency, Mr. Jenkins said that the 
Labour Party ought not to veer course now: saying one thing in Government 
and another when in Opposition. 
'For us to change now would be to make ourselves a mirror image 
of the present discredited Tory Government. They made promises in Opposi-
tion and set off in exactly the opposite direction in Government. 
We set a course in Government and should stick to it. It would 
otherwise be very damaging to the long-term interests both of the British 
people and of the Labour Party. There never was a time when honesty and 
consistency were more desirable in politics.' 
Mr. Jenkins stressed that it was the Labour Government in 1967 
which applied for entry 'because we believed it was in the best political and 
economic interest of the nation.' 
He saw no basis on which it was right to seek entry then and persist 
in the enterprise until Labour left office last year, 'but to oppose it in yrinci-
ple in 1971. ' 
He did not believe there was any basis for a party changing its atti-
tude to the national interest when it ceased to be in Government. 'I believe 
that what was right in 1967 is at least as right in 1971. ' 
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Mr. Jenkins accepted that public opinion to-day was against entry. 
But it might change again. 
'In any event, I don't believe that it is always the duty of those wh,, 
seek to lead to follow public opinion. Majority opinion was in favour of ar-
peasement before the war. It was wrong. Churchill was right not to veer. ,n-
1948, and Gaitskell was right not to veer in 1956 (over unilateral disarma 
ment).' 
(The Times, 19 June 1971; 
The Financial Times, 19 June 1971; 
Le Monde, 20-21 June 1971) 
17. Statements by the German Political Parties on the successful conclusion 
of the negotiations on Britain's accession to the EEC 
On 23 June 1971, the governing parties in Bonn and the CDU/CSU 
Opposition warmly welcomed the successful outcome of the Luxembourg nego-
tiations and spoke of a great step forward towards the political unification of 
Europe. 
The leaders of the governing parties, Mr. Wehner (SPD) and Mr .. 
Mischnick ( FDP), referred to the Hague summit conference, at which Mr. 
Brandt had played an important part in ensuring the reopening of negotiations. 
Mr. Wehner added that it was now important to begin discussions with the . 
other applicant countries. Mr. Mischnick criticized the CDU for paying lip,'. 
service to the European spirit but for doing very little to make real progresf: 
while it was in power. 
Mr. William Borm (FDP), stressed the 'historical significance .f. 
the results achieved in Luxembourg' and felt that the completion of a Eurq;; 
Community which could speak with one voice in the concert of nations wa · 
becoming a reality. Mr. Jochen Schulz, spokesman for the SPD Exe cut; 
called the Luxembourg decision the most important step towards a new i, 
sion in Europe since the signature of the Rome Treaties in 1957. : {ive 
, ,ple 
Mr. Reiner Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU Group in the Bt .: 
tag, spoke of a great day in the history of Europe. The agreement reach1::. 
between the EEC Council of Ministers and Britain on the latter's accession 
was welcomed by all who seriously wanted Europe to be united. The aim of 
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closer cooperation between the nations of Europe must be 'to ensure that 
Europe can at least speak with a single voice.' 
In addition to progress in financial and economic policy, Mr. Barzel 
" ieved that the political unification of Europe must be continued. 'Only a po-
..:ally united Europe will be able to bring its weight to bear in world politics 
-_n ,,_ manner consistent with its importance.' Mr. Erik Blumenfeld (CDU) 
~ommented as follows in the 'Deutschland-Union-Dienst' of his party: 'The 
'"lults of the Luxembourg negotiations between the EEC and Britain give good 
,son for satisfaction. They have created a firm basis for the parliamentary 
_,bates in Westminster on the final decision to join. Both the arrangements 
for Britain's financial contribution and the solution found for the New Zealand 
•roblem represent a compromise acceptable to both sides. It is pleasing to 
,ote that no attempt has been made to undermine the Rome Treaties. It is 
10w important to make sure that the political aim of the Treaties is also 
achieved because the EEC must not remain a mere customs union associated 
with certain agricultural market regulations. Political union is indispensable. 
Britain must also play a part as soon as possible in creating the economic and 
monetary union and in taking the decisions necessary on this subject because 
the monetary problems which are being experienced at present can only be 
solved permanently in cooperation with Britain (and the United States). 
It is now urgently necessary to open a full debate in the national 
Parliaments on the structure of the future enlarged Community. The main 
problem is how political cooperation is to be organized and which institutions 
are to be involved in it. A dogmatic debate as to whether the political union 
'lhould take the form of a federation or confederation is bound to be fruitless 
at present. It is more important for the Community to be endowed with appro-
priate and effective institutions as soon as possible. The two coming years 
ue of especial importance in this connection since the second stage of the 
conomic and monetary union involving the creation of a common decision-
aking centre will begin in 197 3. In addition the decisions of the Council of 
Iinisters on the financial constitution of the EEC require the European Com-
sion to present debated proposals on the role of the European Parliament 
vnich will then be determined by the governments. In this context it is prima-
'v necessary to extend the budgetary powers of the Parliament and give it 
~ral legislative authority. 
Velt, 24 June 1971; 
Zurcher Zeitung, 25 June 1971; 
schland-Union-Dienst, No. 118, 25 June 1971) 
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18. Lord George Brown expresses his views on the importance of British 
membership of the EEC 
In an article in 'The Guardian' Lord George Brown, former Foreigl' 
Minister in the British Labour Government, wrote in favour of Britain's 
joining the EEC. He laid special stress on the economic significance of me 
bership. 
'The early consequences of our accession to the Treaties and adap-
tation to their requirements is bound to be very much a swings and round-
abouts affair. There are areas where it seems we must make gains right 
from the word go and others where the outlook is much more conjectural or 
even downright worrying. But just how much the gains on the swings prove to 
be substantial enough to offset any losses on the roundabouts will be almost 
wholly in our control. 
One of my worries is that there will be a psychological spin-off from 
having at last got to the crunch, which will lead to our approaching the imme-
diate pre-entry period in the wrong mood. "All right, so we're in - let us now 
see what it does for us" may be a temptation, but it would be disastrous. 
Let's be absolutely, brutally frank and realistic with ourselves as we move up 
to January 1973. This decision doesn't carry with it an armchair seat in the 
Pullman car to prosperity, peace, and plenty for all. It doesn't even license 
us to carry on industrially and economically as we have been doing this last 
decade and increasingly so in the last few years. But then I can't believe that 
there were really many who thought that lunacy could go on much longer any-
way. 
We must have an immediate fundamental reappraisal of Government 
policies (and that goes for the Labour Party as the likely next Government too. 
Our people could well be the ones with the responsibilities around D-day 1973 
which would beautifully round off the ironies of the situation). We must have 
different financial policies and tax structures; we must finally commit our-
selves to a rooted belief in expansion and learn how to manage our affairs 
without the crucifying consequences of everlasting squeezes, and perpetual 
credit and cash flow restrictions. 
Nai'vetes about lame ducks and other farmyard fantasies must 
way to realistic regional and industrial distribution policies which pay pe 
and machines for being put to use and not for being compulsorily made idl 
Why aid to achieve the former is a "detestable subsidy" while money (which 
we are not earning) spent to relieve the victims of the latter is acceptable, 
shall never understand. 
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But if government - whichever it is - must revamp all its economic, 
financial, industrial, and social policies, so must industry take on a much 
more dynamic thrusting attitude than distinguishes much of it today. How often 
does one hear that hoary old sinful phrase "You mustn't expect too much over-
night"? So often better translated as '"Damn-all will happen th the next six 
months if I can avoid it '. " 
We have some of the best, most adventurous managements in the 
world here - but far too many of the others as well. And when any of the for-
mer slip once in a while, as they must, it's far too fashionable for the finan-
cial cognoscenti to rub their hands almost with glee. These are precisely the 
enterprises that will thrive and prosper in the post-EEC climate. It's the 
others that will get caught on the hop unless they grasp the nettle now. 
I trust that we shall be as inspired by the challenge of Community 
membership, and exposure to its problems and pressures, as nothing else 
short of war has ever in my lifetime seemed able to do. 
When my grandchildren reach their twenties, it will already be the 
1990's. They aren't then going to ask me (always assuming I'm still available) 
"What was the price of butter or beef in 1971 or 1973, Grandpa ? 11 They are 
going to be interested in the vigour, the dynamism, and the opportunities we 
bequeathed to them. The prices they then pay for their commodities will be 
as natural to them as ours already seemed to us. It's the standard of living 
which matters most to everyone, and in all my trade union life I've found more 
are poor in real terms when prices tend to be lower than the other way round. 
Cheap food in Britain, for example, has always meant an exploited farm wor-
ker however skilled. But above all, it's the place of Britain in the world, in-
volving as it does what we can do to influence our continent to play a wider po-
litical part in world Super-Power politics and in the frighteningly urgent task 
of assisting the developing world to cope with its ghastly problems of poverty, 
misery and disease. 
Surely this is how Socialists, trade unionists, radicals, and reform-
ers must approach the new world we are living in. Surely this is the challenge 
and the opportunity that joining a wider community with our close neighbours, 
friends, and allies, presents to us. 
It is not just that the Labour Government committed itself so heavily 
to seek EEC membership in 1967 which prevents our reneging with honour in 
1971 (although that's true enough). In my personal view we can't be Little 
Englanders and at the same time espouse our international faith. We can't be 
cowards when faced with change and challenge and yet deride the reactionaries 
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we profess to wish to displace. Britain and British labour can make a tremen-
dous impact on Europe and, through Europe, 6n the world via membership of 
the wider European Community. We can now give dear Dean Acheson the 
answer to his scornful comment. "Yes,friend, we did indeed lose our Empire: 
we have now found our r6le." ' 
(The Guardian, 30 June 1971) 
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III. ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPINGS 
1. Two meetings of European Movements in Luxembourg 
On 22 March 1971 the European Movement of Luxembourg held a 
general meeting when it passed a resolution on institutional and political 
questions relating to the European Communities. 
In the Movement's opinion, it is not enough 'merely to have consul-
tative monthly meetings between the Ministers concerned if no provision is 
made at Community level for a body empowered to take majority decisions ... ' 
According to the European Movement it is necessary in particular: 
a) 'that the European Parliament be elected by direct universal suffrage as 
provided in Article 138(3) of the Rome Treaty; 
b) that Parliament should have, in addition, genuine legislative powers to 
ensure closer participation of the people of Europe in the work of the 
Community institutions; 
c) that the powers of the EEC Commission be strengthened in order that it 
may conduct its business as a true executive. 
On 27 and 28 May 1971 the European Union of Federalists of 
Luxembourg held a meeting in Mersch on assistance to developing countries. 
The meeting passed a resolution urging that the action taken by the 
European Community under the Yaounde Convention be intensified in particular 
'by a fairer organization of world trade, by protection of the less favoured 
third world countries of which the 18 associated African States and Madagascar 
form part, and by increased non-refundable assistance and wider public 
assistance. ' 
The meeting further requested that the Community should take into 
account the educational, experimental and exemplary value of the work carried 
out by a large number of non-governmental organizations. 
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The Union finally appealed to the Luxembourg Government to 'take 
legislative measures with a view to guaranteeii'ig social security to the volun-
tary workers sharing in the cooperation action in favour of the third world, 
and that donors within these organizations are granted income tax relief for 
the amount of their donations.' 
(Tageblatt, 25 March 1971; 
Journal, 30 March 1971) 
2. The President of the Nederlandse Bank discusses the eurodollar market 
In the annual report of the Nederlandse Bank for 1970, the President, 
Mr. Zijlstra, writes that procedures for influencing, if not controlling, the 
eurodollar market should now be considered. For many years the eurodollar 
market has been largely supported by American balance of payments deficits. 
The effect of those deficits in increasing liquidity has been apparent on a very 
large scale in the form of internationally available liquid resources which are 
partly or entirely beyond the control of national monetary authorities. 
If the central banks invest part of their reserves on this market it 
will be inflated even further. Liquid resources must be invested, but when-
ever this happens interest levels are forced down, even in countries which for 
internal reasons would rather maintain a relatively high interest rate. The 
Netherlands experienced this situation in 1970. 
According to the annual report, this has made interest policy very 
difficult ro determine outside the United States and also raised the more 
general problem of resisting the inflow of funds from abroad. As far as in-
terest policy is concerned, the only solution is to wait as long as possible 
before reducing the bank rate, i.e. until external developments make it abso-
lutely impossible to maintain the old rate. There is no fundamental solution to 
the problem if existing parities are maintained. 
The American balance of payments deficit has become to persistent 
that no turn-around in the position can be expected. According to Mr. Zijlstra 
this was clearly reflected in the fundamental change - for internal reasons -
from restriction to expansion in American policy in 1970 in spite of the bal-
ance of payments deficit. Although expansion followed by a rise in interest 
rates may blunt the immediate impact of the interest problem, the underlying 
problem still remains. 
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Mr. Zijlstra also doubted whether American policy would be suc-
cessful. Economic growth was likely to recover very slowly in the United 
States. One reason for this, which may also be a factor outside the United 
States, is that the restrictive policy has led to an erosion of profits. This has 
caused many companies to curtail their investment plans. Thi' whole problem 
is very complicated. On the one hand wage rates, which have risen sharply 
by comparison with productivity, are a blow to investment. On the other hand, 
the erosion of profits will limit the possibility of making investments. It is 
difficult to see which way things will move. The outcome may differ from 
country to country and from sector to sector. 
Referring to the rapid price inflation in many countries, 
Mr. Zijlstra mentioned the phenomenon of 'stagflation'. The dilemma con-
sists in choosing between a continuation of restrictive policy in order to damp 
down inflation further and stimulating expansion in order to avoid stagnation. 
The risk of inflation being accompanied by stagnation was therefore very real. 
According to Mr. Zijlstra it was difficult to see how this dilemma 
could be avoided without a genuine incomes policy. He found it regrettable 
that although on the one hand the need for such a policy in one form or another 
was becoming increasingly clear, on the other the practical possibilities of 
implementing it seemed increasingly remote. 
At first sight the world monetary situation was very peaceful; this 
was not the peace which stems from genuine equilibrium, but rather the calm 
which comes from resignation, i.e. resignation to the American balance of 
payments deficit and resulting influx of dollars which is threatening to create 
increasing problems for policy in other countries. 
(1970 Annual Report of the Nederlandse Bank; 
Handels & Transport Courant, 28 April 1971) 
3. The President of the National Council of French Employers argues that 
inflation must be dealt with at the Community level 
In the April edition of 'Patronat', Mr. Paul Huvelin, President of 
the National Council of French Employers stressed the need for coordinated 
international action against inflation. Mr. Huvelin wrote: 'In contrast to what 
has happened so frequently since the war, the present wave of inflation is not 
a primarily French phenomenon but an international one. 
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As a result the usual remedies, involving the kind of rigid controls 
that take no account of international realities, 1are bound to act as a brake on 
trade and weaken our capacity to invest, our competitive position and, ulti-
mately, France's capacity to adjust and expand economically. 
France cannot deal with inflation on its own. On the contrary the 
governments of the Community - the world's second largest economic entity -
have the necessary means to uphold Europe's role of pursuing a financial, 
economic and social policy of moderating prices and establishing monetary 
stability. This step forward appears to us particularly vital because if we 
fail to do this the Six countries will be running the risk that one or other of 
them take national protective action which could endanger the Community's 
future.' 
(Patronat, Conseil national du patronat francais, April 1971) 
4. The Netherlands Agricultural Association considers the Council's decisions 
on agricultural structures and prices 
After the Council's decisions on the structure of agriculture and 
prices for 1971-72, the Netherlands Agricultural Association issued the fol-
lowing statement on 1 April: 
'The Executive of the Agricultural Association considers one posi-
tive aspect of the Brussels agricultural decisions of 25 March to be that the 
Council of the European Communities has broken the long price freeze and 
after lengthy discussions at last made a beginning on a common structural 
policy. This has prevented a deadlock and even break-up of the Community. 
The Executive hopes that the resolution will be implemented in a truly Com-
munity spirit and will not be diluted by national measures. 
The Executive notes with satisfaction that the price rises for the. 
cattle sector coincide broadly with the ideas of the Agricultural Association. 
The new grain prices, which will rise on average by 1! - 2% for Dutch farm-
ers, are, however, rather disappointing. The Executive stresses that this 
price correction must not be followed by a further price freeze. At the very 
least, the general increase in costs as a result of inflation must be compen-
sated each year in the price review. The Executive believes that Netherlands 
policy should take into account the new components of structural policy in-
cluded in the Brussels decisions .. The Agricultural Association is disappointed 
by the fact that the retirement arrangements included in the provisions do not 
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apply to older workers who are not active on farms which are closed down but 
who have to leave their employment for other structural reasons. The new 
principles of structural policy must be included as quickly as possible in EEC 
regulations. 
The harmonization of Member States' support policy laid down in the 
resolution meets with the approval of the Executive. Effective results can be 
expected quickly in this particular sphere. 
The Executive draws attention to the fact that the measures resulting 
from the Council resolution will be financed out of existing funds so that no 
extra funds will be needed. 
Finally the Agricultural Association believes that an effective link 
must be established between agricultural structural measures and general 
EEC policy in the sphere of economic and monetary activities, in particular 
for regional employment. ' 
('Boer en Tuinder', 1 April 1971) 
5. Action programme for 1971-1975 of the trade union movement in the 
Netherlands 
The three associated national trade unions in the Netherlands have 
drawn up an action programme by reference to which they will judge the Gov-
ernment and the various groups in the Chamber on their activities. 
With regard to European integration the trade union movement con-
siders that the action to be taken in the next cabinet period should include: 
- the adoption by the Community of a wholly outward-looking attitude and the 
strengthening of democracy within the Community through, inter alia, 
- the accession of other democratic countries; 
- a merger of the Treaties of the ECSC, the EEC and the EAEC, enlarging on 
their supranational aspects in the direction of a European federation; 
- direct elections of a European Parliament invested with basic budgetary and 
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legislative powers and with the right to have a say in the appointment of the 
European Commission and to call on individual members of the European 
Commission to resign; 
- strengthening the position of the European Commission in relation to the 
Council. 
In a number of fields it is no longer possible to pursue an effective 
policy nationally. It is therefore urgently necessary that national powers 
should be transferred to the European authority in the following fields: 
employment policy and labour market policy, economic and monetary policy, 
trade policy, policy in the field of technological development, regional policy 
and-policy on individual sectors. 
This would have to be coupled with the democratization of the 
various institutions. 
In the drafting of the European Treaty, social provisions should be 
given a more important place so that European social policy can be given a 
firmer legal basis; in the meantime the provisions in the existing Treaties 
should be interpreted as broadly as possible. 
Planning in the medium term is necessary so as to promote a 
balanced development of the European Community in all fields. The inter-
relationship between the social aspects of individual sectors needs to be 
analyzed and taken into account. 
The trade union movement must have a greater say in Community 
policy. It must be involved in the formulation and execution of policy ideas 
and decisions. Information on progress made in the EEC should be stepped up. 
Community policy in the various fields should reflect a greater con-
cern for the interest of consumers. In this connection it is desirable that the 
bodies representing the consumers in the Community institutions should have 
a more satisfactory place. 
(Beleid Beschouwd No. 2035 - Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst, 7 April 1971) 
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6. The Italian Council of the European Movement discusses the Werner Plan 
On 14 April, after hearing a report by Professor Petrilli, the 
Italian Council of the European Movement approved a statement· emphasizing 
that the creation of an economic and monetary union between the Community 
States was the central problem in the new policy adopted since The Hague 
summit conference, and stated that without political coordination the stable 
expansion wanted by the economic and monetary authorities would be jeopar-
dized. 
Taken as a whole the Werner Report was a valid proposal to solve 
economic and monetary problems, both through the objectives it laid down and 
the institutional machinery it recommended. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the importance for external 
relations of a unified monetary policy. Progressive independence of the Euro-
pean currencies from the dollar was in fact an impossible objective, since no 
Community body had the necessary decision-making powers. Among the pro-
posals contained in the Werner Plan and reflected in the decisions taken on 
9 February 1971 by the Council of Ministers of the Community, particular 
importance attached to granting the Council of Ministers power to approve the 
major lines of economic policy and national budgets acting on a proposal of the 
Commission. 
The document points out that the Brussels decisions included aban-
donment of the principle of automatic and irreversible progress towards eco-
nomic and monetary union, so that in fact the basic political objectives had 
been shelved. In their future political action the federalist movements must 
therefore adopt a critical approach to the process which was now under way; 
they should take advantage of the increasingly obvious contradictions between 
political objectives and institutional instruments to submit new proposals and 
exert pressure. On the other hand the existence at European level of organi-
cally linked interests lent concrete support to the European cause whose im-
portance must not be underrated. 
In Italy too there was a wider realization of the benefits which may 
result from closer political coordination in the Community in checking the 
efficiency of national administrations, rationalizing many decision-making 
processes and assuming European responsibility in face of the heed for com-
mon efforts to overcome regional imbalance. Against this background it 
would be necessary in future to give increasing attention to the links between 
internal policy options and Community decisions through a genuine federal 
dialectic. 
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According to the Italian Council of the European Movement, the 
broad repercussions of the Brussels decisions, in spite of their undeniable 
limits, justified the conviction that new efforts to democratize the common 
institutions must now centre on concrete problems which need solving if there 
is to be any real possibility of institutional development of the process of in-
tegration. 
(Il Popolo, 15 April 1971) 
7. Afro-Italian economic conference on 'The new Europe and a new Africa' 
The 20th African Economic Conference, organized by the Bottego 
Group with the cooperation of the Institute for Foreign Trade and the Afro-
Italian Economic Centre, opened on 16 April; its theme was 'The new Europe 
and a new Africa'. 
Professor Dell'Amore, the President of the Savings Banks of the 
Lombardy provinces, speaking of financial assistance to the developing coun-
tries, began by describing the various types of financing which had developed 
constantly since the Second World War, such as loans by international corpo-
rations and individual States and credits granted with or without State guaran-
tees. He added, however, that another form of financial assistance was be-
coming increasingly necessary to promote the economic and social growth of 
the developing countries. Banking systems in the developing countries in 
general and the African countries in particular had grave shortcomings. Pro-
fessor Dell'Amore thought these shortcomings could be eliminated by pro-
viding incentives for family savings through a systematic publicity campaign 
which would reach even the smallest villages; by ensuring wider use of bills 
in order to increase the administrative resources of each banking system; by 
appointing a Euro-African monetary committee, initially in a consultative ca-
pacity, with the task of providing technical assistance to the central African 
banks and enabling them to benefit from the wide experience of the industrial-
ized nations. This committee could later be transformed into an effective fi-
nancial body capable of ensuring the help of European countries to defend the 
various currencies in times of danger. It could then operate with the same 
criteria as the Bank for International Settlements which has provided valuable 
aid to the European economies. This problem will be discussed at the Italo-
African conference to be held next September in Milan at the initiative of the 
Savings Bank of the Lombardy provinces; the conference will be attended by 
the finance ministers, governors of central banks, presidents and general 
managers of the main credit institutions in all the African countries. This 
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conference, the first of its kind, will mark a decisive step in the provision of 
financial assistance to the African countries. 
(Il Sole - 24 Ore, 16 April 1971) 
8. Survey conducted by the European Movement among candidates for election 
to the Second Chamber 
The European Movement in the Netherlands conducted a written 
survey to determine the attitude of candidates of the major parties for election 
to the Second Chamber on a number of European problems. The major con-
clusion from the answers received is that the candidates are in broad agree-
ment on the need for European unification. 
This common approach and positive attitude is particularly apparent 
from the consensus of opinion on the need for a common European external 
policy. The overwhelming majority also believed that a European social and 
economic policy must be achieved before 1980. National powers must be 
transferred to a European authority beforehand in clearly defined stages. 
The candidates were particularly unanimous in their desire for 
direct elections to the European Parliament although they are clearly aware, 
as their answers show, that it will be necessary to form European parties. 
The European Parliament should then also have full budgetary and legislative 
powers. There is also a very large majority which believes that members of 
the European Commission should be appointed in consultation with the Euro-
pean Parliament. 
Opinions are divided on the question as to who in the national Gov-
ernment must bear primary responsibility for European policy: a Vice-
Premier with his own coordinating staff, or a Minister without Portfolio 
attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affoirs, or else a Secretary of State in 
the same department. The answers given by the Labour Party and D'66 can-
didates clearly showed preference for a Secretary.of State. 
The Catholic People's Party candidates were divided between a 
Secretary of State and a Minister without Portfolio. A Minister without Port-
folio was also preferred by Christian Historical Union members. The Anti-
Revolutionary Party candidates agreed that they would like a Vice-Premier to 
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be responsible. This unanimity is not surprising as the Anti-Revolutionary 
Party had returned a collective answer on behalf of all its candidates. 
(Information Bulletin of the European Movement in the Netherlands, No. 6, 
22 April 1971) 
9. The Central Association of German Chambers of Industry and Trade 
(DIHT) calls for a common short-term economic policy in the EEC 
Until supranational solutions can be found the coordination of eco-
nomic policies would make for progress in the EEC. This proposal was made 
by the Chairman of the Central Association of German Chambers of Industry 
and Trade (DIHT), Mr. Otto Wolff von Amerongen, early in April in a lecture 
given to the Statistical and Economic Association in Basle. He expressed the 
fear that emphasis on narrow technical harmonization might hold up the devel-
opment towards a larger Europe. According to the President attempts must 
now be made to harmonize economic and budgetary policy itself through 'func-
tional integration'. 
In his opinion the continuing existence of the European Community 
was dependent on the success of this policy. Hitherto short-term economic 
policy had been determined by national considerations. Something better was 
now necessary. Economic links between the six (and presumably soon ten) 
countries meant that the freedom of action for a successful national cyclical, 
economic and financial policy was being constantly restricted. 
With the more or less complete abolition of internal frontiers, 
European integration had reached a stage at which business cycle fluctuations 
and economic disequilibrium were transmitted rapidly and directly from one 
country to another within the Community. In a community of nations it was 
not permissible for individual economies to be governed by divergent national 
economic policies. 
The major partners of the EEC were industrial countries with an 
independent history as world powers. But the movement towards integration 
in a supranational union meant that these industrial countries would lose much 
of their power to determine monetary, economic, budgetary and financial po-
licy. Therefore the aim must not be a federal state in the traditional German 
sense of the word but rather a federative arrangement 'whose legal and orga-
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nizational structure still requires detailed scientific and political study. ' 
(Die Aussenwirtschaft, No. 16, 22 April 1971) 
10. Twenty-second Congress of the Italian Confederation of Direct Farmers 
At the close of the twenty-second Congress of the Italian Confedera-
tion of Direct Farmers held in Rome from 26 to 28 April 1971, a motion was 
approved of which the following is an extract: 
The twenty-second Congress notes: 
- having regard to the persistence and, with regard to many aspects, to the 
worsening of social, territorial and sector imbalances which are in many 
areas having an adverse effect on farmers and the agricultural community 
in Italy and in the Europe of the Six 
- having regard to lack of any political will or solidarity, which is the reason 
both for the delay in the EEC in pursuing the aims laid down in the first 
medium-term economic policy programme and for the failure of the nation-
al development programme for 1966 to 1970; 
Trusts, 
- that in the interests of democratic institutions and peaceful industrial rela-
tions, the recent sound decisions of the EEC Council and the provisions the 
Confederation asked for - which the Government is putting before the Cham-
ber - will reverse the trend to one of balanced growth making for real and 
harmonious development in social conditions. 
The lines of agricultural market policy, social policy, structures 
policy and regional planning suitable for restoring to agriculture and the far-
mer their rightful position in our industrial society of the Seventies, no longer 
raise any problems of theoretical or conceptual elaboration, but the essential 
short-term requirement is renewed political resolve to make the vital effort 
of solidarity. 
(Il Coltivatore, No. 26 of 4 May 1971) 
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11. Inquiry conducted by the Belgian Council of the European Movement into 
the election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffr~ge 
At a press luncheon on 27 April, Mr. Lefevre, Minister for Science 
Planning and Policy, announced the results of an inquiry conducted among the 
387 members of the Belgian Parliament at the suggestion of the Belgian Coun7 
cil of the European Movement, of which he is chairman. 
The inquiry concerned the need to elect1Belgian members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage . 121 replies were received, 
117 from members who were in favour of the election of the Belgian members 
of the European Parliament and ready to vote in support of appropriate legisla-
tion. 77 per cent of those replying felt the elections were a matter of urgency; 
26 delegates did not. The latter felt the powers of the European Parliament 
should first be increased. In their opinion absolute priority should be given to 
the enlargement of the Community. 
The Belgian Council of the European Movement subsequently pub-
lished a summary of the suggestions made by the Belgian M. P. s in the course 
of the inquiry regarding the steps that should be taken to bring about direct 
elections. 
'Six representatives state quite clearly that it is not up to them to 
take the initiative for they feel that they are not qualified to do so. It is up to 
authorities enjoying greater prestige whose proposals would be given consider-
ation and which would have a chance of winning through to the Council of Minis-
ters. Such authorities are the European Parliament, the European Movement, 
the executives of the political parties, and the parliamentary groups. 
Sixteen parliamentarians promised support for any stand taken on 
this by the Senate, the Chamber, their Party, the Government or the European 
Movement, or for any such position adopted in another European country. 
For ten parliamentarians action assumes a practical form in their 
taking the Chabert-Nothomb bill into consideration. 
The bill will be supported but will have to be amended. 
(1) See bill submitted by Mr. Chabert and Mr. Nothomb, European Documen-
tation No. 2/1970, p. 9. 
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A new bill is suggested by three representatives. 
A direct approach to the Minister of Foreign Affairs is envisaged(l), 
at the level of the European Commission (1) or of the Council of Ministers (1), 
or to the Government (1). In most cases it is within their own parties that 
parliamentarians propose to try and win acceptance for their views (10). 
The need for an infrastructure is stressed by nine parliamentarians 
who would like publicity campaigns to be carried out at trade union and youth 
organization level and on festive occasions. Three parliamentarians under-
take to write articles for the press and two others to support the plan for uni-
versal suffrage at conferences and meetings. Lastly, one representative will 
include lectures on the subject in a political training course. 
Concerted action is advocated between Belgian parliamentarians of 
all parties, between political groups, within a single political party at the 
European level. 
The incompatability of mandates is stressed by three parliamen-
tarians: 'The European Parliamentarians must be independent of their national 
authorities.' 
Criticisms were made: of the European Movement, that it is always 
slow to react; it should propose practical action for which serious prepara-
tions are made and be a little more vigorous; of the Government, that its 
attitude is restrictive ... 
Wishing to explain their personal points of view, ten parliamentar-
ians also sent a letter in which they expressed their opinions in a more 
detailed manner or drew attention to the practical problems of organizing the 
election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage. 
In the national context, reference is made to the problem of dividing 
up the seats between the different regions, establishing representative elec-
toral constituencies for the Belgian communities whose diversity must be 
reflected in the European Parliament - although this does not rule out the idea 
of a single electoral constituency - and the need to provide for electoral dis-
tricts and safeguard the rights of the various communities. 
With the enlargement of the Community in prospect, absolute prior-
ity should be given to British membership. The British were liable to be held 
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back or discouraged by a transfer of national sovereignty to the European Par-
liament. 
This fear of frightening the United Kingdom is also commented on 
by one parliamentarian who thinks it has had a direct effect on the reserva-
tions of the Belgian Government. 
Within the framework of the Six, the importance of a simultaneous. 
procedure is stressed because an overall operation would have a greater im-
pact on public opinion and this would thus help to bring home the European 
idea to the peoples of Europe; it would also allow for a revision of the Trea-
ties in force. Yet in view of the difficulty of obtaining a decision at the level 
of the Council of Ministers it is desirable to envisage the procedure in collab-
oration with all the countries that are at present resolved to organize it in 
their own countries. An isolated initiative on the part of one country could 
undermine the overall operation and does not appear to be advisable. 
A transitional period is envisaged to enable the present Assembly 
to acquire greater authority and give it an exclusive character by making 
European parliamentarians independent of the national Parliaments. 
Another solution was also suggested on a provisional basis, namely 
some formula making it possible to nominate national parliamentarians and 
non-parHamentarians in equal numbers. 
One parliamentarian put forward the idea of indirect elections, 
which would be more to the point than direct elections because 60 to 80 per 
cent of the electorate is indifferent to this matter. The electors could be 
chosen from among the members of the Provincial Councils and other insti-
tutions representing the Belgian electorate.' 
(La Libre Belgique, 29 April; 
De Standaard, 28 April; 
Documents forwarded by the Belgian Council of the European Movement) 
12. The European Independence Movement on British membership 
The National Bureau of the European Independence Movement has 
adopted a policy report on 'the United Kingdom and the future of Europe' 
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submitted by Mr. Alain Revenues. 
Dealing with whether British membership would contribute to 
greater cohesion, independence and prosperity among the Mefuber States of 
the Community, the document states: 
'To begin with we must recognize that the United Kingdom would 
help to heighten the sense of national realities - still very much lacking in the 
Community - and to inculcate a down-to-earth spirit. Britain's presence 
might help to ensure that priority was given to specific and clearly defined 
projects rather than long-term plans, and to actual developments rather than 
empty proposals.' 
To claim that Britain's presence in the Community would help to 
offset the power of Germany would be to ignore facts and the very spirit of the 
Community enterprise which aimed not at ensuring a risky balance or precar-
ious interplay of forces but at creating the conditions for an ever closer soli-
darity. 
In regard to agriculture 'the commercial benefits that the Commu-
nity would gain from British membership would involve scarcely anything 
apart from wine and certain types of cheeses and fruit and vegetable, and even 
the quantities of these products are difficult to determine. On the other hand 
it is reasonable to suggest that the United Kingdom would gain from entering 
the Community through an increase in the sales of its food industries (tinned 
foods, biscuits and so on). 
Under pressure from the Community the British negotiators accept-
ed the financing regulation but coupled this with a request for a transitional 
period; this is liable to be more in the nature of a waiting period following 
which all the problems raised by their integration into the system would still 
be there. Hence "enlargement" could call into question "completion", its 
prerequisite. 
In fact whatever arrangements are envisaged or proposals made in 
the course of the negotiations it seems obvious that the entry of the United 
Kingdom would greatly strengthen the hand of those in the Community who 
wish to call into question the principles underlying the common agricultural 
policy. 
By initiating standing negotiations within agricultural Europe the 
United Kingdom would exert its influence in favour of the gradual or sudden 
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abandonment of the common agricultural policy, which is a major reason why 
France is a member of the Common Market and which establishes the Commu-
nity nature of the EEC.' 
How would the economic situation of the United Kingdom affect the 
Six if Britain were to join? 
'If the United Kingdom pursues a policy of strictly balanced budgets 
it will be bound more or less to call into question the abandonment of customs 
duties in favour of the Community. On the other hand the British market 
would be very sluggish for the Community's agricultural and industrial exports, 
while British exports would be encouraged. 
If the United Kingdom initiates a policy of reviving its economy the 
Community, which is generally speaking in credit and only indebted to a very 
slight extent, would have to bear the burden of the United Kingdom's debt and 
the renewed deficit in its balance of payments and would contribute towards the 
very difficult and onerous job of defending the pound. 
It is hard to see how the United Kingdom could reconcile its eco-
nomic expansion with that of the Six without threatening its interests or com-
promising the approach opted for by the Community. It is also hard to see 
how it could help in the main plans for "consolidating" the EEC. ' 
With reference to monetary affairs the report indicates that 'by 
preserving the status of the pound against all odds the United Kingdom exposes 
itself to the constant threat of speculation and is dependent on international 
solidarity, that is to say on American support, which is hardly compatible 
with the aims of the Community regarding monetary stability and independence.' 
The entry of the United Kingdom to the Community would no doubt 
take it in a different direction. 'Possibly towards the great European free 
trade area proposed by the British at the OECD in 1957. The emergence of 
a giant economic and commercial entity would be something that the other 
great trading powers, such as the United States and Japan, would find it hard 
to accept. 
In the long run, therefore, the enlargement of the Community, the 
American and no doubt Japanese offensives, and the pause in consolidating the 
Community, would all combine to impose on us an Atlantic free trade area 
and ultimately an international free trade area.' 
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In conclusion Mr. Ravennes said that it was hard to believe that 
Britain's accession would at present increase the cohesion of the Community, 
consolidate its independence, or increase its prosperity. But the problem 
should be tackled dispassionately. It was not a question of deciding whether 
one was for or against the British. It was essential to ensure that any failure 
of the negotiations did not call into question either the existenc!e or the devel-
opment of the EEC or the friendship and cooperation that existed between the 
countries of the EEC and those of the European Free Trade Area. 
'If the United Kingdom, an old and solid nation, an outstanding 
people which has stood the test of time, wishes to reform its economy, gives 
up a monetary situation that is more illusory and dangerous than beneficial, 
gives evidence of its friendship for the United States but also of its indepen-
dence, and undertakes in Europe and in the world initiatives that are worthy 
of its genius, then truly for the second time this century the United Kingdom 
could change the destiny of Europe.' 
(Documents Europeens - May 1971, No. 1) 
13. The Italian Council of the European Federalist Movement calls for the 
direct election of members of the European Parliament 
At the 'European Congress' on 5 May, the Italian Council of the 
European Federalist Movement issued an appeal (published in numerous 
dailies) pointing out that the will of 65,000 citizens who had subscribed to the 
popular bill for the direct election of the Italian delegates to European Parlia-
ment had been sufficient to bring the political parties face to face with the 
problem of the first European elections. Other countries in the Community 
were ready to follow the Italian example and to take the first step towards the 
formation of a European Government. 
A European Government - the appeal went on - could free the States 
from the difficulties now facing them. Only Europe could re-establish a bal-
ance with Russia and the United States. Only Europe could enable the new 
generations to build a more humane society. But Europe could be brought into 
being only if all its citizens, following the example of the 65, 000 who had sub-
mitted the bill, demonstrated that they wanted this by taking direct personal 
action. 
Individually almost every citizen was in favour of Europe - the Fed-
eralist appeal concluded - but by acting individually they could not bring it into 
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being, whereas acting together they could get everything. The European 
Federalist Movement, which was open to all democratic ideas, could organize 
the action of Europe's citizens ... 
It could, in the interest and with the agreement and support of the 
people, make any move that might be needed to get European elections in Italy, 
to get European elections in Europe, and to entrust to the representatives of 
the European people, meeting in the European Parliament, the task of com-
pleting the construction of Europe. 
On the same occasion Professor Giuseppe Petrilli, President of the 
Italian Council of the European Movement, issued a statement. After recapitu-
lating the main lines of the appeal, he concluded: 'The European Movement is 
convinced that the future of European democracy depends, to a decisive degree, 
on the construction of federal institutions - which can be delayed no longer -
and proposes the watchword: "European elections now! " to all federalist-
inspired movements and to the Italian public at large.' 
(Avanti, 5 May; 
Il Popolo, 5 May 1971) 
14. At the Meeting of the Italian Council of the European Movement, 
Mr. Bersani discusses the institutional set-up Europe ought to have 
The Italian Council of the European Movement held a meeting in 
Rimini from 21 to 23 May at which Mr. Giovanni Bersani, Vice-President of 
the European Parliament, took part in the work of the committee on political 
problems. He said that for Europe to create suitable institutions and play an 
adequate part in international affairs, it had first of all to know what kind of 
society it wished to build. The discussion concerning the characteristics of 
the type of society to be built with the help of all the vitality of the European 
peoples, lead to the conclusion that one had to go beyond the stage of the 
single nation State, that the need was for a responsible, open and democratic 
society and an ordered, integrated Community, 
Mr. Bersani suggested that the design of the European society as a 
third alternative should be gone into more deeply with a view to touching off a 
wide movement of support, with large numbers participating. Taking the 
present community as a basis, it was a matter of urgency to devise an insti-
tutional strategy with definite aims and time-limits. He added: 
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'It has become urgent to solve the problem of a European Govern-
ment which would give the Community an adequate decision-making centre. 
Even more essential is the problem of the European Parliament, its election 
by universal suffrage and its real powers. With this end in view, the moves to 
bring in general elections for delegates to the Community Assembly is of real 
political significance, even if only in one of the Member States. 1 
Referring to the enlargement of the Community, Mr. Bersani said 
that this made a treaty on merging the three Communities a matter of urgency, 
as was a restructurization which, while leaving the broad bases of the Trea-
ties of Paris and Rome unaltered, would allow for a final institutional pro-
gramme. A Europe built as a Community State and enlarged to include ten 
members could assume the burden of its international responsibilities more 
decisively. The lack of common foreign policy had opened up voids which had 
been prejudicial to Europe and the world at large. 
'Europe needs to take an active part in and impart a new impetus to 
international affairs to foster democratic development in Europe, to promote 
a practical policy for peace and disarmament, bringing WEU within the orbit 
of Community institutions, to develop a more adequate third world policy and 
to call for a common approach to international problems. The Community's 
approach to solving world problems in the large geopolitical areas and even 
the rudimentary type of cooperation it practises with some of the developing 
countries is already a practical contribution to the development of new inter-
national balances. 1 
(Il Popolo, 23 May 1971) 
15, Mr. Brugger, Federal Councillor, advocates steering a middle course 
on the integration question 
In Basle on 25 May 1971, on the occasion of the Swiss Trade Union 
Congress for 1971, Mr. Brugger, Federal Councillor, stated his views on 
relations between the EEC and Switzerland. 
He referred particularly to the close trade relations between 
Switzerland and the EEC countries which amounted to a 'de facto integration'. 
Against this background there could be no question of Switzerland's cutting it-
self off, to shield itself against the impact of new developments. Economical-
ly, Switzerland would now be dependent on new factors as a result of the en-
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largement of the EEC, whether we like it or not'. Switzerland's top priority 
at the negotiations in Brussels was now to establish exemption from duty in its 
relations with an enlarged Community. Another outstanding issue was the 
degree of freedom Switzerland would have to retain in the organization of its 
external trade relations. Following the exploratory phase, still in progress, 
'the real stuff of the negotiations must be established in close agreement with 
the Parliament, both sides of industry and the general public.' In this con-
nection it would not be enough, for the public discussion of integration ques-
tions which would have to be held, simply to look at the consequences of mem-
bership or of complete isolationism; clear ideas would have to be produced 
about practical interim solutions that were genuine alternatives. 
With the split in public opinion and the conflict between economic 
interests, the difficulty with integration and many other problems was to find 
a basis for an 'acceptable overall solution'. Was there in any case still 'a 
Swiss viewpoint?' 
On 18 June 1971 Mr. Brugger, Head of the Federal Economic 
Affairs Department (EVD), commented as follows in the European Commis-
sion's report on relations between an enlarged EEC and the non-applicant 
EFTA States: 'The proposal about a free trade area for industrial goods is 
basically in line with my own ideas. But such a trade policy agreement ought 
to contain one or two props for closer cooperation in other economic policy 
fields, as we said in our general policy statement of 10 November 1970.' 
The alternative arrangements for relations between the EEC and the 
non-applicant EFTA States, that the European Commission had put forward, 
were discussed by Mr. Jolles, ambassador, Director of the Trade Section of 
the EVD and leader of the Swiss delegation at the negotiations at a press con-
ference in Berne on 19 June. He welcomed the proposal for a free-trade 
settlement for industrial products and compared this alternative with Switzer-
land's own ideas on a generalized abolition of customs duties throughout 
Europe. On the Swiss side a free-trade settlement was regarded as a useful 
starting point. It formed part of Switzerland's concept of integration. 
(Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 27 May 1971 and 21 June 1971) 
16. Fbundationofan Information Committee on Europeancooperation in Sweden 
A special Information Committee on European cooperation was 
founded in Sweden in June at the suggestion of Ambassador Bo Siegbahn, a 
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counsellor of the Swedish Confederation of Industry. The purpose of this 
Committee is to disseminate information on the effects of closer ties between 
Sweden and the European Community. The aims of the Committee are to com -
bat the indifference and incompetence which have so far characterized the ar-
guments of all who oppose the Common Market. 
The Committe's manifesto states that Sweden must move closer to 
the European Community in order to maintain vital contacts with democratic 
Europe, above all in the spheres of trade and technological cooperation. Ac-
cording to the Committee, the prosperity of Swedish industry and future gen-
erations are dependent on Swedish membership of the EEC. 
Economically, Sweden could live without the EEC but the Committee 
rejected the suggestion that the advantages of European cooperation were 
limited to the facilities of a customs agreement. It was at least equally im-
portant that Swedish participation opened the door to more trusting and closer 
cooperation and to exchanges of views and experience in all spheres of pro-
ductive life. In addition all the barriers to international economic activity 
must be removed. 
The manifesto deplores the decision taken by the Government on 
18 March not to apply for full membership of the EEC. According to the sig-
natories of the manifesto, Sweden must find an active and fruitful form of 
cooperation, taking into account the fact that the neutrality clause must not be 
an obstacle to economic cooperation. 
(Il Sole - 24 Ore, 16 June 1971) 
17. Opinion of Belgian industry on relations with non-applicant EFTA coun-
tries 
The Federalion of Belgian Industries carried out an enquiry among 
the various branches of trade and industry in Belgium to learn their opinions 
about the problems raised by the inclusion in the negotiations on the enlarge-
ment of the EEC of the non-applicant EFTA States. From an analysis of these 
opinions the minimum general conditions for the conclusion of an agreement 
emerged as follows: 
'A customs union, de jure or de facto, seems to be the first condi-
tion for any complete customs dismantlement on a reciprocal basis between 
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these countries and the EEC. 
The alignment of the tariff and customs system of these countries on 
that of the EEC States, i.e. the common external tariff in particular, is es-
sential to avoid any deflection of trade or distortions of competition. 
Respect for the neutrality of these countries does not seem to be 
affected by participation in common decisions in the field of customs. 
In the field of common policies under the Treaty of Rome the 
following minimum requirements must be formulated with regard to non-
applicant EFTA States: 
Trade policy: regular consultations should be provided for. The 
neutral countries would undertake to follow a policy close to that of the en-
larged EEC. In the event of any undue divergence there would be a safeguard 
clause of the "Article 115" type. 
Taxation: one could ask the contracting parties: 
1. to adopt a rule based on non-discrimination in fiscal matters based, 
for example, on Articles 95 and 96 of the Treaty of Rome; 
2. to conclude bilateral conventions to avoid the double taxation of in-
come (based on the OECD model). 
Law of competition: the neutral countries should undertake to 
legislate against any concerted practice liable to affect trade between mem -
bers of the area coming within the scope of these agreements. They should 
also accept the competence of the Court of Justice of the Communities to deal 
with trade disputes. 
Right of establishment of enterprises: there should be a law against 
any discrimination based on nationality for the member countries of EFTA and, 
in any case, the most-favoured-nation clause should be applied to the EEC 
countries. 
Common agricultural policy: it would be desirable for these coun-
tries to adopt the common agricultural policy in toto or, failing that, the ma-
chinery provided for by the market organizations of the Community; otherwise 
the only Community concessions conceivable would be the protective element 
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for the processing industries, i.e. the fixed element in levies (similar to a 
customs duty). 
Technical obstacles to trade: the contracting parties to the specific 
agreements should together resolve the problem of technical obstacles; the 
neutral countries would have to accept the directives already taken (they are 
rare) or participate in their adaptation in the same way as the applicant States. 
Safeguard clauses: there should be safeguard clauses similar in 
scope to Articles 115 and 226 of the Treaty of Rome to resolve the problems. 
of sectors which could be placed in serious difficulty when these agreements 
come into force. ' 
The Federation further notes that certain particularly sensitive 
industries would like special arrangements. These are the pulp, paper, 
cardboard and plywood industries and the vegetable oils and fats sector. 
As for the date when any agreement could come into force, the 
Federation would like this to coincide with that of the accession agreements. 
Similarly the duration and the ttmetable for the transitional period should 
closely coincide with those laid down for the accession agreements. 
'Should it not be possible to reach an agreement on this basis and 
these minimum conditions between the EEC and the neutral EFTA States, the 
Federation believes that the only solution would be for the new members of the 
EEC gradually to apply the common external tariff in their trade with their 
former EFTA partners according to the timetable laid down for all third coun-
tries. 
(Bulletin de la Federation des Industries belges, 10 June 1971) 
18. Swiss democracy and the EEC 
At the invitation of the St. Gallen Legal Association, lawyers from 
the countries bordering on Lake Constance attended a conference in St. Gallen 
on 27 June 1971. Its highlight was a lecture by Dr. Alois Riklin, Professor 
of Political Science at St. Gallen University, on the subject 'Switzerland and 
the European Economic Community - legal and political problems'. 
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After a critical analysis of the special features of Swiss democracy, 
Professor Riklin concluded that the Swiss were perhaps reticent in exercising 
their political rights but would react strongly to any attempt to remove or 
curtail these rights. This meant that additional problems which did not arise 
or were not so pronounced in other European States would be encountered in 
settling relations between Switzerland and the EEC. What then were the true 
implications of relations between Switzerland and the EEC for Swiss democra-
cy? 
'Accession to the EEC in its present form would entail a substantial 
curtailment of our democracy. Recent studies of the Swiss system of democ-
racy by referendum have proved that the indirect effects of the referendum are 
more important than its direct effects, since the "quasi-legislature" repre-
sented by the associations entitled to call referendums in the pre-parliamentary 
decision-making process frequently arrives at neat compromises. The result 
of this development has been that the most important bills have not in fact 
come up for referendum since the 1950s. Accession to the EEC would consid-
erably diminish the rights of the people but would not do away with them alto-
gether. Even then Switzerland would be anything but a purely representative 
democracy. 
The erosion of direct democracy is, however, only one aspect of the 
problem. The loss of representative democratic rights would be an even more 
serious and far-reaching problem. Accession to the EEC would reduce the 
powers of Parliament to an even greater extent than the rights of citizens. 
Parliament would lose in large measure its power to approve treaties drawn 
up under international law as well as its legislative, budgetary and supervisory 
powers. This important aspect of the problem has been almost completely 
overlooked in Switzerland because of the emphasis placed on the implications 
for direct democracy. Here in fact we are in the same boat as all the EEC 
member countries and applicant States. 
The loss of powers would not be so important if the curtailment of 
national democracy were countered by greater democracy at international 
level. But this is not the case. Rightly enough membership of the EEC is 
only open to democratic States, but the EEC itself has an undemocratic struc-
ture and therefore undermines democracy in its Member States. The auto-
cratic system which has been set up in the EEC includes no direct democratic 
components and its representative democratic component has no practical 
importance. 
The European Parliament has almost none of the features of modern 
parliamentarism. It has no power to approve international treaties in the 
EEC and no legislative authority but merely the right to be consulted in certain 
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instances. Until the end of 1970 it had no real say in budgetary matters, and 
the budgetary powers it has enjoyed since 1971 - which will be extended in 
1975 - must not be overemphasized since it will in reality only be concerned 
with 3. 5 per cent of the total budget of the European Community. Finally its 
supervisory powers are only rudimentary. The European Parliament is there-
fore a shining example of mock parliamentarism and mock democracy. 
The undermining of democracy through international and supra-
national cooperation is a general trend in international relations today. It is, 
however, not so marked in any international organization as in the European 
Communities because no other international association of States has such 
far-reaching powers. ' 
Because of these implications for democracy Switzerland might be 
tempted to have nothing to do with the Community. But Professor Riklin felt 
that would be a big mistake. If the EEC were enlarged and consolidated from 
a partial to a general economic union, let alone a political union, it would be 
a 'colossal illusion' to assume that Switzerland could remain in 'splendid iso-
lation' and pursue a completely independent external and internal policy as a 
non-member. 'On the contrary our economic policy would become increasing-
ly dependent on this economic colossus without our having an equivalent say 
in the effective process of integration. But just as our freedom of external 
and internal political action would be limited, we should also have to accept a 
curtailment of our democratic freedom. The loss of independence would be 
accompanied by a loss of democracy. We are therefore caught in a vicious 
circle: if we join the EEC we will suffer a loss of democracy because the 
EEC is undemocratic; if we do not join, the loss of democracy will result 
from the fact that the freedom of action of the democratic decision-making 
bodies will be narrowed. What is the answer?' 
According to Professor Riklin, democratization of the EEC was the 
only solution. 'But how can democratization be achieved when President 
Pompidou and Mr. Heath have agreed on their own special concept? 
Two possible methods of democratization must be ruled out imme-
diately because they are either irreconcilable with the existing system or 
inappropriate. 
The formula of a parliamentary system of Government with the 
right of appointment and provision for votes of confidence would be incompat-
able with the existing structure. President Pompidou and Mr. Heath want to 
turn the Council of Ministers, which consists of representatives of the Mem-
ber States' Governments, into a "quasi-Government". The concept of making 
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the Governments dependent on instructions from national Parliaments would 
also be inappropriate, because it would be too cumbersome and not flexible 
enough to arrive at compromises. 
The only possible means of democratizing the Communities was 
therefore to upgrade the international Parliament of the Community. The ini-
tiative for this must stem from the national Parliaments. No treaty on the 
merger of the three European Communities, agreements to establish economic 
and monetary union or any other treaty whose purpose is the development of 
the Communities should be approved by national Parliaments unless these 
treaties also contain measures to develop the democratic structure of the 
Community. ' 
Professor Riklin concluded his report by pointing out that democra-
cy in Switzerland would be threatened regardless of whether it joined the Com-
munity. It would therefore be sensible for it to establish the closest possible 
links with the EEC in order to strengthen the position of European democrats 
and advocate democratization of the Community. 
(Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 29 June and 17 July 1971) 
19. Call for new action by the Italian Executive Committee of the 'European 
Left' movement 
The Italian section of the 'European Left' movement has published a 
programme appealing to all the forces of the democratic Left in Italy to band 
together in a strong movement aiming at creating a European Federation 
through the determined efforts of the working classes, the younger generation 
and the people. 
'In particular the European Left has the following objectives: 
1. Enlargement of the European Community to include all the democratic 
countries of Western Europe; 
2. Rapid establishment of the European economic union as a second important 
step now that the customs union has been almost completed; 
3. Creation of a European Federation led by a supranational authority which 
would not stand for the individual nation states but would be a genuine 
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independent authority exercising its power in a single European Parlia-
ment; 
4. Immediate attribution of decision-making and supervisory powers to the 
existing European Parliament which must be enlarged and eiected by uni-
versal direct suffrage among the electors of the European countries re-
presented in it; 
5, New relations with Eastern Europe as a necessary step towards establish-
ing unity throughout the continent, which is impossible today because of 
the rigid system of opposing blocs; 
6. A review of relations between Europe and the United States of America 
with the creation of new links based on the new reality of a united Europe; 
7. Rationalization and continuation of a joint effort by all European countries 
to assist the developing countries. 
In this struggle, the Italian Section of the European Left movement 
sees various factors which will facilitate the creation of a Europe of the 
peoples, that is to say, a Europe in which all its citizens participate directly. 
This Europe, putting behind it its recent history and recovering genuine unity, 
can still continue to make a major contribution to the development of human 
civilization. ' 
(Iniziativa Europea, No. 14/1971) 
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I. COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS 
1. The meeting of the EEC Finance Ministens in Hamburg yields little in the 
way of practical results 
The meeting of the EEC Finance and Economic Affairs Ministers 
held in Hamburg on 26 and 27 April 1971, dealt mainly with questions of mone-
tary, budget and short-term economic policy. 
The Ministers failed to agree on a common system for securing the 
flexibility of EEC rates of exchange vis-a-vis the outside world. Three pro-
posals, which had been debated at the last meeting of the International Mone-
tary Fund in Copenhagen, came up for discussion: (i) frequent changes in 
parities over narrow bands, (ii) a basic widening of bands and a temporary 
floating of rates of exchange. After the close of the meeting Mr. Schiller, 
Federal Minister for Economic Affairs, stressed the diversity of views of the 
EEC Ministers. 
The Ministers we:re, however, able to agree on a procedure for 
trying to solve the problem of flexibility vis-a-vis the rest of the world. The 
Finance Ministers would meet in Belgium in June 1971 to hold a discussion on 
the subject at the invitation of Mr. Snoy et d'Oppuers, the Belgian Finance 
Minister. 
The bands of the EEC currencies in relation to each other would be 
reduced from 1. 5 to 1. 2 per cent on 15 June 1971. This decision by the 
Finance Ministers was in accordance with the aims laid down in the plan for 
the establishment by stages of economic and monetary union. The President 
of the Committee of the EEC Central Banks, Mr. Carli, President of the 
Italian Central Bank, told the Ministers of the technical arrangements for close 
cooperation between the Central Banks, including special telephone lines be-
tween them with conference facilities. The planned narrowing of bands was 
described by Mr. Schiller as an experimental phase. Until the internal nar-
rowing of bands was coupled with a common system to secure flexibility vis-
a-vis the rest of the world, the EEC Member States would remain independent 
in regard to monetary policy, so that individual revaluations or devaluations 
would still be theoretically, if not practically, possible. 
Mr. Schiller reminded the EEC Finance Ministers of the escape 
clause in the stage-by-stage plan, whereby the introduction of economic and 
monetary union would be cancelled if the sought-after stability within the EEC 
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were not achieved. 
Mr. Haferkamp, the EEC Vice-President, announced a European 
Commission plan for common regulations laying down the bases of assessment 
of the value added tax and consumer tax before the summer recess. Mr. 
Haferkamp called upon the Finance Ministers to give the Commission a broader 
mandate and allow it to set maximum and minimum levels for rates of VAT 
and consumer tax. Then the prevailing highest rate of one Member State 
would serve as the upper limit, and the current lowest rate of one Member 
State the lower limit, for the whole Community. Only this could prevent 
divergence in rates of tax in the Community until the harmonization of taxation 
systems. 
For 1971 Mr. Haferkamp announced a further Commission proposal 
to harmonize the types of tax affecting the flow of capital, particularly those 
taxes on interest earned on fixed-interest bearing securities and dividends. 
The Finance Ministers were agreed that as a result of the work done so far by 
the EEC Commission in this field, no kind of practical decision could be taken 
about the future form of these taxes. 
Mr. M<>ller, the Federal Finance Minister, told the 'Handelsblatt' 
that for the implementation of fiscal harmonization in Brussels the best ex-
perts of all the countries would have to be brought together. He had referred 
the Finance Ministers to the German model. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 April 1971; 
Handelsblatt, 28 April 1971; 
Die Welt, 28 April 1971; 
Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 29 April 1971; 
Luxemburger Wort, 29 April 1971) 
2. Statements made in Rome by Mr. Haferkamp on Community policy on 
energy and fiscal and monetary matters 
On 28 May Professor Haferkamp, a member of the European Com-
mission, gave a press conference in Rome on Community policy on energy and 
fiscal and monetary matters. 
He was optimistic about Britain's accession to the EEC, but added 
that the most important task now was that of organizing the economic and 
- 216 -
monetary union. Recent events had shown Europe to be 'in extended order', 
adopting quite different attitudes from those decided upon at The Hague. It 
was a dangerous precedent which could later create serious difficulties, es-
pecially in an enlarged Community. A return had to be made to the system of 
fixed exchange rates and a common approach to monetary probrems. This 
was the only way in which an energy policy could be worked out and fiscal har-
monization achieved. 
With reference to energy policy Professor Haferkamp pointed out 
that there were the Treaties setting up the ECSC and Euratom but there was 
no treaty on primary sources of energy. The individual countries were pur-
suing different policies and the interests at stake were considerable. The 
Community had to import enormous quantities of energy. Whereas Europe 
was more or less self-sufficient regarding the coal needed by the steel indus-
try, the reverse was true as regards oil, which was the main source of energy 
despite the progress made in the nuclear sector. 
Apart from recent increases in the price of crude oil, the Commu-
nity was faced with a new strategy on the part of the producer countries so 
that the policies so far pursued were out of date: the Community had to find 
a way out of this situation. 
After stressing the importance of relations between the Community 
and the producer countries and the need to develop technical cooperation be-
tween them, Professor Haferkamp said: 'We do not intend to undermine the 
activities of oil enterprises but to improve the conditions under which they 
work.' 
He was very cautious regarding direct negotiations between States 
although he recognized that there would be no interference in foreign policy. 
But commercial policy had to be common to the Six and bilateral relations 
should not divert them from this common course. 
As regards nuclear energy, the Commission directive was to enable 
firms operating in that field to get Community loans, particularly for carrying 
out programmes relating to enriched uranium. 
As regards tax harmonization, Professor Haferkamp confirmed the 
time-limit of 1972 for the adoption of value-added tax in the Six. By the end 
of 1973 the bases of taxation should be harmonized. In the European countries 
there were 26 different types of consumer tax. The aims should be to harmo-
nize the six or seven types that produced distortions in competition. It was 
- 217 -
also necessary to harmonize taxes on bonds, dividends and fixed incomes. 
Professor Haferkamp trusted that it would be possible to double the quantity 
of duty-free goods that tourists resident in the Community were allowed to 
bring in with them. 
(Il Sole - 24 Ore, 29 May 1971) 
3. Speech by Mr. Spinelli on the future of the European Community 
During a speech to the biannual meeting of the Permanent Confer-
ence of Chambers of Commerce on 11 June in Rotterdam, Mr. Spinelli ex-
pressed his opinion that enlargement of the Community might result in its 
dilution into a kind of free trade area. The history of the European Commu-
nity and in particular the recent monetary crisis had shown that the major 
problem of building a united Europe did not lie in the number of members but 
in the weakness and inadequacy of its institutional structure. It might perhaps 
be more difficult to control a Community of ten countries, but the process of 
integration must be considered to have failed even in a Europe of the Six if 
those who bear responsibility did not quickly make allowance for the need to 
strengthen the organizational structure. In this connection the enlargement 
of the European Community was a positive factor because it removed one of 
the causes of political disagreement which so far had prevented real progress 
towards European unification. 
Mr. Spinelli considered it surprising that the same governments 
which emphasized their desire for economic and monetary union were strongly 
opposed to structural reinforcement without which enlargement and economic 
and monetary union would be meaningless. Statements by various politicians, 
and in particular by Mr. Pompidou, showed that they too were concerned by 
this matter even though plans were still in an extremely vague stage. 
'It is therefore important', Mr. Spinelli said, 'to avoid disputes on 
words and doctrines. We must work towards concrete objectives.' The main 
aim at present was what President Pompidou had called the creation of a 
European confederation with a government which would have genuine decision-
taking powers and would not be dependent on the Governments of Member 
States but would have an adequate administrative apparatus. 
At this stage Mr. Spinelli did not want to discuss the question as to 
whether the European Government should be developed from the European 
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Commission, the Council or a new institution. 'We must have a long-term 
plan and above all a clear and adequate procedure to set up the European gov-
ernment and ensure the gradual transfer of power from national to Community 
institutions. In this process, which will lead to a European confederation, full 
account must be taken of existing realities. These include beytnd any shadow 
of doubt the national identity of States, but also the experience which has been 
gathered in close on twenty years of European cooperation. The tradition and 
democratic institutions of the various European countries are also a reality.' 
'We in the European Community are confronted with a paradoxical 
situation. In all the countries the governments are faced with increasing 
pressure to increase the level of participation and popular control over poli-
tical decisions. In the European Community it is believed possible to discuss 
and decide on the transfer of powers and the creation of a new European policy 
through a secret diplomatic conference. ' 
Mr. Spinelli thought this method was not only unacceptable but also 
unlikely to bring results. An institution capable of representing the will of the 
people must therefore be created immediately. The European Parliament was 
such an institution but it would obviously remain weak until it had real powers 
and the possibility of playing an effective role in creating Europe. 
Mr. Spinelli concluded that the plans to strengthen the present Com-
munity structure and gradually establish the European confederation must be 
discussed, developed and approved with the firm support of the European Par-
liament. This also meant that Parliament must be elected as soon as possible 
by general European elections to enable it to perform such an important task. 
(Handels & Transport Courant, 15 June 1971) 
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II. MOVEMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS AND PROMINENT FIGURES 
1. European industry is disturbed by the monetary situation in the Community 
In a statement to the press on 12 March 1971, the Council of Chair-
men of the Union of Industries in the European Community (UNICE) expressed 
its concern over worldwide inflationary trends which had made their effects 
felt in the Community. It called upon Member States to adopt joint, concerted 
measures which would allow a harmonious development of economic, mone-
tary and social policy. 'In the first place we must make sure that wages do 
not rise faster than productivity, otherwise there can be no solid foundation 
for an increase in the purchasing power of wage-earners. 
The Governments must also take especial care to hold public 
spending within limits which are compatible with general economic equilib-
rium and they must prevent budgetary policy from being an additional infla-
tionary factor. 
On a more general plane vigorous measures should be taken by the 
Governments, the European Commission and both sides of industry to ensure 
balanced economic development in all the Community countries. This is the 
only way for Europe to hold in check the stresses which are apparent in the 
economies of Member States, and to maintain constant expansion while en-
suring monetary stability. ' 
On 24 May, UNICE issued a further communique after the German 
and Dutch decision to float the DM and Florin. It underlined once again the 
concern already expressed in March. 'UNICE regrets that Member States 
have failed to face up to foreseeable events and take in good time measures 
which would have been less harmful and less extreme than the fluctuating 
exchange rate of certain Community currencies. 
UNICE emphasizes that normal operation of the Common Market 
requires a fixed parity between Member States' currencies. It stresses the 
serious impact which monetary uncertainty may have on trade and calls for 
a return to the normal system of exchange rates at the earliest possible date. 
Having regard to the difficulties which the Community has experi-
enced yet again, UNICE believes it essential to pursue with greater vigour 
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and effectiveness the measures needed to make real progress towards econom-
ic and monetary union. In particular stronger efforts must be made to ensure 
closer coordination of the development of Member States' economies and a 
common approach to monetary problems both within the Community and in 
relations with non-Member States.' 
(Conseil national du Patronat francais, April and June 1971) 
2. European industry states its position on the proposed statute for the Euro-
pean company 
The Union of Industries in the European Community (UNICE) con-
siders 'that a statute for European companies is likely to be a useful legal 
instrument and psychological contribution to foster international mergers; 
this is one of the aims which the European Commission and other interests 
concerned have defined for the statute. A condition for its practical use is, 
however, that the proposed statute must meet the requirements of the com-
panies for which it is intended if they are to stand up to worldwide competi-
tion. 
In this connection UNICE deplores the fact that the European Com-
mission has presented to the Council of Ministers a proposal which has been 
prepared by its departments without proper consultation of the interests 
directly involved. Because of this lack of consultation, the Commission of 
the European Communities has lost the opportunity of drawing on outside in-
formation and experience. After examining this project, industry considers 
that the Commission's proposal is unacceptable in some respects and requires 
a thorough revision in others.' 
UNICE believes that against the background of future harmonization 
of company law, the Commission's proposal represents on certain very im-
portant matters 'a synthesis of the most stringent provisions applied at nation-
al level in Member States and even lays down certain strict rules which do 
not exist in any Member State. In addition the proposed statute offers less 
possibility for efficient operation and management of the company than is the 
case under legislation in non-Member States from which the main competitors 
to Community concerns come. 
The formula of the European company which has been designed as 
an instrument to strengthen the competitive position of European companies 
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would therefore have the opposite effect and weaken the situation of those com-
panies which adopt this solution. These considerations concern in particular 
the representation of workers, the preparation of annual accounts and the 
rights of individual groups. ' 
With regard to the representation of workers in the European com-
pany, UNICE finds that instead of seeking cooperation between workers and 
management to eliminate causes of industrial conflict 'the projects grants the 
works committee certain co-management functions and lays down procedural 
rules of an inquisitorial and bureaucratic nature which will only help to create 
tension at company level. ' 
UNICE strongly rejects 'any other provision which would lead to 
institutional participation by workers in the supervisory board of companies. ' 
The UNICE opinion contains a significant passage on fiscal provi-
sions applicable to the European company. If European industry 'shares the 
Commission's belief that the present arrangements for taxing companies 
which operate in several States through permanent establisments or subsid-
iaries is far from giving full satisfaction, it does not consider that the dis-
advantages of this system are less serious for companies which cannot or do 
not want to have the status of a European company than for those which do opt 
for this status. It therefore believes it essential for the proposed directives 
on the common fiscal system applicable to mergers, hive-offs and transfers 
of assets as well as to the common fiscal system governing parent companies 
and their subsidiaries to be adopted beforehand; these directives are referred 
to in the proposed statute of the European company and in the accompanying 
explanatory comments. 
It considers that subject to the prior adoption of these two directives 
and having regard to the differences which exist at present between national 
legislations, the arrangements proposed by the Commission will enable the 
fiscal problems of the European company to be solved. UNICE would however 
like the benefit of the solutions proposed in the statute to be extended to all 
companies in Member States irrespective of whether they have the status of 
European companies. ' 
(L'Echo de l'Industrie, No. 4, April 1971) 
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3. The 'Scelba plan' for Europe 
At a press conference on 15 April, marking the end of his two-year 
term as President of the European Parliament, Senator Scelba outlined his 
'plan' for European unification. 
The main points in the 'Scelba plan' are as follows: 
1) The Heads of Government of the Member States will form a Govern-
ment of the European Communities. 
2) Each Head of Government will appoint a deputy in the person of a 
Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, who will exercise the powers of 
the Head of Government in all Community matters. 
A Government of this kind would establish an organic link with na-
tional Governments and ensure the continuity of governmental activity in the 
Community. From time to time national ministers responsible for specific 
sectors could participate in a consultative capacity. 
3) Immediate extension of the powers which will be granted to the 
European Parliament over the Community's operating budget after 1975 by 
virtue of the Luxembourg Treaty to all measures which have financial or 
legal implications for citizens of the Member States. 
4) Election of the European Parliament by direct suffrage according 
to a procedure which each Member State will be free to determine on the 
basis of its own constitutional system, provided that democratic principles 
are respected. 
5) For a transitional period, links could be ensured between the na-
tional Parliaments and European Parliament with a substantial number (one 
third) of the Members of the European Parliament elected from among the 
members of national Parliaments. 
6) The number of members of the European Parliament laid down in 
the Treaties should be doubled. 
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7) The Executive Commission should be granted full independence. Its 
powers of initiative and decision-taking should be extended to all sectors of 
Community policy. 
8) Members of the Executive Commission should be appointed by the 
Community Government subject to approval by the enlarged Bureau of the 
President of the European Parliament, i.e. including the Chairmen of the 
duly constituted political groups. 
In practice a similar procedure is adopted in the United States of 
America for appointment to high offices of State. 
9) The European Parliament would be given the supervisory powers 
which devolve on national Parliaments of Member States over actions of the 
Executive Commission and Community Government. 
10) The Committee of Permanent Representatives appointed by the 
Community Government would be an auxiliary body. The members of the 
Committee could also be given the role played in the Member States by the 
Secretaries or Under-Secretaries of State but without political responsibili-
ties. 
11) The European Community, i.e. the three existing Communities, 
would take over the powers of the Western European Union (WEU) which would 
be disbanded. 
12) The above measures should form part of the agreements on the 
membership of the United Kingdom and other applicant States. 
Finally, Senator Scelba hoped that in the not too distant future we 
would no longer speak of the European Communities but of a single European 
Community which would also take over the powers of the Western European 
Union. 
(Il Popolo, 16 April; 
Corriere della Sera, 16 April 1971) 
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4. President Walter Behrendt calls for more powers for the European Parlia-
ment 
Mr. Walter Behrendt, new President of the European Parliament, 
wants fresh consideration to be given to a complaint against the European 
Council of Ministers aimed at forcing direct elections to the European Parlia-
ment to be held as provided by the Treaties. As he explained in discussions 
with the journal 'Europa-Union' on 8 April 1971, however, he did not want to 
approach the Council of Ministers 'with forefinger raised'; on the contrary he 
wanted to try and win them over by convincing them. 
Touching on the question of the lack of powers of the Parliament in 
Strasbourg, the President said that it was no longer 'acceptable that legal 
decisions applicable to 183 million people should go through, at the European 
level, without being subject to parliamentary control'. Mr. Behrendt called 
on the EEC Commission in Brussels at long last to submit proposals for 
strengthening the powers of the European Parliament. He agreed with the 
Council of Ministers that it was possible to bargain on the basis of Article 235 
- and hence without making any change in the Treaty - about the European 
Parliament's right to participate in decisions on matters not directly con-
cerned with the state of the Community. As an example he quoted the current 
discussions on a statute for a European company. 'In this context more could 
be conferred on the Parliament than the mere right of consultation.' 
On 19 April Mr. Behrendt wrote in 'Vorwlirts' regarding the func-
tions and rights of the European Parliament: 'All my predecessors have 
joined with the members of the European Parliament in striving for more 
rights for this Parliament. These are quite simply inadequate. I should like 
the general public to be better informed on this point and to enlist its aid in 
this struggle. 
Similarly I should like to make the national Parliaments our allies 
because at the moment they are giving up powers to the EEC without these 
powers accruing to the European Parliament. Instead of that these former 
powers of the national Parliaments are being exercised by the Council of 
Ministers in Brussels which not only works in secret but is at the same time 
answerable to no parliament. As a democrat I find this situation intolerable. 
It will not, however be changed in one fell swoop. 
I am first going to put practical proposals for a stage-by-stage 
procedure to the general public. Generally speaking, what I have in mind is 
that there would be a first phase in which the Council would state its willing-
ness to adopt a procedure involving the European Parliament more closely. 
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This could be done without any amendment to the Treaty. 
More powers through changes in the Treaty would fir~t be achieved 
in a second phase. The creation of an economic and monetary union is bound 
to mean more powers for the European Parliament. 
When I took office I said that I would attach quite a lot of importance 
to work with the general public. The European Parliament is in fact to a 
large extent unknown. So far as it is within my power to improve this situa-
tion I will endeavour to do so. I can assure you that I have already begun with 
this task.' 
In Bonn on 4 May, Mr. Behrendt appealed for support for the Euro-
pean Parliament in its bid for greater powers of decision. At a meeting orga-
nized by Europa-Union on the occasion of Europe Day he explained: 'We want 
no Europe whose decision-making structure is not subject to supervision and 
which can no longer be controlled by the people. We attach great importance 
to making a distinction between ourselves and any dictatorship. ' 
Mr. Behrendt took further issue in Bonn with the continuing use of 
the veto right on the Council of Ministers over trifles: 'When it is simply a 
matter of deciding on provisions on the manufacture of beer or lorries, this 
should no longer be subject to delays as a result of the veto of an individual 
Member State. ' Similarly, he called upon the Community of the Six to make 
a joint effort towards a settlement J:etween rich and poor nations. This was a 
task it must tackle in its own interest because an improvement in the situation 
in the third world would also secure Europe's prosperity. 
As Mr. Behrendt further explained, there was today everywhere 
'a serious state of weariness with Europe', It was clear that there was no 
national alternative to cooperation. He saw this particularly in the context of 
the fast growing international competition, which Western Europe could only 
contend with tl1rough cooperation. He warned, however, against regarding 
integration solely from the point of view of economic power. 'This Europe', 
he said, 'must give an example of social progress and so strengthen the rights 
of the worker so that he can become an effective counterweight to growing 
economic power. As soon as possible, therefore, we need to have European 
trade unions and European parties so that we may get the political infrastruc-
ture to control economic power. ' 
(Europa-Union-Dienst, Nos. 15 and 18, 8 April and 4 May 1971; 
Vorw!irts, No. 18, 29 April 1971; 
SPD-Auslandsbrief, No. 10, 19 April 1971) 
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5. European Industry and enlargement of the Community 
The Council of European Industrial Federations (FIE) consists of 
federations of industries belonging to the European Community and the Euro-
pean Free Trade Area. It has published a study on the economic objectives 
and problems raised by enlargement of the Community and in particular the 
economic and monetary union, the capital market and regional policy. 
'European industry believes that the work now being done by the 
European Commission on economic and monetary union meets the require-
ments for integration in Europe. These proposals will lead to the creation of 
an economic area without frontiers within the Community which will become a 
single economic and monetary unit in relation to the outside world. 
Clearly these objectives can only be achieved if the Member States 
enter into a binding commitment to progressively transfer certain responsibi-
lities from national to community level. 
It is possible that during the phase of progress towards an economic 
and monetary union, Member States may encounter difficulties, in particular 
in the sphere of their balance of payments. These difficulties may lessen the 
possibilities of economic harmonization. This also holds good for the new 
members of the Community, which will share in the process of harmonizing 
policies and economic objectives at a time when they will have to make the 
difficult adjustment of their economy to the conditions imposed by member-
ship of the EEC. It would be particularly regrettable if progress towards the 
coordination of economic policies were endangered, or the monetary union 
seriously retarded, because a particular country might be incapable of main-
taining the rhythm of integration. These delays will be avoided by making 
sure that the methods selected to establish the economic and monetary union 
and the agreements on the accession of the applicant countries to the EEC 
take into account all these facts.' 
With regard to the capital market, the Federations believe that the 
progress of industry requires free movement of capital; also the State must 
abstain from allowing the public sector privileged access to the capital mar-
ket. Today movements of floating capital are caused by differences of opinion 
concerning the risks and possible income, and this complicates the manage-
ment of national economies. Ideally, exchange rates should remain stable; 
this is at one and the same time a condition and a consequence, because ex-
pansion rates are less unequal between the national economies involved.' 
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The Industrial Federations of Europe believe that 'regional policy 
must be the subject of a plan as an integral part of progress towards economic 
and monetary union. When capital movements are liberalized and the Euro-
pean capital market developed, it will be necessary to harmonize national 
regional policies to prevent these policies from having the effect of attracting 
too many industrial concerns to one region to the detriment of others. ' 
(L'Echo de la Bourse, 27 April 1971) 
6. The former President of the Commission, Mr. Jean Rey, comments on 
the relationship between the EEC and Greece 
For some time there has been a group of intellectuals in Athens 
known as the 'Society for the Study of Greek Problems'. This society includes 
leading scientists who are well known for their free democratic ideas. 
On 29 April 1971 it organized a public debate in Athens on relations 
between Greece and Europe. Various speakers expressed their faith in the 
objectives of European integration and advocated closer economic, political 
and cultural links between Greece and the democratic countries of Europe. 
The former professor of economics, Mr. Ioannis Pesmazoglou, who played a 
decisive role in the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Association 
between Greece and the European Economic Community, spoke in favour of a 
'European policy in Greece'. 
Mr. Jean Rey, the former President of the European Commission, 
gave a lecture at the invitation of the Society. He began by describing the 
latest developments on the question of European integration and expressed his 
general optimism. 
In the second part of his lecture, Mr. Rey examined relations 
between the EEC and Greece, and stressed ideological and political aspects 
of the problem. He said that a regime could be called democratic if it guar-
anteed basic rights and had a freely elected parliament. But in speaking of 
democracy in Athens, he was bound to reflect the concern felt by Europeans 
about the situation in Greece. Mr. Rey then outlined the reasons for which 
the EEC had decided to freeze its relations with Greece. The Treaty of 
Association concluded between Greece and the EEC on 9 July 1961, which 
came into force on 1 November 1962, had both economic and political aspects. 
As far as the economic aspect of the agreements was concerned, the Treaty 
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of Association had not been suspended. However, as regards the political 
side of the agreements the EEC had decided that continuation of work to har-
monize agricultural policy and grant further financial aid to Greece would be 
impossible. This policy was due in no small measure to the fact that the 
practical operation of the Treaty of Association had become impossible be-
cause no Greek deputies could represent their country on the Joint Parliamen-
tary Association Committee. The EEC deeply regretted this situation. It 
was, however, to be hoped that it would change one day. The political history 
of Europe proved that Pascal's aphorism on truth also applied to freedom: 'It 
is eternal and omnipotent like God himself. ' 
Mr. Rey's lecture elicited a vigorous response from government 
circles in Athens. The newspapers 'Eleftheros Kosmos' and 'Nea Politeia', 
which support the regime, published a statement by 'officials closely connect-
ed with the economic development of the country' in which the former Presi-
dent of the European Commission was criticized for 'irresponsibility' and 
'making political capital'. On 2 June 'Nea Politeia' published a leading arti-
cle in which Mr. Rey was represented as falsifying the character and tasks 
of the EEC. The author of this article stated that the EEC was not an ideolog-
ical Community but based solely on the common economic interests of the 
Member States. 
(Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 9 June 1971) 
7. The Europa-Union criticizes the unsatisfactory course of European policy 
On 5 May, which the member countries of the Council of Europe 
celebrated as Europe Day, the Europa-Union expressed the view that not 
enough progress was being made with European unification. 
On these grounds, Mr. Gerhard Eickhorn, General Secretary of the 
Europa-Union, made the following statement on 3 May: 'The celebrations 
being held from 5 to 9 May on the occasion of the anniversary of the founding 
of the Council of Europe and the European Communities - must be regarded as 
an opportunity for the Europa-Union to draw attention to the unsatisfactory 
progress being made with European unification. Once again astonished tour-
ists at the internal frontiers of the EEC will note, during the forthcoming 
Whitsun holiday, that Europe is not there for them because frontier controls 
persist, even though it is three years since the customs union came into 
operation. 
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If a person not only travels as a tourist in the other EEC countries 
but also wishes to settle down there and take a job he will find that he cannot 
take his citizen's rights with him. A foreign worker is, despite the EEC 
regulations and the Council of Europe agreements, still a second-class citi-
zen. On his behalf, therefore the Europa-Union demands tha(he should at 
least have the right to vote in local elections denied him in his second home 
in Europe. 
More democracy in Europe - which includes direct elections to the 
European Parliament. This is laid down in the Rome Treaties and has been 
advocated by the European Parliament for over ten years, since 17 May 1960. 
That is also an anniversary but of course it is a sad one '. Direct elections 
should ensure that the citizen can himself determine who is to formulate policy 
in Europe. There is nothing to prevent the unilateral direct election of the 
European members in the countries prepared to go ahead with this - which 
has been for a long time advocated for the Federal Republic by the Europa-
Union. 
A 'European Parliament' without sufficient powers is, as we under-
stand the language of democracy, no true parliament. It is unacceptable for 
legally binding decisions to go through at the European level for 180 million 
people without parliamentary control. 
The Europa-Union advocated a currency for Europe in 1968. In 
1971 the European Council of Ministers decided on the design for economic 
and monetary union without agreeing on the Community instruments necessary 
for this purpose. The Europa-Union sees it as its duty to bring pressure to 
bear on the governments to make up for what it has let slip before the end of 
the first stage to protect the people of Europe against financial loss. A Com-
munity that is already producing crises in the agricultural sector and which at 
present has no power to negotiate in the economic and monetary sphere would 
be a costly business for the citizen. ' 
(Europa-Union-Dienst, No. 17, 3 May 1971) 
8. Mr. Triboulet discusses the enlargement of the European Communities 
On 4 May 1971 Mr. Raymond Triboulet, President of the U. D. E. 
Group in the European Parliament, gave a lecture on 'the true Europe and the 
United Kingdom'. 
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After considering the various phases of the process of building 
Europe, Mr. Triboulet discussed the problem of the enlargement of the Com-
munities and especially the 'three black spots' in the negotiations with the 
United Kingdom: a) Britain's contribution to financing the Community; 
b) Britain's imports of foodstuffs, and c) the reserve currency role of sterling. 
These difficulties could not be overcome without mutual understand-
ing, particularly on the part of the British who had to realize that they were 
negotiating with a Community 'in which a Community spirit exists'. 
'Yes, the Community spirit has grown up out of the success of the 
European Economic Community and this spirit finds expression at both the 
technical and the political level. At the technical level you must realize that 
in the Community bodies everyone has gradually acquired this common spirit. 
We have 142 parliamentarians including 36 French, 36 German, 36 Italian. 
We have 101 members of the Economic and Social Committee. It is said that 
the Parliament is only a Cinderella. It was a British review which wrote: 
"It is. hardly more than a debating club". In fact the European Parliament 
plays an important part because it is referred to by the nine European com-
missioners and their departments, their statistical services which are made 
available to us, their technical experts - not to use the word "technocrats" -
who prepare all the texts; the Parliament is apprised of all these texts at a 
time when in most of our countries we no longer see even the most important 
regulations and laws are no longer any more than "outline" laws. All texts 
are sent to the European Parliament for its opinion. We amend them. It is 
the Council of Ministers which finally adopts them and our amendments are 
almost always taken into consideration by the Ministers. The Ministers are 
politicians who argue that the technical departments must have been rather 
inflexible, that they were not obliged to bow to pressure from any specific 
lobby and that by making the texts more flexible, the Parliament's amend-
ments give them a certain guarantee of political viability. 
Hence the Parliament, which is only a consultative body, very often 
does effective work in amending texts, and neither Article 40 nor any other 
article of the regulation is any obstacle to this, as is the case in certain na-
tional Parliaments. 
I think that the European Parliament already plays an important 
part and as things are at present we must not be shocked by the fact that it is 
to some extent the Council of Ministers that legislates. In fact when it issues 
directives, when it takes upon itself the responsibility of deciding on regula-
tions like any other executive authority, it is the only way - as things are at 
present and at the stage we have reached in Europe - of not having the national 
Parliaments in the opposition against us. If it were we, the European Parlia-
ment, who voted these directives as of right and who exercised legislative 
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power, our 550 colleagues in the French National Assembly, for example, 
would never agree to a mere twenty-four of their members passing European 
laws which took precedence over national legislation. At present they accept 
some of them with a full knowledge of the facts and others perhaps because 
they are not very much aware of the problem, but they agree ts> the six Minis-
ters - of agriculture, foreign affairs, etc. - adopting texts because each of 
them is answerable to his national Parliament. It is because he has the power 
delegated to him that he takes decisions on these various problems in Brussels. 
But we, the European Parliament, who have no legislative power 
- and I believe that at present this is wise - nonetheless play an important 
part, that of amending texts, and more often than not our advice is acted upon 
by the Council of Ministers. 
A quite remarkable feeling of friendship between Europeans has 
grown up between political groups and nationalities both in the Parliament, 
the departments and committees, and between the national experts and the 
Permanent Representatives of the Ministers in Brussels and their depart-
ments. All these people have grown accustomed to working together. And 
Britain must not ignore this fact. 
Britain would be wrong to ignore this because the experts who give 
us all the facts we need for our decisions have great authority. We consider 
them to be impartial in providing us with figures that it is not in their interest 
to falsify. And the six countries gradually come to conduct their discussions 
on the basis of the figures provided by these experts at negotiations which are 
extremely difficult and in which the unanimity rule operates in favour of the 
Community spirit. I will not dwell here on the value of the unanimity rule, 
but the fact is that it has created a habit of compromise among the Six which 
really does bring into being a spirit that needs to be borne in mind. (On im-
portant problems the six Ministers ring up to find out whether their Govern-
ment is in agreement, and come back saying: "We can."). 
The proposal of the British regarding their initial contribution to 
the Community budget is a serious blunder. All who want Britain to join the 
Common Market are very sorry about it. Sorry because it might perhaps 
have been a good point of departure for negotiations on traditional lines. One 
says three per cent, thinking one may perhaps give way at six, etc. . .. , but 
for negotiations with the EEC, which is remarkably well equipped statistically 
and where France, Germany and Italy negotiate the percentage contributions 
to the nearest one per cent, when the experts say that the figure should be 12 
per cent, then 12 per cent must be regarded as reasonable. The British say: 
"Make us reasonable proposals." I am astonished to see them quoting figures 
of this kind. ' 
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In conclusion, Mr. Triboulet called on the United Kingdom to 'com-
mit itself to Europe'. 
'Now we are ready for our part not to follow the advice of our ex-
perts to the nearest figure. I am convinced the Six are ready to make con-
cessions. We ask Britain to show some understanding. If Britain is to work 
with the Community and if it wants to come in, it must change its proposals 
to some extent to bring them closer to the figures of the experts. It must 
above all give us the feeling that its Government is committing itself to 
Europe.' 
(Les Conferences des Ambassadeurs, No. 53) 
9. Teaching problems in the Europe of the Six 
In May and June there were two meetings of teachers in the Europe 
of the Six. 
(a) The Committee of the European Teachers Trade Union 
The Trade Union Committee held a meeting in Berlin from 4 to 6 
May 1971 with an eye to the first European inter-ministerial conference on 
training and education. After this meeting the Committee published a resolu-
tion in which it recalled that the Community texts (stemming either from the 
Rome Treaty or from the institutions set up for its application) contained a 
great many decisions on education and training, particularly occupational 
training, and regretted that these had not yet been acted on. 
It stressed that a real European policy for teaching, education and 
permanent training should be directed not only at ensuring Europe's economic 
development but above all at promoting the social advancement of workers. 
Consequently the forthcoming inter-ministerial conference must serve to 
establish the range of Community tools to be harnessed to the service of such 
a policy. 
As regards the essentials for the immediate future, the Committee 
demands that this conference should at the very least conclude with a joint 
undertaking to resolve the crucial problems outstanding in each of the six 
- 234 -
countries within a short period, and that this should be done in relation to a 
clearly visualized and frankly accepted Community policy. 
Being aware of the complexity of the problem and bearing in mind 
the recommendations of the International Labour Office and UNESCO, the 
Committee stated that this problem would only be resolved if there were 
standing consultations between freely organized educationalists and teachers 
of whom it was the mandatory. 
Within the trade union organizations it comprised it had decided to 
conduct a general information drive geared to achieving the following main 
objectives in the six countries of the European Community: 
1) a democratic overhaul of educational systems, including universities, by 
reference to a Community design; 
2) an undertaking to promote the scientific, technological and vocational pro-
gress necessary for Europe's immediate future; 
3) consideration of the economic, social and institutional realities of Europe 
in the education of the citizen; 
4) a reassessment of the material and moral status of the teacher, bearing in 
mind the fundamental task that he has to carry out; 
5) the possibility of teachers being able to circulate freely throughout the 
Community through mutual recognition of training and qualifications, adap-
tation of administrative regulations, harmonization of pay rates and the 
preservation of social benefits; 
6) facilities for teachers to round off their training in other Member States. 
Lastly the Committee demanded the right to regular consultation at 
every national or Community level of authority likely to contribute to the 
establishment of a European educational system. Such consultations should 
run parallel to and be consistent with the practice for each national trade 
union organization responsible at this level. The Committee also decided to 
step up the research essential to effective trade union action and, as part of 
the information done, to organize meetings at the frontiers - on the initiative 
of its consultative organization - to make teachers more aware of the situatio~ 
this, with a view to the first European trade union conference on education 
which the Committee envisaged holding in 1972.' 
(La Tribune, May 1971) 
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(b) The Committee of Socialist teachers in the European Community 
This Committee was set up on 29 December 1970 by the Bureau of 
the International Union of Socialist Teachers. It comprises members appoint-
ed by the Associations of Socialist teachers in the Member States of the Euro-
pean Community and its main aims are to look into the general problems of 
teaching and education at Community level and to decide its attitude to them. 
The Committee of Socialist Teachers held a congress on 2 and 3 
June 1971 to study the report by the ad hoc group in preparation for the 
meeting of the Ministers of Education of the six Member States. After the 
congress the Committee drew up a note stating the position of the Socialist 
teachers. 
'1. The cultural and educational aspects of these pro bl ems cannot be 
dissociated from the economic and social aspects and vice versa. 
European culture cannot be conceived solely as a way of safe-
guarding the special characteristics and ways of thought of the various coun-
tries by reference to common roots. It must be dynamic and firmly directed 
towards the future and open to contributions from all other forms of civiliza-
tion. 
Education must be democratic. It must promote freedom of study, 
mutual respect and participation. Education is the basis of the development of 
peoples. It must be the main function and concern of every government. It 
must be available to all. 
The legal framework of the Treaty of Rome does not allow us to 
achieve these objectives in full and it must be enlarged. 
2. The socialist teaching staffs fear that the principle of freedom of 
establishment may institute a form of organized teaching geared to the market 
economy. They recall the political, civic, cultural and human objectives of 
education which constitute the basis of socialist theory. These aims can only 
be achieved through integrated schools (of the comprehensive type). 
The number of years a child spends being educated must be re-
appraised within the framework of a general policy for permanent or recurrent 
education. The new structures must make provision for a many-sided and 
longer basic education. 
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3. Cooperation in the field of education is essential at every level. In 
basic education (primary and secondary) not only must the educational systems 
be coordinated but provision must be made for institutions allowing for migrant 
workers' children to continue their studies. These "European" schools must 
not be reserved solely for the children of officials of international bodies or 
constitute the educational system of a caste. , There must be a great many of 
them and they must be open to all, without reference to status. 
The creation of specialized European higher education establish-
ments (at the level of the first or second cycle) would lead to discrimination 
and promote a class-based teaching system. The creation of "centres of 
excellence" is desirable to bring together the teams and material essential 
for advanced research. They cannot be devised except at the level of the 
third cycle. 
4. The socialist teaching staffs agree with setting up a European centre 
for the development of education: 
- the centre should compile facts and figures on structures, prospects and 
various ways of management within establishments (powers of teachers, 
parents, students, organizational powers ... ); 
- there should be permanent links with associations representing the various 
categories concerned; 
- the centre should initiate and organize pedagogical research and promote 
the implementation of international research programmes, especially in the 
field of pedagogy, at every level. ' 
(Document forwarded by the Commission des Enseignants socialistes de la 
Communaute europeenne) 
10. Talks with Mr. Hans Furler, Vice-President of the European Parliament, 
on new moves to promote European integration 
Interviewed by the weekly 'Das Parlament' on 8 May 1971, Dr. Hans 
Furler, a CDU Member of the Bundestag and Vice-President of the European 
Parliament, stated his views on the institutional aspects of European unifica-
tion. 
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On the relationship between the Parliament and the Council of Minis-
ters he said: 'The Council of Ministers has the supreme powers of decision 
and legislation in its hands. But in fact it is not often in a position to do or 
live up to what the European Parliament and the European public expect of it. 
This has less to do with the conservative nature of the six ministers of the 
Council than with their national ties. Theoretically there are only two changes 
possible to remedy this: (i) for the Council to be able to take majority deci-
sions on all questions, which is something which certain countries, and espe-
cially France, do not want, or else (ii) for the parliamentary system to be put 
into practice and for the Council to be made subject to the control of the Euro-
pean Parliament, as is the case with the Commission. I have for many years 
championed this progressive solution.' 
Dr. Furler dealt further with the statements by the French Presi-
dent concerning the political organization of Europe and with the proposal to 
set up a standing cabinet of European ministers: 'In my opinion the statements 
made by Mr. Pompidou, the French President, should not be taken as prac-
tical proposals but as theoretical comments on the development of Europe. It 
is very much to be welcomed that Mr. Pompidou has pointed the way to a 
European State with a government transcending national sovereignty and a 
genuine parliament with legislative powers and a right to influence the govern-
ment. I approve of these ideas because they are identical with the aims of the 
Europeans and of past and present German policy. More details are needed 
but discussions have already been held in responsible European circles as to 
how the ideas of President Pompidou can be given practical shape and put into 
effect. 
A cabinet of European ministers does not seem to me to be a very 
good idea. To begin with, the problem of European ministers is very difficult 
because every national government would endeavour to bind this European 
minister to the decisions of its own cabinet. A European minister in Europe 
would not be likely to obtain the independent powers he would need for this 
new Europe to speak with its own voice and take decisions on vital points. A 
European government would have to have one or two independent specialist 
ministers and a foreign and defence minister who could pursue an effective 
European policy independently of the nation States. The natural consequence, 
which President Pompidou also forsees, would be for this European cabinet 
to be responsible to the new European Parliament.' 
In conclusion, Dr. Furler described the political significance of the 
economic and monetary union as follows: 'I think that a common economic 
policy and a single currency for the States of the Community, including the 
applicant States, would have a greater effect on unity and permanently bind 
the States much more closely together than any common external policy 
decisions could do. I do not wish to sa:i, of course, that a common external 
and defence policy is not necessary. Both fields must be brought within the 
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scope of a political union and a common Europe . . . First of all, though, the 
European Community has to assume its final form as a State.' 
('Das Parlament', 8 May 1971) 
11. Reactions of the European Left to the Council of Ministers' decisions on 
the monetary crisis 
In a communique issued on 13 May 1971 the French branch of the 
'European Left' stated: 'The present monetary crisis and the conclusion that 
the Council of Ministers in Brussels have just endorsed, under pressure from 
the Finance Minister of the German Federal Republic, clash head-on with 
any prospect of consolidating the Community, which the European Left con-
siders must be done. These decisions are incompatible with pursuing the 
common agricultural policy as they are with any headway towards monetary 
union. Now - just as it did when the fault lay with the Gaullists in power -
the French branch of the European Left takes issue with anything threatening 
the development of Europe or conflicting with the European spirit. ' 
(Le Monde, 16-17 May 1971) 
12. COPA (Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations) comments 
on the monetary decisions and their repercussions on agricultural prices 
Following the resolution of the Council of Finance Ministers of 
8 May 1971, which allowed one or two Member States to introduce floating 
rates of exchange for a limited period, COPA has examined the situation 
arising in the Community. 
COPA expressed its concern about the danger that the economic 
, and monetary union set up by the Council under the resolution of 22 March, 
and the customs union itself (particularly in agriculture) might again be called 
into question. 
Faced with this extremely serious situation, COPA urged: 
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1) that the uncertainty brought about by the introduction of floating rates of 
exchange be dispelled as soon as possible; 
2) that all appropriate non-discriminatory measures be taken in the meantime 
with regard to the various agricultural products, so as to avoid any dis-
turbance of the flows of trade in agricultural products and above all any 
reduction in their market prices of these products. 
It was in fact unacceptable for the farmers of any Community coun-
try to have to pay, in the form of reduced incomes, for a failure to integrate 
the economic, monetary and financial policies of the Community. 
COPA pointed out once again that the present system of fixing agri-
cultural prices would remain inoperative until the Council set up an effective 
economic and monetary union. Only such a union would prevent any repetition 
of the monetary speculation which was continuously threatening the real value 
of the prices obtained by the farmers. 
The monetary squall had naturally aroused serious concern in agri-
cultural circles in Italy too, both because it was feared that the uniformity of 
prices would be suspended and because of the possible distortions in the pat-
tern of intra-Community agricultural trade. Despite the shortcomings of the 
system established by Brussels and the disappointments about the decisions of 
25 March, the Italian agricultural community considered the common agricul-
tural policy as a safety anchor for good order on the markets and for the drive 
towards structural reorganization. It was however to be expected that every 
disturbance due to causes outside agriculture would give rise to concern, es-
pecially at a time when the completion of the common policy was necessary to 
provide greater discipline in the markets and to act as an incentive to business 
investments. 
(11 Sole - 24 Ore, 15 May 1971) 
13. The conference of the Socialist International in Helsinki 
The conference of the Socialist International was held on 25 to 27 
May 1971 in Helsinki. 
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A number of resolutions were passed, among them one on the en-
largement of the Common Market which includes the following statements: 
'1. The Socialist International considers it important that if the nego-
tiations lead to conditions which are mutually acceptable to the applicant coun-
tries and Member States of the European Community, all the other democratic 
members of EFTA should find an adequate formula for cooperation with the 
EEC. The Socialist International calls upon the EEC and the applicant coun-
tries to respect in their negotiations on the enlargement of the Community the 
obligations which exist between the members of EFTA and FINEFTA. In this 
way Sweden, Switzerland and Austria could participate in the process of eco-
nomic integration in Europe in accordance with their position as neutral coun-
tries. The enlarged EEC should seek to arrive at a special agreement with 
Finland which is also a neutral State. 
2. An enlarged Community should also 
(a) prevent the erection of new commercial barriers in Western Europe; 
(b) extend the possibilities for exports from the developing countries to the 
Community and guarantee at the same time substantial aid to these coun-
tries from the Community; 
(c) take every possible initiative to foster technical, scientific and commer-
cial exchanges with the Eastern countries. 
3. The Socialist International notes the opinion expressed by the mem-
ber parties of the EEC which, since the existence of the Community, has 
enabled -
(a) a high and constant level of economic growth to be achieved in all the 
Member States; 
(b) trade between Member States and between the Community and the rest of 
the world to be stepped up considerably; 
(c) the basis to be created for a substantial improvement in the social condi-
tions of the working population of the Community 
and 
(d) the problems of the decline of certain regions to be faced more effectively. 
4. The Socialist International believes that in an enlarged Community 
the Socialist parties should work to: 
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{a) establish a structure by which the workers' representatives can exercise 
effective democratic control and real legislative powers in the Community; 
{b) closely coordinate their action against the monopolies represented by 
international and national groups as well as entrenched interests; 
{c) guarantee full employment, improve the social security systems and 
raise the standard of living; 
{d) bring about a substantial improvement in the status of workers both in 
companies and in society; 
{e) coordinate and support the interests of public enterprises and in particular 
public industrial projects. 
During the conference Chancellor Brandt made a detailed statement 
on the problems of integration. In his opinion it should be remembered that 
'this association, which is unique in the history of States, has as its aim the 
creation of a political will. The enlargement of the Common Market will lead 
not only to quantitative but also to qualitative growth. ' 
When the EEC was enlarged, the aim must not be to create a citadel 
behind whose walls countries could be entrenched. The Community must 
recognize the task of cooperation in Europe. It must also see itself as a com -
ponent of the future order of peace throughout Europe and must understand 
once and for all its continental responsibility. 
In this connection the Chancellor warned against an 'ideological 
contraction of this process' by the Social Democratic parties and trade unions. 
There was no question of creating a socialist or social democratic Europe. On 
the other hand, more was at stake then the creation of a Europe of business-
enterprises. The final objective must be a Europe which would be a living 
and as far as possible exemplary body in the spheres of social justice, equali-
ty of opportunity and democratic participation. 
{Die Welt, 27 May 1971; 
Tribune, No. 12, June 1971; 
Bulletin of the Socialist International) 
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14. The Trade Unions in the EEC - 20th European Conference in Reckling-
hauscn 
The 20th European Conference of the German Trade Unions Federa-
tion (DGB) was held in Recklinghausen under the auspices of the Ruhr Festival 
in mid-June 1971. The following theme was chosen for the discussions be-
tween trade unionists, politicians, publicity experts and the EEC representa-
tives: 'The European Confederation of Free Trade Unions (EBFG) in the 
Community - a new force for Europe'. 
A European trade union secretariat has already been in existence 
for many years in the framework of the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions. But successful action at EEC level only became possible in 
1969 when the EBFG was founded. The national trade union associations re-
presented on the EBFG have over 12m members today. But its real influence 
on the decisions taken by the EEC institutions is still very small. This led 
to the unanimous demand in Recklinghausen for a programme of trade union 
principles and action in the European Community. 
The Vice-President of the EEC Commission, Mr. Wilhelm 
Haferkamp, called upon the trade unions to cooperate continuously with the 
Commission. In his opinion they should always speak from a position of 
European unity when faced with the cumbersome structures and decision-
making machinery of the EEC. The EEC Commission, to which the Rome 
Treaties gives the right to take initiatives in Community policy, would support 
the unions. 
The European trade unionists vigorously criticized the short-
comings in the democratic structure of the European Community. Criticism 
was levelled above all at the European Parliament's inadequate powers and 
the inability of the different social groups to participate in determining Euro-
pean policy. 
Agreement was reached in Recklinghausen that European workers 
were strong enough to create a new force in favour of a democratic and so-
cially just Europe. Of the 60 million or so persons employed in the EEC 
area, some 33 per cent were organized in trade unions but were split into 
several different party-political and ideological groups. 
Relations with the communist-led trade unions in Italy and France 
were also discussed. The Chairman of the DGB, Mr. Vetter, who is also 
Chairman of the EBFG, stated that cooperation with these unions would only 
be possible if they were committed to the principle of a united Europe. Until 
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this point was clarified cooperation was out of the question. However 
Mr. Vetter did not exclude the possibility of joint action in certain limited 
areas. 
Relations with trade unions in the applicant countries, Britain, Ire-
land, Denmark and Norway, also appeared difficult to maintain. The Scandi-
navian trade unions, which were not represented, came in for sharp criti-
cism in Recklinghausen. The leader of the DGB, Mr. Vetter, accused them 
of refusing to participate in discussions with their EEC colleagues. 
There was no shortage of ideas to foster more active trade union 
cooperation at the EEC level. The most interesting proposals, especially 
those made by Manfred Lahnstein, Mr. Haferkamp's principal assistant, were 
as follows: creation of greater solidarity through a common strike fund, per-
manent cooperation between the scientific institutes of the national trade union 
associations, foundation of a European Trade Union Academy, regular dis-
cussions between monetary experts of the trade unions, appointment of per-
manent trade union representatives to the EEC institutions in Brussels, and 
more active work in other countries by national trade union organizations, 
especially in specific branches of the economy. 
(Das Parlament, 19 June 1971) 
15. Study conference on institutional problems of a United Europe held by the 
International European Movement on 4 and 5 June at The Hague 
On 4 and 5 June the International European Movement held a study 
conference at The Hague in conjunction with the International Action Centre 
for European federalism. The conference, which dealt with the institutional 
problems of a united Europe, was intended to pave the way for an international 
European congress due to be held at the end of this year or early next year. 
The working document compiled by Professor Maas, the Director 
of the European Institute in Leiden, deals with the organization of a European 
government and its relationship with other Community institutions. Professor 
Maas assumes that the accession of new countries to the Community will not 
lead to a change in the institutional structure as laid down in the Treaties of 
Paris and Rome. As regards the Luxembourg Agreement, he notes that 
there is no reason to condemn or shelve it altogether. When the Community 
is enlarged, all the Member States must show a firm determination to adapt 
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the institutional structure in such a way that the Community is able to function 
effectively and attain its objectives, having regard to the ultimate political 
aims of European integration. The institutions of the enlarged Community 
must seize every opportunity to strengthen the operations of the. system, in 
particular by amending their internal regulations. The major institutions of 
the European Community would be as follows in the final phase: a Parliament 
and a Council of Ministers, both at Community level. The Parliament would 
consL,t of two chambers, the Chamber of the People and the Chamber of the 
States. In the Chamber of the People each member would represent about 
500,000 citizens. The members of this Chamber would be elected by a sys-
tem of general direct elections, the precise details of which would be worked 
out later on. A mixed system would be preferable, characterized primarily 
by application at regional level of the principle of a single, transferable vote 
and at European level by the principle of proportional representation. 
The Chamber of the States would consist of 120 members in the 
same ratio as that provided for weighted votes in the Council of Ministers of 
the enlarged Community, with the proviso that Luxembourg would have only 
two seats. The members of this Chamber would be elected by direct general 
elections according to a procedure which each country would determine for 
itself on the basis of its own constitution, respecting democratic principles. 
The Council of Ministers, based on the collegial principle, would 
consist of 15 (?) persons elected by the Parliament (possibly from among its 
members) by a system of single, transferable votes in such a way that each 
important group would be represented. The Council would not have more than 
two members of the same nationality. 
Legislative and budgetary powers would be exercised jointly by the 
Parliament and Council. The two Chambers would forego the right to make 
amendments. The Council would generally have the right to take initiatives. 
But if the Council failed to take action when called upon to do so, the Chamber 
itself would be entitled to set the legislative procedure in motion. 
Executive power would rest with the Council on the basis of direc-
tives to be worked out in cooperation with Parliament and under parliamentary 
supervision. The Member States would generally take part in the implemen-
tation of Community legislation unless otherwise stipulated by law. 
As a possible intermediate stage, the working document refers to 
the transformation of the present European Parliament into a Chamber of the 
People. Legislative powers could be exercised through a system of 'supporting 
opinions' by the European Parliament instead of 'compulsory consultation' as 
at present. The Parliament would then reach its decisions on measures 
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already approved by the Council of Ministers. 
The Commission must be transformed into a Council of the Commu-
nity. First of all the members of the Commission must be appointed by the 
Council of Ministers (after consulting Parliament) and in the second stage they 
would be appointed by Parliament acting on a proposal of the Council of Minis-
ters. 
According to Professor Maas, the central problem would be to find 
a method of transforming the Council of Ministers into a Chamber of States. 
During the discussions a British speaker expressed the interesting 
opinion that the keenest opponents of Britain's entry to the EEC included those 
very people who would be most interested in strengthening the position of the 
European Parliament once Britain became a member. 
The Chairman of the European Movement in the Netherlands, 
Mr. Molenaar, said that interest must be aroused in the European Parliament 
on the basis of issues and not of institutions. The most important problems 
arising at present could only be solved at European level, and a European 
Parliament was needed to make sure that this was done in a democratic 
manner. The European Movement must work trough the political parties, the 
trade union movement and other professional organizations. 
The Secretary-General of the European Parliament, Mr. Nord, 
said that one fundamental problem was to determine whether the European 
Commission was the embryo of a European executive or whether the latter 
must originate from the national governments. There were two arguments 
in favour of the latter opinion: a) the Commission behaves as a second sec-
retariat of the Council and does not use its powers to the full; it allows itself 
to be guided by the Permanent Representatives and does not present its own 
proposals; b) the Commission has no European political infrastructure (a 
genuine Parliament). If the governments are to provide the basis for an 
executive there is, however, the disadvantage that the very institution (the 
Commission) through which the Community differs from all other international 
organizations, would be eliminated. Ten ministers of European affairs were 
not enough to form a European government. According to Mr. Nord, the po-
sition of the Commission should therefore be strengthened by enabling the 
European Parliament to influence the appointment of members of the Com-
mission and by organizing general direct elections to the European Parliament 
Only in this way could a political infrastructure be created for the Commission 
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Mr. Hallstein pointed out that people were increasingly coming to realize that 
the 'finalites politiques' were still a vague concept. This had become particu-
larly apparent since the decision to ask applicant countries to accept those 
ultimate political objectives. Mr. Hallstein believed it was impossible to 
state an opinion on proposals for an interim period (in accordance with Presi-
dent Pompidou's concept) without knowing what the final objectives were. The 
French President had merely assumed what the final form of the Community 
might be; acceptance of his proposals would imply a substantial shift in the 
centre of gravity towards the Council. On the other hand the multi-stage plan 
proposed by Mr. Barzel, the CDU Leader in the Bundestag, attempted to 
clarify the content and dates of the subsequent stages. 
In addition, Mr. Hallstein believed that the word confederation was 
also used in French to denote structures which were in fact States. This was 
apparent from President Pompidou's own words: he spoke of a 'European 
Government' and only a State has a government. There was, however, a risk 
that the principle of confederation might be used to gratify a demand for una-
nimity and even double consultation. Unanimity was an impossible solution, 
Mr. Hallstein said. For the ultimate aim of European unification it would be 
necessary to work on the basis of the 'whole federal tradition'. Completely 
new problems arose when a federation is formed. Discussions on the position 
of the Commission seemed irrelevant to him in this connection. 
Summarizing the discussions, Mr. Rifflet said that agreement had 
been reached on a large number of points. He found that preference was still 
given to the objective of a federal Europe. In the European movement, people 
wanted political as well as economic integration. It was generally agreed 
that the European Parliament must play an important part although the younger 
members were sceptical about the workings of the parliamentary system be-
cause of experience at national level. Finally, general regret was felt at the 
slow progress of the Community institutions. Mr. Rifflet thought that the 
main point of disagreement was the question as to whether there was a 'cate-
gorical imperative' leading to a united Europe. He felt a clear 'choice and 
will' were necessary; a precise tactic must be laid down. There was no 
common ground between what the European Movement wanted and what the 
French President Pompidou wanted. According to him, President Pompidou's 
success stemmed from his proposal that something be done right away. 'The 
world will not wait until 197 5. ' 
Finally the speaker expressed his opinion that the European Move-
ment must have close links with both sides of industry, the political parties 
and the Community institutions. 
('Nieuw Europa', No. 7 /8 - July /August 1971) 
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16. Statement by the Permanent Conference of Chambers of Commerce in the 
European Community on the subject of floating currencies 
The Permanent Conference of Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
in the European Community held a meeting in Rotterdam on 11 June attended 
by representatives of organizations of the Chambers of Commerce in Britain, 
Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Spain, Turkey, Greece, Austria, Yugoslavia and 
Israel: the Conference issued a statement expressing its regret and disap-
pointment over the 'present monetary crisis in the European Communities, 
caused by the decision of the Netherlands and German Governments to allow 
the exchange rates of their currencies to float '. The statement stresses the 
need to create appropriate instruments enabling speculative movements of 
capital to be restricted and guaranteeing that problems of this kind will in 
future be solved solely by Community methods and action. 
In its statement the Permanent Conference expresses its great 
regret that the Governments of the six countries of the European Community 
have not succeeded in deciding on common action to overcome the serious 
crisis in the monetary sector. Business interests were facing grave problems 
as a result of the floating exchange rates which make it particularly difficult 
to calculate prices for internal and external trade. Floating exchange rates 
might also entail serious risks for investment activity and this might in turn 
endanger the security of employment. 
Turning to the causes of the monetary crisis and world inflation, 
the Permanent Conference believed that the essential factor was the inadequa-
cy of the international monetary system and the increasing American balance 
of payments deficit. It believed the United States would be able to improve 
the present critical situation by reducing this deficit, but that in the meantime 
the European Community must take internal measures and propose interna-
tional action to overcome the present difficulties. The European Community 
must attempt to reach immediate agreement with the other major economic 
powers on the adaptation of the international monetary system and on a ration-
al policy to combat inflation. In addition a return must be made as soon as 
possible to the system of fixed exchange rates, and ways must be found of 
neutralizing short-term capital movements. According to the Permanent Con-
ference, the coordination of economic policy throughout the Community should 
be speeded up. 
(Handels & Transport Courant, 16 June 1971) 
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17. European agriculture and the enlargement of the Community 
The Committee of Professional Agricultural Organi~tions (COPA) 
organized a meeting with the leaders of the three agricultural organizations of 
the United Kingdom. This meeting took place under the chairmanship of 
Mr. Berns, President of COPA on 14 and 15 June 1971. 
On this subject the weekly magazine 'L'Agriculteur', the organ of 
the Boerenbond , gives the following report: 'The agenda included (i) a dis-
cussion on the annual report on the agricultural situation; (ii) a discussion by 
farmers on the consultation of those professionally engaged in agriculture by 
the Community authorities; (iii) a discussion of the problem of agriculture in 
the less favoured regions; and (iv) a discussion of the economic organization 
of farmers, particularly marketing boards. Problems relating to the transi-
tional period, relations between the enlarged Community and non-applicant 
third countries (in particular in EFTA) and future relations between the 
Farmers' Unions and COPA were also dealt with. 
The various delegations were unanimous in the view that consulta-
tions between the Commission and the agricultural profession should be in-
stitutionalized by means of a Council regulation. The purpose of these oblig-
atory consultations should be the preparation of a report on economic and 
social conditions in agriculture and among farmers, and future prospects for 
them. Consultations should involve a discussion with the Commission leading 
to the preparation of the annual report which should also comprise the con-
clusions reached by COPA. The preparation of this report should precede 
the elaboration by the Commission of its proposals on prices and other mea-
sures accompanying them concerning which the agricultural Community should 
also be consulted. The meeting also decided to call for effective consultations 
on all other measures involved in the development of the common agricultural 
policy. 
The annual report must be presented to the Council, to the Parlia-
ment and to the Economic and Social Committee. It is therefore very impor-
tant for COPA to be able to make contact with these official bodies at least 
once a year, when ihe annual report is being examined, to explain the views 
contained in the report. 
The agricultural organizations of the Member States and the United 
Kingdom noted that in an enlarged Community the problems of agriculture in 
the less-favoured regions, notably hill and mountain areas, were even more 
serious. It was recognized that maintaining agriculture in these regions im-
plied special measures which should directly or indirectly enable farmers to 
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obtain an income in keeping with the capital they have invested and the work 
they do. 
The various delegations agreed that the economic organization of 
farmers had to be maintained and made more effective. They noted that 
marketing boards created on the initiative of producers and controlled by them 
had played an important part in the organization of the agricultural markets 
and strengthened the fundamentally weak position of individual farmers on the 
market. 
The meeting also noted that the ministers had recognized the prin-
ciple that there should be a safeguard clause similar to that laid down in the 
agricultural regulations of the Community during the transitional period. 
Horticultural products, and particularly fruit and vegetables, were 
a matter that attracted great attention. The meeting decided to undertake a 
joint study of a Community regulation for the organization of the fruit and 
vegetable markets which would ensure a respect for the interests of the pro-
ducers. · 
The meeting recognized the need to keep a careful watch on the way 
in which the Community authorities in the enlarged Community reacted to 
pressure from third countries over the application of special safeguard mea-
sures, bearing in mind that the principle of Community preference had to be 
respected. 
If the negotiations at ministerial level were successful it would be 
necessary to maintain and increase the contacts between COPA and the far-
mers' unions in the United Kingdom during the period preceding Britain's 
actual entry into the Common Market. ' 
(L'Agriculteur, 26 June 1971) 
18. Meeting between representatives of the Latin-American countries and of 
the European Communities 
In Buenos Aires on 18 June 1971 a meeting was held at ambassadorial 
level between the European Communities and the countries of Latin America; 
this followed a request made by the latter at the meeting of the special com-
- 250 -
mittee on Latin-American coordination (CECLA). 
In a press communique issued at the close of the meeting, the 
Argentine Government expressed great satisfaction at the new altitude adopted 
by the Member States of the European Communities in their common policy so 
as to allow for the institutionalization of their traditional and friendly rela-
tions with Latin America. The Argentine Government considered a continuous 
and fruitful dialogue could now be initiated to achieve effective multilateral 
action in the study and solution of questions of mutual interest. 
Until quite recently the contacts initiated with this objective had 
been sporadic and had yielded no results to satisfy Latin America's aspirn-
tions; nor had they led to any practical measures or suitable arrangements 
for a policy of cooperation. This situation had taken a decisive turn at the 
CECLA meeting referred to; its "Buenos Aires Declaration" not only referred 
to the common desires of the Latin-American countries regarding the develop-
ment of their relations with the European Communities, but also contained a 
practical proposal that a meeting, such as that which had just taken place, 
should be held between representatives of the two regions. 
'This meeting ushers in another stage leading to a profitable rap-
prochement between Latin America and Europe. The Argentine Government 
is glad to have prompted this initiative by sending a proposal to the other 
Latin-American Governments (on 25 November 1969) to take steps to set up 
institutionalized machinery. We are sure that this will be adequate to achieve 
its ultimate aim of creating a system of relationships which will define a 
policy to govern existing policies between the Latin-American countries and 
the Communities in their commercial, financial and technological aspects. 
There has been a change in the structure of international economic 
relations; one example is the creation of the European Communities. Here 
the importance of the Europe of the 'Six' in our external relations should be 
noted. Although our countries have always been linked to Europe, it is be-
coming increasingly obvious that the European Communities have gradually 
come to represent them.' 
In conclusion the communique indicates that 'acts of good will 
remain necessary on both sides. The present meeting, the culmination of 
the negotiations in progress with Argentina and the initiation, as from 1 July, 
of the system of generalized preferences decided upon by the EEC Council of 
Ministers, are good grounds for confidence in the future. 
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Diplomatic progress has to be restrained and practical if it is to be 
solid and lasting. In certain cases an apparently narrow, slow approach is 
more a sign of strength than weakness.' 
(Press communique of the Argentine Government - 18 June 1971) 
19. The President of the International Metal Workers Union, Mr. Otto 
Brenner, calls for public checks on multinational companies 
During the world economic conference of the International Confeder-
ation of Free Trade Unions on 25 June 1971 in Geneva, Mr. Otto Brenner, 
President of the International Metal Workers' Union, called for public, dem-
ocratic checks on the power of multinational companies. 
Mr. Brenner opened the discussion on multinational companies with 
a report on the role of outside capital investment and multinational companies 
in the modern world. He said that the trade unions had long been concerned 
with this important problem. A trade union answer must be found to the chal-
lenge of multinational companies. These were a logical consequence of the 
rapid advance in international capital link-ups and would continue to prolifer-
ate. 'Under these circumstances it will not only be necessary to bring the 
international sources of finance for these companies under control primarily 
by solving the Eurodollar market problem; it will be equally important to 
harmonize through international conventions the conditions under which shares 
may be issued in order to ensure that national financial and credit policy is 
equally effective for multinational companies. ' 
Referring to company management structures, Mr. Brenner said 
that a decentralized decision-making structure was clearly better from the 
economic standpoint and also from that of workers' interests. A closely 
related problem was that of centralizing or decentralizing research and tech-
nical development programmes. 'The multinational companies often operate 
in advanced technical sectors and use their lead to gain a foothold on foreign 
markets. The dominant position of these multinational companies in a partic-
ular sector then generally makes the development of a domestic industry more 
or less impossible. ' 
Mr. Brenner thought that discussion in the European Community of 
a statute for a European company could give a lead beyond the frontiers of the 
EEC. 'This is particularly true for worker participation and the formation of 
a European works council. Through participation and the formation of a 
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central works council in multinational companies, ways could be found of 
solving many of the problems which face us today. ' 
The free trade unions should demand that multinational industrial 
groups comply with two requirements. The companies belonging to the multi-
national group must not be 'remote-controlled' in individual countries and 
must take the general interests of their employees fully into account whenever 
decisions affecting company policy were taken. Ways must also be found of 
using the activity of multinational companies for the economic and social 
advancement of the developing countries. There must be even closer cooper-
ation and permanent mutual support in the International Trade Union Move-
ment 'in order to form a closed block to defend the interests of workers in 
this age of increasing capital tie-ups. ' 
(VWD-Europa, 25 June 1971) 
20. Eighth Congress of the Social Democratic Parties in the European Com-
munity 
The Social Democratic Parties in the European Communities held 
their Eighth Congress in Brussels from 28 to 30 June 1971. 
They passed one resolution on the reform of their Liaison Office 
and another on the problems of European integration. 
a) The reform of the Liaison Office 
The Congress noted that the creation of a democratic structure for 
a united Europe, accompanied by fuller economic, social, monetary and polit-
ical integration could not be achieved without a supranational structure for the 
democratic and, in particular, the Social Democratic forces and that closer 
cohesion of and concerted political action by the Social Democratic Parties 
were therefore necessary. 
It approved the proposals made by its Bureau on the arrangement of 
regular meetings, in particular between the executives of the Social Demo-
cratic parties and the executive bodies of the respective parliamentary groups 
as a first stage towards more effective cooperation. 
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It decided to change the name 'Liaison Office of the Social Demo-
cratic Parties in the European Community' to 'Office of the Social Democratic 
Parties in the European Community'. 
b) General resolution 
The executives and representatives of the Social Democratic parties 
in the European Community examined current problems of the European 
Economic Community in detail and defined their position in a resolution from 
which the following passages have been taken: 
'The Social Democratic delegates find that the common ideals and 
practical objectives shared by the Social Democratic parties in the Commu-
nity can best be carried into effect through the most comprehensive form of 
European integration. They strongly reaffirm their conviction that the inte-
gration begun with the ECSC Treaty and the EEC and Euratom Treaties must 
be continued through the economic and monetary union to its ultimate comple-
tion in the United States of Europe in the form of a Federal State. 
The Social Democrats are conscious of their special responsibility 
for the social content of the Community. They accept this responsibility which 
they will gladly share with all who wish to build the United States of Europe as 
a democratic and socially just State whose institutional structures should be 
worked out right away. They draw attention to the fact that with the rapidly 
changing world situation Europeans cannot afford to lose any more time after 
having already lost so much since the end of the last World War. 
The Parties underline their conviction that the Community can only 
continue to exist and develop if all the activities of the executives are subject 
to effective control by a Parliament with the most democratic foundation it is 
possible to provide and elected as soon as possible by direct universal suf-
frage. 
In addition to its legislative powers the Parliament must be respon-
sible for appointing the Commission of the European Communities so as to 
give that important institution greater independence from the Member States' 
Governments. By 1973 the European Parliament must be given the ultimate 
right to reject the budget of the Community's expenditure based on independent 
resources; this will be a guarantee of adequate democratic supervision. 
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The parties will call upon their representatives in national Parlia-
ments and in the European Parliament to do all in their power to persuade the 
Council to ad more effectively as a Community body whose duties are clearly 
laid down in the T reatics. 
The parties draw attention to the special responsibility of the Com-
mission of the European Communities for the Community's development. They 
call upon the Commission to bring into the open all conflicts arising in this 
connection with the Council, the Permanent Representatives, national govern-
ments and national administrations in such a way that politically-minded mem-
bers of the public can see what is going on and form their own opinion. This 
would be the best way of encouraging public interest in the Community and its 
policies. 
The European Social Democratic parties note that so far no overall 
concept has been developed which would clearly show that the Community's 
main aim is to bring about a decisive improvement in the social order. For 
the Social Democrats this improvement takes precedence over all economic, 
technical and other considerations. They therefore consider that the social 
objectives of the Community must be freed as quickly as possible from their 
present dependence on economic objectives and that social policy must in no 
way be a mere appendage of other more technical and economic forms of com-
mon policy. ' 
The resolution lists a number of aims in the social sphere and goes 
on to examine the political significance of future development of the Commu-
nity towards an economic and monetary union. 'Events of recent months have 
shown that the achievement of such a union is as difficult as it is necessary. 
Our parties wish to solve these difficulties by transferring powers to a com-
mon authority functioning under democratic control with a view to the ultimate 
formation of a federation of the United States of Europe. It follows that the 
Treaty of Rome must be amended to grant new powers to the Europea11 Parlia.-
ment and Commission before the decisive steps are taken towards economic 
and monetary union. 
The parties therefore regret that the Council of Ministers has not 
reached a conclusive decision on the basis of the Werner Report. The~com-
promise of 8 February 1971 on the economic and monetary union has given 
rise to fresh doubts as to whether the statements made on this subject by the 
Heads of State or Government at The Hague with all the consequences that they 
implied were intended seriously. ' The resolution goes on to indicate the 
special tasks for economic and monetary policy. 
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Referring to agricultural policy, 'the Social Democratic parties 
regret that in spite of the expenditure of public funds running into several 
thousand million units of account and the heavy taxes borne by consumers and 
the economy as a whole, no progress has been made towards solving the eco-
nomic and social problems of agriculture and the farming community within 
the framework of the common agricultural policy. They therefore welcome 
the fact that the Commission's latest proposals at long last make the improve-
ment of agricultural structures the starting-point for new agricultural policy 
measures. 
The Social Democrats are convinced that a common commercial 
policy without any form of protectionism in dealings with the developing coun-
tries would be the best proof that the Community is not only following its own 
interests but also conscious of its responsibility for the world economy. 
The Social Democratic parties see the enlargement of the Commu-
nity of the Six to include the applicant countries as the surest guarantee that 
the integration process already started will move towards its ultimate goal. 
They call upon the Social Democratic parties and trade unions in the applicant 
countries to accept this responsibility and invite them to take part in their 
work.' 
(Courrier Socialiste Europeen) 
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